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
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
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**STABILITY IN POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Milan Zimer

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

STABILITY IN POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Milan Zimer

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
27 May 1980

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SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, OUTLOOK

SUMMARY

In 1948, Communist Yugoslavia, a model Soviet client state, was expelled from the Soviet Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) and later became the first Communist country to successfully break from the Russian Socialist bloc of countries. For various reasons, it has been felt that at the appropriate time the Soviets would through political, economic or by any other means available, attempt to bring Yugoslavs back into the Socialist bloc. With the death of Joseph Broz Tito, supreme leader of the Yugoslavs, many felt that the Soviets, short of military force, would exert some kind of pressure to regain the one country that got away. Central to this thought is, what would the West do if the Soviets threatened the nonaligned territories and independence of Yugoslavia? Hence, a basic premise of this study is that Yugoslavia is a "trip-wire" for confrontation in Europe between the West and USSR because the West believes that Yugoslavia is geostrategically crucial to the balance of power in the Mediterranean and to NATO's continued alliance. A follow-on debatable question is, can Yugoslavia carry on the policies of independence, non-alignment, workers self-management, and open borders as forged by Tito since World War II? But more importantly, with the inherent nationality tensions, faltering economy, and the collective leadership system designed by Tito to succeed him and take over the government administration and Communist party; will, the new leadership be able to thwart internal exploitable weaknesses and external pressures to realign Yugoslavia with the Soviet bloc?

The factors affecting Yugoslav stability and her world position in the nonalign movement are addressed in this research paper.

Study Outline

The purpose of the study is to: (1) examine the historical roots and the basis of political, economic, ethnic, and cultural factors of stability in Yugoslavia, (2) inform, identify, and highlight the importance of Yugoslavia to the United States, NATO and the West, (3) analyze the potential path Yugoslavia may pursue after Tito, and (4) examine US national interests and perceived US stated policy toward Yugoslavia, and suggest policy options available to US decision makers.

The method used to obtain data included an exhaustive search of all the available literature, including newspapers and periodicals; personal interviews with Yugoslav Embassy Officials and US State Department personnel; talks with International Security Affairs Officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a visit by the author to Yugoslavia, principally to the American Embassy in Belgrade and the Zagreb Consulate.

Historical Synopsis of Yugoslavia

"Yugoslavia" which means the "land of the south Slavs" has been described as a nation of approximately twenty-two million people consisting of six individual republics and two autonomous provinces, six south slav groups of people and seventeen or more non-slav minorities, three major religions, two alphabets, three officially recognized south slav languages and fourteen other slavic and non-slavic languages, and Tito who is now gone from the scene. This variation of nationalities and ethnic differences is the basis for all the actions of its leaders, past and present, to accommodate, appease, and neutralize the national antagonisms and animosities. It is

important, therefore, to examine the historical roots of these animosities to understand Yugoslavia today.

One aspect of Yugoslavia that is most overlooked is the geographical topography of the country which has contributed to the unequal cultural development of its people. First (see figure 2-1), the long narrow Adriatic coastline that stretches the entire length of the country. Second, the rugged Dinaric mountains that stretch the length of the country and historically has been a barrier to east/west travel through the country. Finally, the great fertile low-lying plains to the north of Belgrade, which is the heart of the agriculture segment. These features combine to: (1) cultural fragmentation and isolation of the people created by the rugged terrain of the Dinaric mountains and which tend to split the people, and (2) deny access of the interior from outside her borders. The topography has led to three specific characteristics of the people. First, those who live on the coasts have a mediterranean flair. Second, those who settled and now live in the northern republics, primarily Croatia, Slovenia, northern Bosnia-Herzegovina and the province of Vojvodina, came under the influence of the Austro-Hungarian empire and Europe, thus became more developed culturally and economically. Moreover, influenced by the Roman empire, developed the use of the Latin alphabet. Finally, those who settled in the southern half of Yugoslavia, principally the republics of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and the province of Kosovo, came under the influence of the Ottoman empire and thus were slower to develop culturally and economically. These regions for many years were considered backward and uncultured. They also differ from the north in that the cyrillic alphabet is used, a difference that can be seen today. One nuance exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina

and lower Montenegro which is due to the Turkish influence and relative isolation brought about by terrain; that is, it is predominantly Muslem.

A characteristic of the development of Yugoslavia up to the twentieth century was a history of peoples in continual conflict and resistant to foreign domination. It is this struggle among the nationalities for independence which led to the animosities that exist today. Another idea that pervaded during the nineteenth century was Soviet expansionism and the idea of Pan-Slavism--the protector of all the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe. Finally, toward the latter part of the nineteenth century the Serbs, with the help from Russia, extricated themselves from the Turks and became independent. An idea flourished whereas Serbia thought in terms of unifying all the Slavs under Serbian rule. However, the strong Austro-Hungarian regime which ruled Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, and administratively controlled Bosnia-Herzegovina would have none of the Serbian ideas of unification.

The twentieth century began in a flurry of nationalistic thought throughout the Balkans and Europe. In the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the last vestiges of the Ottoman empire was removed from Macedonia by a combined force from Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece. During the division of the spoils of war, Serbia and Bulgaria fought, Serbia won, Bulgaria lost, and to this day tensions exist between the two. Basically, Bulgaria does not recognize a Macedonian race and considers them Bulgars, thus they would like to have those lands for themselves.

As is well documented historically, Germany became a power and supported the Austro-Hungarian government. Anti-Hapsburg feelings in Yugoslavia grew culminating in the murder of Archduke Ferdinand, the heir apparent to the monarchy, by a Bosnian radical. World War One followed shortly thereafter.

Serbia emerged from the war as the leader of the south slav peoples, and the scheme for a greater Serbia was nearly realized. Tremendous animosities existed between the nationalities of Yugoslavia, especially Croatia, which after the war found herself independent, only to be joined by her leaders in a south slav union with the Serbs. Serbia tried vigorously to rebuild the country after World War One. The main issues were economic disparity between the north and south of Yugoslavia, and the constant bickering between the Serbs and Croats over Serb hegemony and Croat independence. The illiteracy rate in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia were 65.4%, 67%, 80.5% and 83.3% respectively. In Croatia it was at 32.2% and Slovenia was 8.8%. The economic development of Yugoslavia paralleled the illiteracy rates above.

Politically, Yugoslavia had become a police state under the royal dictatorship of King Alexander and considerable social unrest existed in the entire country. The democratic constitutional government tried by the King had failed and he turned to a dictatorship which fomented political activists. The Serbs completely dominated all aspects of the government.

It was between the wars that the Communist party flourished, was made illegal, and finally pushed underground. Joseph Broz Tito, from Croatia came to the fore as the leading Yugoslav Communist Party official. Tito, who had spent time in Russia, was jailed in Yugoslavia between 1929 and 1934. It was here that his thoughts and ideas for the Communist party were formulated and solidified.

When the Second World War broke out Tito formed a resistance movement to the Germans called the Partisans, received support from the West, and eventually became the President of Yugoslavia in 1945. Yugoslavia was devastated by the war having lost an estimated 1,700,000 or eleven percent

of her people. The economy and country was in shambles. One of Tito's first acts was to establish a Soviet type system of rule for economic recovery. The methods used were nationalization, collectivization, and rapid industrialization. Moreover, he catered to the various nationalities by forming a Federation of States consisting of six republics and two autonomous provinces based upon nationality lines. Tito's overall plan to overcome the nationality problem was to equalize economic development between the territories. Communist socialism offered the promise of egalitarianism that Tito was looking for. But, in June 1948, Yugoslavia fell out of favor with the Soviets, and were expelled from the Cominform. The basis of the split was Tito's intensely strong feeling of independence. He had fought and won Yugoslavia's "freedom" and he was not about to subjugate his country to the Russians.

In summary, the historical development provides the background and basis for the formation of the state and traced the nationalistic animosities which permeated Yugoslav thought and actions. It set the stage for the further development of modern Yugoslavia under Tito's leadership.

Yugoslav Unity and Stability

After Tito's death, the question became what institution(s) would carry on the legacy of his unbending quest for Yugoslav unity and independence in the world political arena. Yugoslav unity was often challenged by internal nationalistic, ethnic, economic, and political problems. The three pressure points of Yugoslav society most likely will lead to instability are nationalism, political forces, and a faltering economy.

When Yugoslavs separated from the Soviets, she was under great stress. The Eastern bloc countries led by the Soviets imposed an economic embargo,

and Yugoslavia was forced to turn to the West for aid. It also caused her to look critically at the policies she had pursued for economic recovery after the war. Tito concluded that a new system was needed to supersede the central control mechanism of the Soviet type system. Tito, with his ideologists developed a system of workers self-management; or, the workers control of the resources and means of production within bounds set by the federation. However, to do this, she had to devolve the power of the federation to the republics and provinces. Power was transferred to the regions; however, with liberalization and decentralization came a diminution in the power of the party and government. As the republics and provinces gained in stature, the nationalistic tendencies long dormant were revived and tensions mounted. In 1971, there were 36% Serbs, 20% Croats, 8% Muslims, 7% Slovenes, 6% Albanians, 5% Macedonians, 2% Montenegrins and another 16% composed of sixteen minorities. Tito realized that his task to maintain Brotherhood and Unity for Yugoslavia rested with his success in accommodating and neutralizing the nationalistic tendencies which historically had split the country. Tito initiated plans to economically equalize the disparity between the northern and southern regions. The greatest difficulty had been the tendency for conflict between the Serbs and Croats. The late sixties and early seventies saw Croatian nationalism flourish as the decentralization and liberalization policies instituted by the government took effect. In 1971, a Croatian uprising by students in Zagreb University led to riots which Tito personally had to quell. In 1974, following the riots, the fourth constitution of the federation was promulgated. It sanctified another attempt to appease the ethnic groups by: (1) legalizing workers' self-management as the cornerstone of the society; and (2) instituted a process in the government and party whereby upon Tito's

death, a collective body of people would rule the government and party. The sole purpose of the latter was to prevent any one man from gaining power and ruling Yugoslavia. Basically, each republic and province would be represented in a collective body, which would rotate the position of President within the "Presidency" (Party and Government) yearly, in an eight-year cycle in a prescribed rotation. Following Tito's death this system was put into effect and appears to be working.

Economically, Yugoslavia went from a centrally controlled economy to a market socialism system. She has grown rapidly and had averaged, since the late sixties, a growth rate of $6\frac{1}{2}\%$ in her Social Product, a term analogous to Gross National Product. However, at present she is in trouble economically. Today Yugoslavia has a 30% inflation rate; a trade deficit in excess of \$6 billion; an unemployment rate of about 8%; a cost of living at 23%; a foreign debt of about \$13 billion; and, a balance of payments of about \$3.2 billion.

In conclusion, the economic condition, coupled with the new government system of a collective leadership, in the author's opinion, are destabilizing influences in the Yugoslav society.

Military: Factor for Stability

It has been said that the three keystones of the Yugoslav government is the Communist Party Central Committee (CC) Presidium, the government administrative element, the Presidency, and the Army. Make no mistake, the Party is the state preserving element, and the Army, because of its protectorate image and loyalty to the state (and Tito), is the right arm of the Party and Government. Historically, the "all Yugoslav" army of Tito won independence for Yugoslavia. The stress on all Yugoslav was intentional to draw attention to the fact that many consider the army capable of rising

above the nationality problem; thus, the key element for stability should civil strife occur.

Tito, when he was alive, always relied on the army to support him in times of trouble. For example, during the Croatian student riots, it was the threat of the army that helped Tito put down the riots.

The character and organization of the army was also affected by the liberalization and decentralization process. At the insistence of Croatia for more control of the military (late sixties) in her republic, and as a result of the Czechoslovakian invasion by Russia, the role of the army changed from one of a standard standing army, to one of "Total National Defense" or territorial defense in depth. Each republic formed territorial defense forces that would be used in conjunction with the regular army to defeat an invading enemy. In concept, it is a defense in depth consisting of approximately 259,000 regular army forces supported by up to 3,000,000 people, or 15% of the population. Organizationally, the territorial forces and the army are considered co-equals. But, the important thing is that the republics and provinces now have military forces.

There is no doubt in the author's mind, that any invader of Yugoslavia will be in for a long, hard, protracted war--this in itself is deterrence.

Nonalignment: Factor for Independence and Unity

The concept of independence and nonalignment are intrinsically tied together. Tito's staunch desire to remain independent thrust him into world prominence as he successfully confronted the Soviets and won. To the smaller nations, it was a lesson in how a small nation could resist a larger, more powerful nation. To many, nonalignment is the natural outgrowth of Tito's balancing act to obtain assistance from both East and West while carefully not antagonizing either.

Tito was the leader of the nonaligned movement and upon his death it does not appear as though anyone in Yugoslavia will have the stature to continue Tito's role in the movement. However, the new leaders will foster the independence Tito built and nonalignment will continue to be an element of unification in Yugoslavia. The reason is it has given Yugoslavia world stature beyond the reality of her size and Yugoslav pride.

Current US Policy for Yugoslavia

The policy of the United States towards Yugoslavia has not been consistent; thus, there is doubt in the minds of many just what the United States would do if the Soviets made overt actions to bring Yugoslavia back into the socialist camp of Eastern Europe.

In 1977, President Carter, then Governor of Georgia, stated in clear terms that he didn't think US security would be threatened if the Soviets used military force in Yugoslavia. However, just before Tito's death, President Carter reaffirmed our (US) determination to help sustain the independence of Yugoslavia. Finally, when the world leaders gathered in Belgrade, including President Brezhnev of the USSR, to pay homage to Tito at his funeral, President Carter was conspicuously absent. The question again was raised: What interest does the United States have in Yugoslavia?

Basically, there are two interests of the United States in Yugoslavia. First, the overwhelming interest in the geostrategic position of Yugoslavia as one of the most important areas in the Mediterranean and Europe. It is also of interest because: military control of the area influences the balance of power worldwide; it influences Western policy which is intrinsically tied to US political and economic support to various countries in the area; and, NATO's security to her southern flank would be threatened if Yugoslavia became a Russian client state.

In summary, the policy of the US towards Yugoslavia is to maintain her independence and neutrality to preserve the balance of power in Europe and the world. The big question is what policies should the United States follow to support the independence and neutrality?

CONCLUSION

Our national interests should be reflected in the goals we set for the area. It was concluded that, a secure, independent Yugoslavia will help to sustain the balance of power in the Mediterranean. By the same token, an economically healthy Yugoslavia will lessen the internal pressures and nationalistic tendencies toward destabilization. The overall goal of the United States should be to sustain and maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean region and prevent Soviet hegemony in the area. Consequently, our policies must be designed to continue the relative stability that now exists. Our policy actions should be concentrated in four areas; political, economic, military and humanitarian.

Politically: (Independence/Leader of Nonaligned)

1. Make clear to the Soviet Union or any other nation, the United States' strong support for Yugoslavia's independence and national unity and indicate that any attempts to undermine these will be looked upon as most serious. In conjunction with our European allies, demonstrate through action not rhetoric a will to keep Yugoslavia independent.

2. Encourage and support the Presidency as the legal governing body in Yugoslavia.

3. Encourage the European community to respect and establish diplomatic relations in cognizance of nonalignment and not as a member of a power bloc.

4. Establish "close" contact with government officials and civic leaders alike.

Economic: (Stability)

1. Continue to support Yugoslavia's most-favored-nation status, and access to low-interest loans, eligibility for Export-Import Bank Credits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation backing.

2. Take action to assist Yugoslavia to overcome her balance of payments, inflation, hard currency debt, and unemployment problems.

3. Educate and encourage American joint ventures, stressing the efficacy and possibility of new markets, albeit small, in Yugoslavia.

4. Encourage the European community to help investments and trading in Yugoslavia.

Military: (Strengthen and Diversify)

1. Within the bounds of the concept of territorial national defense, consider arms sales to Yugoslavia of types of weapons most effective for her concept of defense, to break and diversify her dependency on Soviet arms and logistic support.

2. Increase military contacts with the Yugoslav Army.

Humanitarian: (Concern for the People)

Further foster liberalization and democratization by emphasizing the principles of human rights as agreed to by the Yugoslavs at the United Nations and Helsinki.

OUTLOOK

Yugoslavia faces difficult political, economic, and nationality problems in the post-Tito era. There seems to be no doubt that the Russians will

exert insidious pressures politically and economically to play on the internal problems that exist in Yugoslavia today. Moreover, the Albanian and Macedonian issues, especially in the Kosovo province, could surface once again under a faltering economy since the economic disparity has grown over the past four decades. Without question, Bulgaria as a client state of the Soviets, will also exert irredentist pressures on Yugoslavia. Therefore, Yugoslavia can expect considerable tension to be generated by internal and external forces. Can the collective leadership of the Presidency of the government, and the Party handle these problems without a Tito?

For the first three or four years, the succession system designed by Tito will work, if for no other reason than, the inertia of wanting to make good Tito's policies and programs. In the short run, it will work, but in the long run it will give way to one man's thirst for power. As the economy problems worsen, and this is most likely based upon their track record to date, disillusionment will occur and probably a new leader will emerge to "lead" the country. Presently, it does not seem there is anyone on the horizon to meet this speculation. Incidentally, the basic issue for debate will be whether to decentralize more or re-centralize the economy. Until then, an informal power group will guide the country through the Party and Government mechanisms. The critical stage will occur as the new leader emerges and his position relative to the Soviets becomes clear. One thing is sure, Yugoslavia and her peoples cannot re-centralize or revert to a Soviet type system without civil strife or war. Market socialism, her open border policy, and a much better standard of living than the other Eastern bloc countries, will not allow a reversal willingly by the people to a central control system. Yugoslavian's love to travel and closing her borders would be interpreted by the people as losing their independence and

relative freedom. She has tasted the living of the West, she knows how the East lives, therefore ~~most~~ favor her present style to the other Eastern countries. An independent Yugoslavia, nonaligned, is best for the stability in Europe and NATO. Is the West willing to help Yugoslavia maintain her independence?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The history of the people of Yugoslavia has been a stormy adventurous story of continual conflict and resistance to foreign domination. As one writer put it, there are two distinguishing features of Yugoslav history: "national-religious conflict among the peoples occupying the land; and struggle for freedom from foreign domination."¹ These very same characteristics will once again be of significant importance upon the passing of one of the greatest statesmen of all time: the President of Yugoslavia, Joseph Broz Tito.

His death raises numerous crucial questions and dilemmas for the West. Can Titoism survive after Tito, or better put, can Yugoslavia, which has been held together by the charisma and strong will of Tito successfully weather the inevitable internal and external pressures to realign with the Soviet bloc and drop its policy of non-alignment? What will be the position of the West should civil strife ensue? More specifically, what is the present US policy toward Yugoslavia, and what are our interests? These and many more questions will be addressed in this analysis of the Yugoslavian reality and its prospects. The factors affecting Yugoslav stability, and her world position in the non-align movement will receive particular attention.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this paper is five-fold. First, to maintain this study as simple and understandable as possible. Second, to historically examine the roots and basis of the political, economic, ethnic, and cultural

factors affecting stability in Yugoslavia. Third, to inform, identify, and highlight the importance of Yugoslavia to the United States, NATO, and the West. Fourth, to present an analysis of the path Yugoslavia may pursue after Tito's passing. Finally, based upon perceived US national interests and stated policy towards Yugoslavia, to suggest possible policy options.

THE PROBLEM

I will shake my little finger and there will be
no more Tito. He will fall.

Joseph Stalin²

In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) and became the first Communist country to successfully break away from the Russian Socialist bloc of countries. Joseph Broz Tito was able to thwart Soviet political and economic pressures and coercion in this instance. He was able, through the strong support of the Yugoslav people, his character, and his personal skill as a statesman, to preserve his nation as an independent socialist state by pursuing a foreign policy of "Non-alignment" with regard to the USSR, or for that matter, any power bloc of nations. Yugoslavia undeniably has been the proverbial pain in the Russian side, but more importantly, Yugoslavia has historically represented the geographic kingpin which linked Russia political, economic, military, and communications lines with the Middle East, Africa, and ultimately with Europe, through the Adriatic and Mediterranean oceans. Since 1948, Yugoslavia has maintained its independence by maintaining a careful balance of economic ties with the West and Soviet bloc nations. For the above reasons, and past historical ties to the USSR, there are those in the West who believe that upon Tito's passing, the Soviets will apply strong economic and political pressures

to bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet fold.³ They also believe, using Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and more recently the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan as precedents, that under the guise of "invitation" during a period of internal strife, the Soviets could possibly use military force to accomplish their objectives. The problem then becomes: what support (political, economic, or military) would the West, and in particular the United States, be willing to render the Yugoslavs to preserve their independence should such events occur? It is the author's contention that Yugoslavia represents a "trip-wire" for confrontation with the USSR in Europe. Consider for the moment the following indicators of internal Yugoslav economic problems which will lead to instability if not checked: (1) the current inflation rate between 27 and 30 percent; (2) its trade deficit of \$6.3 billion; (3) its indebtedness to foreign lenders of about \$20 billion; and (4) the current unemployment rate of about 12 percent." Is US interest in Yugoslavia of significant proportion to prompt efforts to reverse or ameliorate these problems? The United States must first define its interests with regard to Yugoslavia, develop a comprehensive policy and proceed to implement it.

METHODOLOGY

The method used to obtain data was an exhaustive search of the available newspapers, literature, and including periodicals; personal interviews with Yugoslav Embassy officials and US State Department personnel; International Security Affairs officials within the Office, Secretary of Defense, and a visit by the author to Yugoslavia, principally Belgrade and Zagreb.

Having gathered the data, the study was structured as follows:

1. Chapter I: Introductory remarks outlining the purpose of the study and state the problem which will confront US decisionmakers in the future.

2. Chapter II: Examination of the historical basis for the nationalistic antagonisms which confront Yugoslav leadership, and which drives all political and economic actions of the Yugoslav government to resolve the nationalistic "tripwire." Further, to provide a better understanding of the factors today which affect Yugoslavia's internal as well as external stability.

3. Chapter III: Examination of the factors most likely to cause conflict and which will contribute to Yugoslavia's problem of maintaining unity and stability. The factors examined will be in the realm of nationalistic ethnic, political, and economic areas.

4. Chapter IV: An examination of the Yugoslav military and its contributions to the problem of unity and stability of the state.

5. Chapter V: Examines the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment and its contribution to Yugoslav independence and unity.

6. Chapter VI: An examination of the espoused American policy towards Yugoslavia, develop the importance of this country to NATO and Europe, and suggest where US interests lie by tracing the stated policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia.

7. Chapter VII: This chapter contains the conclusion and policy recommendations.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hoffman, George W., and Neal, Fred. Yugoslavia and the New Communism. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. P. 46.

2. Talbot, Strobe. trans., ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1970. P. 600.

3. Since the critical illness and amputation of Tito's leg, his deteriorating condition, the press has been flodded with speculation from all quarters. For example, see: (1) "What Comes After Tito," Newsweek, January 28, 1980; (2) "A Tough Old Bird Recovers," Time, February 4, 1980; (3) "Tito's Health: A New Worry," Time, January 28, 1980; (4) "Yugoslavia After Tito: The Dangers Ahead," US News and World Report, February 25, 1980; and other reports during the past six months.

4. Figures were derived from: (1) Djilas, Milovan. "Yugoslavia After Tito." New York Times, January 24, 1980; and Kronholz, June. "Yugoslavia Stresses Trade with the West to keep Independence," The Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1980.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF YUGOSLAVIA

"Yugoslavia" means "land of the south slavs," the ethnic group that settled the area in about the sixth and seventh centuries. The territory now comprising the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia historically has been a natural gateway or landbridge used by dominant powers for further territorial expansion in that part of the world. Its importance is its geostrategic position between Eastern Europe and NATO between the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas, and between the Mideast and Africa. The next discussion examines the physical country, its peoples, and a historical trace of how Yugoslavia became a Federation ruled by the Communist regime of Marshall Tito.

GEOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY¹

Yugoslavia can be geographically summarized as follows (See Figure 2-1):

1. Area and People. Yugoslavia covers an area of about 99,000 square miles, approximately two-thirds the size of California. Its population is estimated at about 22 million people.²
2. Topography. The territory of Yugoslavia can be divided into three distinct regions. First, the long narrow Adriatic coastline which stretches the entire length of the country from the Northwest to Albania. The most striking feature of the coast is the fast rising mountain range which makes it difficult to penetrate the interior from the coastal area. For this reason, the area associated with the coast has long had a Mediterranean or Italian flavor. Second, the rugged Dinaric mountains stretch the entire length of Yugoslavia and have historically been a barrier to east/west travel. Third, the great fertile low-lying plains to the north

of Belgrade, the capital. This area is the richest and most fertile agricultural land in the Balkans.

3. Borders. Yugoslavia is bounded by seven countries, three of which belong to the Warsaw Pact. Starting in the northwest and proceeding clockwise they are: Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. Including the Adriatic coastline, Yugoslavia has 3,000 miles of border of which 1,800 constitutes a land boundary, and about 1,300 miles border on the Communist countries of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. All of which at one time or another have had border disputes with Belgrade.

4. Historical Lines of Communications. With such a large border there are many avenues of approach; historically, however, there have been four important entrances. First, is the northwest, a pass begins at the Eastern Alps and proceeds to Ljubljana, the capital of the Croatian Republic. The second approach departs from the rivers and valleys north of Belgrade that converge on the capital (Drava, Danube, and Tisa). These approaches provide access from Hungary and Romania. The third approach is from the south and once again follows the natural rivers and valleys which wind through the mountains. These are the Vardar River from Greece and the Nisava River from Bulgaria which connects with the Morava River leading to Belgrade. The fourth access to Yugoslavia is provided by the many excellent seaports on the Adriatic coveted by the Soviets. (Rijeka, Split, and Sibenik, Ploce, and Tivat are the largest.) More will be said about this later in the study. In essence, the sea approaches provide Yugoslavia the waterbridge with the Mediterranean for trade with the West and Mideast. It is beyond the scope of this study to delve further into the geographical features and lines of communications. But, two factors are worthy of mention.

They are: (1) the cultural fragmentation and isolation of the people created by the rugged features of the Dinaric mountains, and (2) the accessibility of the interior from outside the borders.³ These two factors--by no means the only ones--helped shape the conduct of the peoples culturally, economically, and militarily as they struggled for freedom from foreign domination. To illustrate the fragmentation factor, consider the following facts. (See figures 2-2, and 2-3 for a summary of the republics/provinces and ethnic groups.)

1. Yugoslavia consists of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro), and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina).

2. There are six South Slav (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Muslims) groups and seventeen or more non-Slav minorities.

3. There are three major religions: Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim.

4. There are two alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin.

5. Three South Slav languages are officially recognized: Serbo-Croatian (Cyrillic), Slovenian (Latin), and Macedonian (Cyrillic). However, there are also fourteen other Slavic or non-Slavic languages spoken. About three-fourths of the people speak Serbo-Croatian. One needs only to ponder the above facts to realize the severity of the nationality question for the Yugoslav leadership. How was it handled? Will it be a problem in the future? The next section examines the formation of the Federation from about the beginning of the twentieth century.



Table 2-2
Population by Republic and Province
(in thousands)

<u>Republic/Province</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>% Increase</u>	<u>% Population</u>
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,278	3,743	14	18
Croatia	4,160	4,423	6	2.2
Macedonia	1,406	1,647	17	8.0
Montenegro	472	530	12	3
Slovena	1,591	1,725	8	8
Serbia	7,642	8,437	10	41
oSerbia Proper	4,823	5,242	9	26
oVojvodina	1,855	1,950	5	9
oKosovo	964	1,245	29	6
Yugoslavia	18,549	20,505	11	100.0

Source: "Yugoslavia's Population After Recent Census," Radio Free Europe Research (Yugoslavia), November 8, 1971, Report No. 1187

Table 2-3

Yugoslavia by Ethnic Group*

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>% Population</u>
Croats	4,526,782	20
Macedonians	1,194,784	5
Montenegrins	508,843	2
Moslems	1,729,932	8
Serbs	8,143,246	36
Slovene	1,678,032	7
Albanian	1,309,523	6
		
		84%
Hungarian	477,374	
Turk	127,920	
Slovak	83,656	
Gypsies	78,485	
Bulgarians	58,627	
Romanians	58,570	
Ruthenians	24,640	
Czecks	21,990	
Wallachians	21,791	
Ukranians	13,972	
Germans	12,785	
Russians	7,427	
Jews	4,811	
Poles	3,033	
Greeks	1,564	
Austrians	852	
Other	21,722	
		
		16%

*Source: Stankovic, Slobodan. "National Minorities in Yugoslavia."
Radio Free Europe Research (Yugoslavia), February 21, 1974,
Report No. 200.

HISTORICAL ROAD TO FEDERATION

Following World War II, on November 29, 1945, the newly elected Constituent Assembly carried out as its first act dissolved the Royal Monarchy of King Peter and proclaimed the formation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Some three short years later on June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the newly formed Communist Information Bureau or Cominform (1947) the proclaimed leader of the Communist world of the Soviets. Its name did not reflect the true purpose of the organization which was to combat, in the Soviet's venacular the imperialism of the United States.⁴ Ironically, from June 1947 to February 1948, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were seized by Communists and joined the Communist countries of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Poland, within the Soviet sphere of Communist influence.

This section will outline the salient historical events which led to the above events. For purposes of this study, the author has chosen to divide the time from about the sixth century AD to 1948, focusing principally on the last four decades. These periods are:

1. Pre-1900: Conflict, Domination and Conscious Nationalistic Awakening.
2. 1900-1918: Pan-Serbianism.
3. 1918 to 1941: Between the wars.
4. 1941 to 1945: World War II.
5. 1945 to 1948: Soviet Yugoslav dispute.

For a clearer understanding of the rise of nationalism, an abbreviated trace of Yugoslavia's religious, nationalist, and foreign domination experience is important. Therefore, some illustrative events will be discussed briefly

to aid in charting the rise of nationalist thought. The primary nationalistic conflict in Yugoslavia during the Second World War between the Serbs and Croats, and their mutual hatred that had immersed the nation in civil war, will also be discussed.

PRE-1900: CONFLICT, DOMINATION, AND CONSCIOUS NATIONALISTIC AWAKENING

The first element of conflict between the Serbs and Croats were religious in nature. Around the sixth and seventh century, a group of ethnically similar people migrated from an area beyond the Carpathian mountains into what is now Yugoslavia. At the same time, other Slavs migrated to an area near Kiev and started the Russian culture.

The tribes that traveled south--the present Serbs and Montenegrins--came under the then controlling Byzantines (Greek), accepted Christianity and became the Orthodox Catholics. Those who traveled north and westward, probably arriving first--the modern Croats and Slovenes--fell under the influence of the Germanic and Hungarian ethos and became Roman Catholics.⁵ In 1054 a schism developed between Rome, the center of Catholicism, and Constantinople, the center for the Eastern Orthodox Church; conflict on religious grounds resulted between the Serbs and Croats.⁶ Then in the twelfth century, Croatia lost her independence to Hungary during an insurrection and, consequently, the next eight-hundred years essentially came under the rule of Hungary.⁷ Croatia never has ceased trying to regain her independence and recognition as an autonomous entity.

Turning to the Serbs, in the fifteenth century the Turks continued to pursue a policy of territorial expansion, and invaded Serbia, severely defeating that people. The Turks ruled for the next three-hundred and fifty years, exerting a profound impact on the South Slav culture. This is also the period

when the Muslim faith flourished and many Slavs were converted to this religion in the Montenegrain and Bosnian regions. Subsequently, in the eighteenth century a new factor began to shape Serbian destiny--Russian expansionism.

During the eighteenth century Russia promulgated the idea of Pan-Slavism "to play the role of guide and protector of all the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe."⁸ It was also during this period that the Russian historic mission of gaining control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was formulated. In time of war this would prevent the Russian fleet from becoming bottled up; and provide access to the Mediterranean and control of Constantinople; and, following Turkey's eradication from Europe, Russia would inherit the Balkans' objectives still paramount today.⁹ At the time, the Serbs saw Russia as an ally to help oust the Turks from their land. Russo-Turk wars ensued. In the first war (1823-1829) in which Russia was victorious, a treaty of Constantinople was signed which gave Serbia her autonomy but as a Russian protectorate.¹⁰ Thus, the historical basis for Russian involvement in the Balkans was established. Resentment against Ottoman rule in other regions soon emerged and erupted into violence. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria began fighting the Turks in 1876. Russia, in response to reported atrocities against the peoples of the Balkan and, in particular, the Orthodox Christians, renewed her long-standing policy of dominating the Balkans by entering the conflict known as the second Russo-Turkish War (1817-78). Two years later (1878), the Treaty of San Stephano between the Russians and the Turks unquestionably terminated the altercation in favor of Russia. But, the great powers of the day, Austria and Great Britain intervened, objecting to the large amounts of conquered lands gained by Russia. Subsequently, in the revised Treaty of Berlin (1878),

the Tsar conceded. In one of the revisions, the Tsar agreed to return much of the land to the Turks, and Bosnia-Herzegovena was placed under Austro-Hungarian control.¹¹ Interestingly, Slovenia and Dalmatia had already come under Austrian control. The pattern was set: Serbia was independent but under Soviet protection; Croatia-Slovenia was controlled by Hungary; and, Bosnia-Herzegovena, Dalmatia, and the lands of present Slovenia were ruled by Austria. In summary, these turbulent years were characterized by the use of nationalism in the Balkans, a striving for Soviet hegemony in the Balkans (Pan-Slavism), and perpetual conflict arising from religious and foreign domination factors. Before we proceed with the chaotic twentieth century, one event needs exposure.

Almost unnoticed to the world, except to Franjo Broz, a Croat, and his wife Marija, a Slovene, was born their seventh child on May 7, 1892-- Joseph Broz.¹² The question often asked is how did he get the name Tito? Tito's biographer explained that in 1937, as a member of the Communist party, following the general rule, avoiding the use of one's name for security reasons, Joseph took a name quite common in that part of the world--Tito.¹³ A romantic explanation was given by a biographer of Tito, Sir Fitzroy Maclean, who during the Second World War parachuted into Yugoslavia to examine Tito's partisan guerrillas operations. Maclean explained that when he, as a leader of the Partisans, wished to give orders, he would shout in Serbo-Croatian while pointing his finger, "Ti To, Ti To, Ti To," which means you do this, you do that, etc.¹⁴ In any case, the name Tito stuck from the many aliases he used while operating underground as a Communist official.'

1900-1918: PAN-SERBIANISM

In the Balkans, the twentieth century began just as the nineteenth century had ended--in conflict. However, a latent historical ambition of the Serbian

empire to extend its control over the peoples considered similar in race and culture also emerged. This "Greater Serbian" scheme envisioned unifying the Turkish provinces of Boservia and Herzegovernia under Austrian administration, and the southern provinces of Croatia and Slovenia under the control of Austria.¹⁵ Serbia, sandwiched between Austria-Hungary in the north and the Turks and the Ottoman influence in the south, attempted to convince the other south Slav nations to join her in removing the Turks from the south and standing fast against the Austrian-Hungarian pressures in the north.¹⁶ The intent was to build a united south Slav nation under Servian jurisdiction, an idea that Austria feared and combated by generating and fostering the already extant antagonisms between the Croats and Serbs. This policy became deep-rooted in Serb-Croatian animosities in the coming decades and exists even today. In 1878 following the second Russo-Turkish war, at the Berlin Congress, the two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovernia had been placed under Austrian administrative control. In 1908, what came to be known as the Bosnian Crises, Austria annexed the two provinces in direct violation of the Berlin Congress. Austria wanted to strengthen her position in the Balkans and the Adriatic, thus altering the cause of the Serb south Slav movement. The Serbs were infuriated because of Austrian ambitions concerning these two territories. Serbia appealed to Russia for help. Emerging Germany backed Austria and tensions mounted. However, Serbia was as yet too weak to pose a real threat and antagonisms simmered.¹⁷ The Bosnian crisis was nonetheless one of the primary causes of World War I since it created intense hostility among these nations, exacerbating animosities between the Serbs and Austria, and fostered Serbian dependence upon Russia for support.¹⁸ Still greater ill feeling was sown between Serbia and Austria through the Balkan wars of 1912

and 1913. Reported atrocities by the Turks on the Slav province of Macedonia drew support from Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece. These nations, in turn, were supported by Russia. The Balkan alliance in less than two months freed Macedonia from the Turks. In the division of the spoils, Serbia was promised a portion of Macedonia and Albania. However, once again, Austria intervened and with the support of Germany and Great Britain established Albania as independent. To the Serbs, this was the last straw. In 1913, Serbia also fought with Bulgaria over the spoils forcing Bulgaria to cede the northern and central parts of Macedonia.¹⁹ Bulgaria has never forgotten this conflict with Serbia and animosity still exists today.

The Serbs were successful in fostering anti-Habsburg feelings and the animosity between the South Slavs and the Dual Monarchy of Austro-Hungary reached a peak in 1914. As is documented by history, Archduke Ferdinand, the heir apparent, was murdered by a Bosnian student, Gavrilo Princip, on June 28, 1914.²⁰ The Austrian reaction was immediate. On July 23, 1914 Austria presented Serbia with an ultimatum. However, on July 25, within the forty-eight hour time limit, and after mobilizing her troops, Serbia rejected the ultimatum. Moreover, Russia warned Austria that she would not stand idly by and see Serbia humiliated. The first World War followed shortly thereafter with the Triple Entente of Russia, France, and Britain on one side, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy who eventually abandoned the alliance, on the other. As is well known, the United States entered the war in February 1917 in response to the German sinking of American passenger ships.²¹ Bulgaria, with a promise from Austria and Germany that she would acquire possession of Serbian Macedonia, took up arms against Serbia. The war raged on.

As the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire came (1915) and just prior to the November 11, 1918 Armistice, the Yugoslav nation was born. As Bladiuir Dedijs, Tito's biographer relates in Zayeb:

On October 29, 1918, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, sitting in the Croatian assembly proclaimed itself the new organ of the state administration . . . there- 22
by securing all ties with the Habsburg monarchy.

At the same time the Council was proclaiming the creation the new state of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, on November 24, the same Council claimed unification with the Kingdom of the Serbs and Montenegius. Hence a new Kingdom, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918 by Price Alexander acting as regent for King Peter of Serbia.²³ Just one week earlier the Montenegrins had deposed King Nichola and voted to join Serbia. However, it would not be until October 1929, that the Kingdom would finally be known as "Yugoslavia."²⁴

In the wars between 1912 (Balkan wars) and World War I ending in 1918, the Slavs lost a total population of about 1.9 million people out of an approximate 11 to 13 million population base. The Serbs lost about 43% or 811,000 people, a toll much larger than the other provinces.²⁵ The cost of war in people to the Yugoslavs was great, not to mention the physical destruction to the country which was to have economic consequences in the twenties and thirties.

1918-1941: BETWEEN THE WARS

The new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had problems almost from the outset. The foremost cause of these problems was Nationalism. From the beginning of the formation of Yugoslavia, antagonism had existed between the Serbs and Croats. Just prior to the WWI Armistice, Croatia

seceded from the Hapsburg empire and gained autonomy; however, drawn by the desire for stabilization, one month later they agreed to join Serbia.²⁶ Many Croats did not wish to be a part of Serbia. As Dedijer recalls, "the new state was created without reference to the people who were never asked what kind of state it should be, how relationships among different nationalities should be settled, whether it should be a republic or a kingdom, or what social organization should be adopted."²⁷ Unrest was evident in Croatia.

Before proceeding further, it is relevant to examine the components of the new state and existing nationalistic differences: First, the state had two independent kingdoms; Serbia and Montenegro; Second, was composed of lands previously under Austrian rule; Slovenia, and Dalmatia; Third, it also had an area which was under Hungarian rule--Croatia; Fourth, it also contained parts of Hungarian land--Vojvodina; Fifth, the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were Austro-Hungarian; Sixth, the disputed Macedonia lands from the Balkan Wars; and the Albanian influence prevalent in the Kosmo, Metohija and Nori Pazar regions adjacent to Albania of which 500,000 people ended up in Serbia. This new state of approximately 12 million people had 5.6 million Orthodox, 4.7 million Catholics, 1.3 million Moslems, and 2 million non-Yugoslavs (Germans, Magyars, Albanians, Romanians, and others).²⁸ Seven countries bordered on the new state, several of which had previous border disputes; namely, Bulgaria, Italy and Albania. It is thus not difficult to understand the problems internally and externally facing Yugoslavia in the post-war rebuilding phase.

Reconstruction after the war were also complicated by poor economic conditions. After the war the emphasis was on industrialization as well as rebuilding. But, very little was done to help the most predominant portion of the population--peasants. To use a popular term, education, roads and

transportation to market, farm implements and credits, were all "deferred." Peasant unrest was prevalent throughout Yugoslavia and the people were ripe for revolution. It was only through the authoritarian, police state of King Alexander which subsequently developed, that things were kept under relative control. However, it is noteworthy that the ruling middle class did well.²⁹

Meanwhile, the post-war economy was improving, but regional disparity was prevalent between the northern and southern provinces and particularly in the backward south. To illustrate stumbling blocks to cultural development, the illiteracy rate according to the 1921 census for various provinces was as follows: Serbia 65.4%, Montenegro 67%, Bosnia-Herzegovina 80.5%, Macedonia 83.8%; whereas the northern provinces had, Croatia 32.2%, Slovenia 8.8%, and Vojvodina at 23.3%³⁰--a vast difference between the north and the south which continues to be an issue in Yugoslavia some sixty years later. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that: (1) agriculture made a rapid recovery, and (2) the trade balance was feasible. Yet the political and economic uncertainty and the resulting unrest continued.

In 1919, general elections were held to elect 419 deputies to the Constituent Assembly. Four parties emerged: (1) the Democratic party which grew out of pre-1914 Serbian parties received 19.9% of the vote, (2) the People's Radical Party, an exclusively Serbian party of long tradition 17%, (3) the Croatian Peasant Party which was purely Croatian and anti-Serb gained 14.3%, and (4) the Communist Party received 12.4% of the vote, which was three times as many votes as there were party members, and reflected a protest vote against the regime.³¹ The primary duty for the Assembly was to draw up a new constitution. However, in the meantime,

the Communists were dealt a severe blow when as one writer put it,³²
"the Democratic/Radical coalition government issued a decree . . .
ordering, until the passing of the constitution, the dissolution of
the Communist organization, including trade unions, and banning all
propaganda advocating dictatorship, revolution or any kind of violence."
The Serbian coalition was prepared to go to any lengths to get its
"Centralist Constitution" adopted in parliament. Communist successes at
the poles frightened the Serb politicians. Subsequently on June 28,
1921, the Vidrodan Constitution was proclaimed by King Peter. The
constitution was highly centralized and (1) denied regional autonomy,
(2) denied regional self-government, and (3) gave the Serbs the leading
positions in government.³³ The Communist Party, now legal after the
enactment of the constitution, became violent and resorted to terrorist
activity during the summer of 1921. By 1922, the government had taken
and had put the Communist Party out of business, once again making it
illegal. It was during this period and subsequently, that Tito who had
been in Russia and returned to Yugoslavia to work in the Communist under-
ground as a Party official.

In addition, the constitution received no support from the Croatian
Peasant Party under Stepan Radic. The Croatians felt that the Serbs were
dominating the country. The issues were Croatian autonomy and Croatian
claims to Bosnia. In effect, the constitution, ramrodded through by the
Serbian coalition, had legitimized Serb hegemony. Consider the following
facts: from December 1918 to January 1929 (121 months), Serbs held: (1)
Office of Prime Minister for 117 months, (2) Minister of Army/Navy for 121
months, (3) Minister of Interior for 111 months, (4) Minister of Foreign
Affairs 100 months, and (5) Minister of Finance, Education and Justice,

118, 110, and 105 months respectively. Also during the same period the government had 24 different cabinets, headed by seven different Prime Ministers. In the cabinet there were 127 various ministers.³⁴ In summary, the king, his court, the administration, the army, and the police were predominantly Serbian and anti-Croatian.

In 1928 the animosity in the Yugoslav parliament came to a head. In June of 1928 during a debate on the parliament floor, a radical shot and killed two members, wounded three others. One of those killed was Stepan Radic, the Croatian Peasant Party leader which only added to the already considerable tension. The Croatians demanded autonomy during the following months. King Alexander responded on January 6, 1929 by suspending the Constitution and declaring a royal dictatorship. He dissolved parliament and the constitution, appointed a new government, and enacted two laws; the law of royal power and supreme administration of the state, and a law which dissolved all parties based on regional ethnic, or religious grounds. He followed this action by changing the name of the nation to "Yugoslavia" (October 1929).³⁵ Yugoslavia was now a police state under Serbian domination. In King Alexander's words, "my social duty is to preserve by every means within my power the unity of the nation and the state."³⁶ Ironically, King Alexander had actually exacerbated disunity and did nothing to correct the social ills and conditions in the state. By 1931 Yugoslav, as well as World economic conditions deteriorated into world recession. The peasants were particularly hard hit: In 1931-32 it was estimated that taxes for the peasant population amounted to fifty percent of their income.³⁷ King Alexander's reign thus witnessed the failure of a democratic constitutional government and the institution of a dictatorship which sowed the seeds of a revolution. His reign was to come to an abrupt end in 1934 when he was assassinated before being able to correct the failed dictatorship.

Fomented by the happenings in Yugoslavia, an ultra-nationalistic organization, the Croatian Ustashe was formed. This illegal organization was headed by the Ante Pavelic living mostly in Italy and was supported by Italy's Benito Mussolini.³⁸ They established contacts with elements desirous of gaining back territories lost during the earlier wars and wishing for revenge against the Yugoslavs. These elements were the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Italian terrorists. Subsequently, the Croatian Ustache with the help of Bulgarian terrorists and the governments of Italy and Hungary, plotted King Alexander's demise. On October 9, 1934, at a planned state visit to France, King Alexander was murdered as he stepped from his plane in Marseilles.³⁹ Serbo-Croatian animosity was greatly exacerbated by this act.

At the time of Alexander's assassination, his son Peter was only eleven years old. However, the King had provided for his succession by stipulating in his will the formation of a three-man regency to hold power until Peter reached age (18). King Alexander had appointed a cousin, Prince Paul as regent. A Serb physician and a Croatian government official were also on the three-man regency.⁴⁰ The latter two obviously chosen to satisfy Serb-Croatian nationalistic animosities. Prince Paul continued the dictatorship and catered to the Italian and German governments while drawing closer to the rising Nazis.⁴¹

Note that the Yugoslav-Russian relationship was unique. Although Russia regarded herself as the protector of both the Serb and Montenagues, Yugoslavia did not establish diplomatic or economic relations with her until late 1939. But all the while, Tito and the Communist Party were trained, receiving assistance, and instruction from Stalin and the Russian Comintern.

In the later part of the thirties the German menace once again began to surface. Internal discord in Yugoslavia flourished. Germany began applying pressure on Yugoslavia. Then on March 25, 1941, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, covered by Germany, signed the Axis Tripartite Pact (Germany, Japan and Italy) much to the displeasure of the Yugoslav people and Army. Truly characteristic of the volatility of the Yugoslavs a coup occurred. The Yugoslav Army backed by the Serbian people overthrew the government, exiled Prince Paul and installed Peter II on the throne. This infuriated Hitler. Several days later, on 6 April 1941, Germany invaded Yugoslavia from Romania. It is said that Hitler had no long range plans for attacking Yugoslavia, but the coup terribly upset him. In fact he blamed Yugoslavia (Serbs) for delaying his invasion of Russia six weeks (Operation Barbarossa). He personally decided to punish Serbia destroy the state of Yugoslavia.⁴² Within a matter of weeks the whole fabric of the Yugoslav state disintegrated. It was divided among eight different occupying authorities and fragmented into ten regions. The Yugoslav Royal Army was humiliated.⁴³ World War II proved to be crucial. It was the springboard for the Communist movement and for Tito.

However, before going into the second World War period, it is important to trace Tito and the Yugoslav Communist part movement. During the first World War when the Hapsburg empire was crumbling and fighting against Serbia, it was known that South Slav fratricide was occurring. The Austrians enlisted South Slavs from Croatia and Slovenia against their brethren in Serbia, Bosnia, etc. It was here that Tito as a part of the Austro-Hungarian regiment fought against the Russians although he had no love for the Hapsburg regime which ruled Croatia at that time. He was twenty-two years old at the time. In 1915 on Eastern morning, Tito was wounded and

nearly killed by the Russians--he became a prisoner of war in Rumania. He remained in Russia for five years, returning to Yugoslavia in 1920.⁴⁴ While a prisoner in Russia, two events occurred which were to shape Tito's thinking in later years. First the Third International was formed. It was later to be known as the Comintern or Communist International. Second, in April 1919 a new party emerged, the Communist party then known as the "Socialist Workers Party of Yugoslavia."⁴⁵ This new party joined the Comintern in 1919. At a Second Workers Congress in Vuchomar in 1920 it declared, "A program calling for a Yugoslav Soviet Republic, with its own peoples Army, as well as the expropriation and socialization of industry and commerce."⁴⁶ As was described earlier, it was this party that was made illegal and practically put out of business. Tito, inspired by his stay in Russia, joined the Communist party through a trade union, becoming a Communist party activist. In 1927 he was arrested while working as secretary of the Metal Workers Union in Zagreb and again was jailed for five years.⁴⁷ Ironically, the judge who sentenced him was the father of one of the leading Croatian figures today--Vladimir Bakaric a member of the Presidency and Communist Politburo of Yugoslavia. Tito spent five years in prison. He considered this period as his educational phase in Communist learning. In prison he established good contacts with other Communist activists. In 1935 after getting out of prison he returned to Russia for one year--a Communist Yugoslav revolutionary known as "Walter" to Stalin. While in Moscow, Tito worked as the "Balkan Secretariat and rapporteur for Yugoslavia."⁴⁸ During this period he studied economics, philosophy, and military art, being greatly impressed by Clausewitz. In 1936 Tito left Moscow permanently for Yugoslavia. From 1936 until the Second World War he carefully acquired leadership of the

Communist party of Yugoslavia and shaped the Party's future role. As the Second World War began in Yugoslavia, Tito seized upon the situation and skillfully maneuvered into immortal history.

1941-1945: SECOND WORLD WAR

Just as the First World War created Yugoslavia, the Second World War destroyed her and germinated a new Communist Yugoslavia. As indicated earlier, within weeks after the German bombardment, Yugoslavia ceased to exist. Germany set up two puppet states: one in Croatia under the Ustashe leader Dr. Auton Parlic, and the second a Serbian state under the control of the quissling General Milan Nedich. In addition, Italy, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria received their revenge, gaining back the land lost in earlier wars. However, to many the most critical factor that led to Tito's success was the fact that King Peter fled the country and set up a government in exile in London, while Tito mobilized the people as "partisans" for brotherhood and unit to free Yugoslavia of the Germans and the other invaders. But this was not the only enemy of Tito. As one writer put it:

At the same time the divided Yugoslavia engaged in internal conflicts which amounted to civil wars, there were two of these--one growing out of the traditional conflict between the Serbs and Croats, which now degenerated into an orgy of torture, murder and massacre; the other involving mainly the pro-Serbian Cetnek organization and the Communist-led Partisan movement.⁴⁹

Two factions had developed; the Cetneks led by Colonel, later General Draza Mihailovich, a Yugoslav Army officer who staunchly supported the Serb Royal Government; and, the Partisans led by Joseph Broz.⁵⁰ It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the complete and detailed ramifications of these two movements. But their philosophy is worth noting. The Cetniks, loyal to the King, were more passive and feared Serb extermination as a

result of German reprisals⁵¹ and Ustashe massacres. Mihailovich and his Cetniks planned to prepare for the moment when the Allies would free the Serbs. Thus it was a movement of "caution" and "restraint" not wanting any more hardship on the people than was necessary. On the other hand, the Partisans were ruthless. They ignored German reprisals and were willing to suffer any hardships to extricate the invaders from Yugoslavia. It was this basic philosophy which attracted all nationalities in Yugoslavia to the Partisan movement to fight for freedom. For example, in 1941 there were 80,000 in the guerrilla movement, its army grew to 200,000 in 1942, 300,000 in 1943, and by 1944 there were 800,000 strong. The Partisan's willingness to suffer is reflected in the following facts. The partisan forces had 350,000 killed, 400,000 wounded, and of the 12,000 Yugoslav Communists in the Partisan movement at the beginning, only 3,000 survived the war.⁵²

During the war Tito masterminded a political structure for the Partisan movement. In 1942, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia was created. It was known by ANVOJ, the initials of the Serbo-Croatian name. The ANVOJ met again in 1943 and established a National Liberation Committee as a provincial government. Tito was named president of the committee. The ANVOJ was the precursor of the Communist Federal People's Republic established in 1945.⁵³ As the war wound down it was evident that the Partisans Peoples Liberation Movement had the majority of the popular support. General Mihailovich and his Cetniks now smaller in number, continued to cling to the hope that the allies would liberate the Serbs and return the king to the throne. At Yalta, Tito made a concession to the Western powers by forming a Provisional assembly consisting of members of the ANVOJ and representatives from six non-Communist parties.

Also, a three-man regency was formed to represent the King until the course of Yugoslavia could be determined by elections. Tito was in the driver's seat, he had set up his Anti-Fascist Council under the control of the Communist party administrative apparatus and had created an armed force and its security apparatus. In addition, Tito who was both Premier and Minister of Defense also controlled twenty-three of twenty-eight ministers in the provisional government. Elections were held in late October 1945 and as expected the new Constituent Assembly was dominated by Tito and his apparatus. In November, the newly elected Assembly met and denounced the King, adopted a new constitution and legitimized the Communist Republic of Yugoslavia.⁵⁴ Tito had masterfully exploited the war, had defeated all comers and was now the President of Yugoslavia faced again with the rebuilding and reconstruction.

As for the King, he never returned to Yugoslavia and lived out his life in Europe. General Mihailovich and some of his Cetniks were captured by Tito backers. In a suspect trial the General was convicted of treason against the people and shot. Thus began Tito's purges,⁵⁵ typical of all Communist regimes, and the beginnings of a Soviet style government.

1945-1948: SOVIET YUGOSLAV DISPUTE

In the post-war period, Tito and his regime were faced with the task of rebuilding the country. One author, Dennison Rusinow, scoped the magnitude of the problem when he wrote:⁵⁶

Yugoslavia had suffered 1,700,000 dead in the triple holocaust of 1941-45, 11 percent of the total pre-war population . . . the average age of the fallen was 22 years and they included an estimated 90,000 skilled workers and 40,000 intellectuals. Some 822,000 buildings had been destroyed, 3.5 million people were homeless, and an estimated 35 percent

of pre-war industry, 289,000 peasant homesteads, between 50 and 70 percent of various categories of livestock and 80 percent of ploughs and harvesting equipment. . . . Over 50 percent of railway trackage, 77 percent of locomotives. . . .

The first priority was to feed the people and restore the economy.

Between 1945 and 1947 Yugoslavia received 14 percent of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) entire budget or \$425,000,000. Of this \$136,338,500 was spent for food, \$37, 188,000 for agricultural rehabilitation. The UNRRA provided 30,000 head of livestock, 3,500 tractors, and nearly 700,000 tons of bread-grains.⁵⁷ Without the UNRRA assistance there would have been mass starvation in Yugoslavia. To further illustrate, the UNRRA supplied between three and five million Yugoslavs with food.

Economic recovery of Yugoslavia was also pursued, mainly through collectivization, nationalization, and industrialization. Laws dealing with confiscation of property, management of industry, banks and transportation, plus land reforms were passed. Concerning collectivization, the number of collectives rose from thirty-one in 1945, to 454 in 1946, to 779 in 1947, to 1,318 in 1948. By that time 60,000 peasants were living on collectives. In the field of nationalization, by 1946, 1947, almost everything except land had been nationalized. As to industrialization, the new plan called for the transfer of 170,000 workers from agriculture to industry for starters.⁵⁸ To support the recovery scheme, Yugoslavia relied upon the Soviet Union for heavy industrial equipment, tracks, tractors, coal, coke, oil, cotton and fertilizers. She became dependent to the tune of 55 percent trade with the Eastern Bloc Communist countries. Finally, Yugoslavia formulated a Five-Year Plan in 1947 which was to be concluded in 1951. The Plan was heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union and the East

European countries for its success, a fact which eventually led to its failure. When the Yugoslavs later broke from the Soviet sphere of influence, the East European countries blockaded Yugoslavia economically, and the plan was doomed.

Politically, after the war Yugoslavia became a model Soviet State and emulated the Soviets in both structure and operation. It was truly oriented toward the Soviets and was in word and deed an extension of Soviet Power. Yugoslavia became a Police state with extensive secret police activity arrived at political subversion. As indicated earlier, it is estimated that thousands were persecuted by the secret police, very akin to other Communist regimes in its purges, persecution, imprisonment, etc. There was, however, a distinct difference between Yugoslavia and the other East European Communist countries, and that difference was Yugoslavia's independent attitude. But this was not the only difference. First, Yugoslavia came to power on its own accord rather than by Soviet military power and might. When the powerful Soviet Army came into Eastern Europe pursuing the German retreat in World War II--Bierut of Poland, Rakosi of Hungary, Ghengis Raj of Romania, Gottensled of Czechoslovakia, Dimitrov of Bulgaria and other refugee Communist leaders--returned to their homelands and were installed by the Soviets. Second, Tito and his Partisan's liberated Yugoslavia for themselves and were generously assisted materially by the West. Russia had a distrust for Tito and his politics and at one point supported the Cetniks, a fact Tito never forgot. Other factors made Yugoslavia different. These were: Tito himself, the staunch historical nationalistic fervor, and the geographic fact that all the other countries border on the USSR while Yugoslavia is more removed.⁵⁹ Hence although Yugoslavia was a

model Soviet state it never became a Soviet satellite as did its Eastern countries' counterparts.

By the end of 1947, relations between Yugoslavia and Russia were becoming tense. The roots of this discord had their beginnings during the Second World War. As noted, the Soviets did not support the Partisan movement as the West had been using the excuse that they were unable to supply Yugoslavia's equipment. Another factor, not appreciated by the Yugoslavs, was the conduct of the Red Army in Yugoslavia after it assisted Tito to free Belgrade toward the end of the war. During the brief stay of the Soviets in 1944, the occupying forces were reputedly responsible for 1,219 rapes, 329 attempted rapes, 111 rapes with murder and 1,204 robberies with violence. Following the war's end, the soldiers left and hundreds of advisers entered Yugoslavia to assist in reconstruction.⁶⁰ It became apparent early on to Tito, unbeknownst to the West, that the aim of the Soviets in all of Eastern Europe, and in particular in Yugoslavia, was subservience to the Soviet cause. Up to this point Tito had been convinced by the Soviet statement outlined by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, in a speech on November 6, 1941, that:

We have not and cannot have any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic and other enslaved nations of Europe expecting our help.

Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle for liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny and then leave it to them to unite freely, to arrange their lives on their lands as they think fit.

In the spirit of the above the Yugoslavs had signed before war's end in 1945, a treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation, the first political treaty conducted by Yugoslavia with another state.⁶¹ Nonetheless, in spite of such Soviet rhetoric and the signed treaty, Moscow

attempted to dominate both the political and economic situation in Yugoslav society--Yugoslavia resisted.

The Soviets employed various means to subjugate Yugoslavia. First, economically she exploited Yugoslavia's weak position and formed two joint stock companies to her advantage.⁶² Second she provided only trade beneficial to the Soviets. Third she attempted to infiltrate the government by eliciting support through intelligence agents and recruiting Yugoslavs to serve as agents, details of which are still secret. In effect it was an attempt at "Russification" of Yugoslavia in all areas of the society. But Tito resisted! By 1947, relations became very strained as were Soviet and United States relations.

The United States, in response to the coming to power of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, inaugurated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The latter was designed to get Europe back on its feet economically by massive aid. The former was designed to prevent the spread of Soviet style communism. Almost in response, in 1949, at the invitation of the Polish Party, although impaired by the Soviets, a meeting of all the Communist parties convened and formed a new Communist Information Bureau of Cominform--follow-on to the earlier Comintern. Its purpose was to unify the Communist cause.

By 1948, Yugoslav relations with Russia had reached breaking point. In April the Soviets delayed concluding a trade agreement to replace existing treaties which were expiring. In March, they added pressure by recalling their military advisers and civilian experts. Tito complained to Stalin trying to explain the Yugoslav position. Stalin's reply, an eight-page letter, attacked Tito and recalled the case of Leon Trotsky, implying

that Yugoslavia was betraying the Communist movement, and further accused the Yugoslavs of slandering the Soviet Union. Tito stood his ground and called a meeting of the Yugoslav Central Committee to draft a response to Moscow. His stinging reply began:

However much any of us loves the country of socialism, the Soviet Union, he should in no case love less his own country, which is also building socialism; to be precise, the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, for which hundreds of thousands of her most progressive citizens have fallen. We know very well that this is realized in the Soviet Union.

He closed the letter with:

. . . there are a number of reasons for which we are dissatisfied. . . . First, we consider it impropriety on the part of organs of the Soviet Intelligence service to engage our citizens for its intelligence service in our country, in a country on the road to socialism. . . . We have evidence that . . . Soviet intelligence service while engaging members of our Party, cast suspicion on our leaders, destroy their good names.⁶⁴

From this point on Stalin took action to punish Yugoslavia and applied additional severe pressure. First he imposed an economic embargo through the Cominform. Second, the propaganda machine was put in motion. Third, the Soviet secret intelligence stepped up activity. On June 28, 1948 a resolution drafted at a meeting in Bucharest and delivered to Yugoslavia stated:

The Information Bureau note that recently the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union. . . . All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has taken a stand unworthy of Communists. . . . The Information Bureau considers in view of all this the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has placed itself . . . outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

It concluded by calling openly on the people of Yugoslavia to "replace" the leadership and "advance a new international leadership of the Party."⁶⁵ Thus, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and was truly independent and on its own. Tito's job was now terribly difficult, but ironically the experience of the Yugoslav people in the Second World War and Tito's stand against the Soviets drew the people solidly behind him. Yugoslavia was now on the road to Socialism much to Stalin's fury.

The political, economic, cultural, and most important, nationalistic tendencies in Yugoslavia, and the salient happenings which have led to Yugoslavia's emerging world position have also been laid out. From this historical perspective it is now easy to see the present external and internal forces at work in Yugoslavia. Although the situation is different today, these same animosities are present and will play an important part in Yugoslavia, now that Tito is gone. To the Soviets, Yugoslavia is the one nation that got away. If she feels it is in her interest, it is not inconceivable that, short of military invasion, Moscow will employ a wide gamut of political and economic pressures and will attempt to exploit existing historical animosities to her advantage. The next chapter will explore these factors for instability/stability.

FOOTNOTES

1. Information in this section is taken from "Yugoslavia: A Country Study," Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-99. First edition, Fourth Printing, 1979, pp. 7-11.
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5. Hoffman, George W. and Neal, Fred. Yugoslavia and the New Communism. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 46-47.
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8. Burns. Op. cit., p. 656 and p. 724.
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18. Burns, ibid.
19. Burns, ibid., pp. 731-732.
20. Dedijer, Vladimir, et al. History of Yugoslavia. (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1974), pp. 468-469.

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22. Dedijs, History of Yugoslavia, op. cit., p. 503.
23. Dedijs, History of Yugoslavia, op. cit., pp. 503-504.
24. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 60.
25. Tomasevich, Jozo. Peasants, Politics and Economic Change.
(California: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 224-225.
26. Auty, op. cit., p. 41.
27. Dedyio, Tito, op. cit., p. 44.
28. Pavlowitch, op. cit., pp. 53-55.
29. Wolff, op. cit., p. 102.
30. Tomasevich, op. cit., p. 61.
31. Pavlowitch, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
32. Auty, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
33. Auty, op. cit., p. 48. Excellent recapitulation of the events leading to the Vidooden Constitution can be found in the work already cited: Pavlowitch, p. 77 and Wolff, pp. 121-123.
34. Tomasevich, op. cit., pp. 241-242.
35. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
36. Pavlowitch, op. cit., p. 74.
37. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 61.
38. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
39. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 62.
40. Pavlowitch, op. cit., p. 87.
41. Wolff, op. cit., p. 124.
42. Dedijs, Tito, op. cit., pp. 133-136.
43. Auty, op. cit., p. 166.
44. Dedijs, Tito, op. cit., pp. 31-35.
45. Auty, op. cit., p. 45.
46. Wolff, op. cit., p. 109.

47. Dedijer, Tito, op. cit., pp. 60-63.
48. Dedijer, Tito, op. cit., pp. 100-106.
49. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 69.
50. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
51. As noted by various writers, the Germans specifically directed by Hitler through a reprisal order, demanded that for every German killed, a hundred native hostages would be executed, for every German wounded, fifty. See Pavlowitch, op. cit., p. 120.
52. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
53. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., p. 75.
54. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 267-270.
55. See Pavlowitch, op. cit., pp. 179-180 and Wolff, op. cit., p. 272, which describes thousands of arrests, trials, and punishment carried out by the security police and judiciary system which gave the Party its control.
56. Rusinow, Dennison. The Yugoslav Equipment: 1948-1974, (California: University of California Press, 1978), p. 19.
57. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 323-324.
58. Wolff, op. cit., pp. 324-338. Gives an excellent synopsis of the Yugoslav plans for rebuilding the country in all important economic areas.
59. Hoffman and Neal., op. cit., pp. 108-109.
60. Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp. 114-115.
61. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. White Book (Belgrade: Yugoslavia, 1951), pp. 12-13.
62. Wolff, op. cit., p. 335; Hoffman and Neal, op. cit., pp. 117-118.
63. Dedijer. Tito, op. cit., pp. 345-346. During a period when relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were to the breaking point, several letters were sent from Moscow to Belgrade and vice versa. In one response from Tito he coldly attacked the Soviets for Soviet intelligence service engaging Yugoslav citizens.
64. Dedijer, Tito, Loc. Cit.
65. "White Book," op. cit., pp. 72-75.

CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAV UNITY AND STABILITY

When Tito died on May 4, 1980, three days before his 88th birthday, there were those who mourned him and those who scorned him. The immediate question generated by his death was who or what institution(s) would carry on the legacy of his unbending quest for Yugoslav unity and independence in the world political arena? The unity was often challenged by internal nationalistic, ethnic, economic and political problems. In the past these problems were wrestled with and partially overcome by the intervention and guidance of Tito, the unquestionable authority, autocrat, patriarch, dictator, arbiter and living charismatic leader of the Yugoslavs. It was he who provided the supreme stabilizing force to the cleavages within the country. In the future there will be pressure points, cultural, ethnic, economic and political which will tend to destabilize the society and act as potential trip wires for conflict within the country. Not only will there be internal problems, but also external pressures in the area of international politics and economics. There seems to be no doubt that the Soviets will insidiously probe these pressure points to achieve three basic objectives: (1) return Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc of socialist governments, (2) obtain warm water ports on the Adriatic, thus upsetting the balance of power in the Mediterranean to weaken NATO and (3) modify Yugoslavia's position of "independence" and "nonalignment" such that they will no longer openly criticize Soviet foreign policy and expouse the Soviet socialist way. Internally, it is not so much of how or what the Soviets will do, but rather, what internal ethnic fissures may be exploited, such as republic independence.

This latter could lead to an "invite," a' la Afghanistan, from pro-Soviet or anti-Tito elements of the country for assistance. However, military invasion is most unlikely because it is less risky to prey upon the innate animosities of the Yugoslavs than to use overt military force. This is especially true since President Carter said on May 5, "it has been the policy of the United States to support the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia. I reaffirm today that America will continue its long-standing policy of support for Yugoslavia and do what it must to provide that support." To some this is a signal to the Soviets that the United States would use military force to counter a Soviet military invasion. But in deference it does not say how the United States will support Yugoslavia. Past Soviet actions of being opportunistic, probing and exploitive will certainly be employed.

This chapter examines these pressure points, or three factors most likely to lead to instability and conflict within the country: (1) nationalism, (2) political forces, and (3) the economy.

NATIONALISM

The one common factor which threads through the entire fabric of Yugoslav society is nationalism. The entire history of the Yugoslavs has been conflict between various ethnic groups who now reside in and immediate to the present Yugoslav borders. Most notably, it has been a struggle for control of all the South slavs, or a portion thereof, by one nation, then another, or simply for some nations to win their own independence (Croatia). Although they are born of the same race, they are not homogeneous because of cultural influence and development. Geography has played an important part in the development of the

Yugoslavs. Ethnically, they are diverse, have different language and alphabets, and practice different religions. Many of these differences were generated by the proximity to Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the 15th through 19th centuries. As a result the Yugoslav nation can be thought of as made up of the more developed European oriented North and the less developed South. As one writer described it in 1971:

Northern Yugoslavia has easy access to the markets of Western Europe, contains most of the Federation's communications network, the bulk of its industry, and its breadbasket.

Southern Yugoslavia, on the other hand, is cut off from access to the outside world by barren mountain ranges, is generally poor in resources, low in literacy and skill, but high in net birth rates.²

These regional development disparities have contributed greatly to the Yugoslav Federation. Let's examine just who we are talking about and the impact these disparities have on Yugoslav unity.

In the 1971 census, of the total population of approximately twenty and one-half million people, only 273,077 (1%) declared themselves as Yugoslavs. The rest described themselves as Serbs, Slovenes, Macedonians, Croats, Montenegrins, Moslem, Albanian, Hungarians and 18 other minorities.³ By design of the 1946 Constitution, the major nationality groups live in geographically identifiable republics. The Serbs, Slovenes, Croats, Montenegrins, Moslems, Hungarians and Albanians, respectively live in the six republics and two autonomous provinces; Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. However, none of the republics or provinces are inhabited by only one nationality, they are heterogeneous. Only Slovenia (1,624,029 of 1,678,032) and Macedonia (1,142,375 of 1,194,784) approach being homogeneous. Yugoslavia is a mosaic of nationalities, all seeking an identity, and all with varied cultural as well as

ethnic differences. These differences will always be present in one form or another in the foreseeable future and a source of conflict. Tito, early on in the Second World War, realized that he must unify the nationalities to be successful. Consequently, all of the actions taken by Tito after he came to power were to perpetuate his Brotherhood and Unity theme, to appease and accommodate the nationality variances. Tito felt the country historically developed internally at a different rate and was an economically divided nation, however unfair, and reflected the nationalistic differences. His vision of a united Communist Yugoslavia was intensified after the war and he pursued programs to Yugoslav the country. Since he was a Communist, it was only natural that Tito, schooled in the Soviet Union, selected the Soviet economic model for reconstruction. We can characterize the rebuilding of Yugoslavia as based on two belief patterns: (1) create a unified South Slav state, and (2) to utilize the Soviet model of a socialist system.

From 1945 to 1948 Yugoslavia moved quickly with the Soviet model of industrialization, land reform and collectivization, nationalization of virtually everything except land, as the key features of the rebuilding process. Heavy emphasis was on industrialization of the society. The theory being that since the regions developed at different rates economically, by industrializing and equalizing the republics and provinces standards of living, the nationalistic and ethnic animosities could be overcome by quick economic progress. However, industrialization requires heavy investment and aid from somewhere, in this case, Russia, which provided equipment and resources. For example, during this time, the Soviets and Eastern bloc countries provided Yugoslavia with heavy industrial equipment, trucks and tractors, coal and coke, oil, cotton and fertilizers and other items.

Approximately 55 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade came from the other
5 Communist countries. True to socialist form, Yugoslavia initiated her first five-year plan (1947-1951) but, the break with Russia in 1948 torpedoed any chances, however optimistic, for the plans success. Yugoslavia turned to the West and a change in policy was about to be initiated by the leadership. But before proceeding, it was found that industrialization brought about an unforeseen problem. Economically, to bring about equalization between the developed North and the less developed South, Central Planning in the government in Belgrade dictated heavy subsidies for the southern republics at the expense of the northern more developed republics. Each republic and province was required to remit a percentage of their gross domestic product funds to a federal fund for the underdeveloped regions. In the next section on economics, this point will be further expanded. Suffice to say here, the industrialization process intensified the animosities of the northern republics by hindering their development by reducing investments.

Next, the forging of the republics to ethnic geographical boundaries legitimized the existence of separate national groups within a federal structure. Because of the Soviet centrally controlled model, the republics had little control over their individual economies or social programs. Thus, after Yugoslavia's break with Russia, Tito attempted to capitalize on the nationality problem by mobilizing the country behind him on his stand against the Soviets. It succeeded and a greater feeling for Yugoslavia--if not because of the collective security of the republics--emerged, and with his success a new concept; Titoism, a new road to socialism. In short, it was a certain degree of decentralization and application of the market mechanism plus a system of workers self-management in which the enterprises are guided by workers councils who in

theory direct the company. Decentralization of power to the republics and provinces signaled a shift from "Yugoslavism" to a federation of a community of nations--another accommodation to the ethnic differences. Tito had failed to make the nation truly Yugoslav at this time, and it was expedient to accommodate the nationalities because of the Soviet split and the failure of the first five-year plan albeit the economy was better off than before the war and Serbian hegemony.

Throughout the 60s and 70s nationalistic accommodations occurred in the form of constitutional changes, economic reforms and greater decentralization. As before, the liberalization by Tito led to nationalistic overtures of republic (Croatia) separatism and intensified antagonisms. The following areas reflect potential triggers to release nationalistic conflict in the future.

Croatian Nationalism

1. Zanko Affair: 1968.

In 1968 the central government in Belgrade diverted funds which were destined for Slovenia for roadbuilding. The Slovenian government complained bitterly. Subsequently, the Croatian republic Communist party supported Slovenia and became involved in a Croatian nationalist issue. It seems that Milos Zanko, Croatia's permanent delegate to the Party Conference of the LCY in Belgrade, published a series of articles critical of Croatian nationalism in Borba, a central newspaper. The Croatian Communists reacted by recalling Zanko to Zagreb and at the 10th plenum of the Croatian League of Communists (1970) stripped him of his party and government posts. The significance was that by recalling Zanko and extricating him for defamatory remarks on Croatian nationalism, Croatia was, in fact, signaling that the primary allegiance of

the Croatian representatives were to Croatia and not Belgrade. Tito was impressed by the unity of the Croats at that time. As you shall see, in 1971 he suppressed another Croatian flexing of separatist thought--an independent Croatia.

2. Croatian Crises: 1971.

The seeds of nationalism in Croatia can be traced to the liberalization and decentralization policies of the LCY in their attempts to modernize Yugoslavia in the 60s. The first apparent unhappiness with the situation was revealed publicly in a March 1967 "Declaration on the Name and on the Use of the Croatian Language." In the proclamation, signed by about 120 prominent Croatian scientific and cultural workers representing 17 philological and cultural institutions in Croatia, they proclaimed the full separation of the Croatian language from the Serbian variant.⁷ Croatian nationalism continued unchecked and was sparked by a Croatian cultural organization named Matica Hrvatska. In essence, it was a rising struggle against centralism in Belgrade (central control), and separatism (republic independence). The turning point in the issue came at the January 1970 plenum of the Croatian CC when they declared the "natural right of every nation to dispose of its own resources and of its own realized surpluses."⁸ This latter statement was a throw-back to the northern republics supporting the southern republics financially. For example, Croatia which was responsible for 33 percent of industrial production and 27 percent of GNP was allowed to retain only 18 percent of capital assets.⁹ Further, Slovenia with 8.3 percent of the total Yugoslav population, was required to bear between 17 - 20 percent of the subsidies for federal expenditures and an equally disproportionate share of aid to the less developed republics. Her share of the Yugoslav GNP was 18.8 percent or more than the combined value of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and

Montenegro. At the same time the Croatian Communist leadership seemingly was encouraging the movement. Charge and counter charge of centralist and separatist ideas flowed from Zagreb to Belgrade. In July 1971, Tito intervened and was assured that nationalism was under control and not a problem. However, the movement later flourished in Zagreb University and on November 22 the students called a strike and a riot ensued. The strike lasted for 11 days. In a speech, Tito threatened the "class enemies" with "the means which the class enemies deserve." "We shall not hesitate to use any kind of means in order to destroy them."¹⁰ In other words it would be the Yugoslav army that would restore order. Purges ensued: (1) President of the Croatian Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), (2) Secretary of the Executive Committee of the LCC, (3) one of two Croatian representatives on the supreme Executive Bureau of the all-Yugoslav Party, (4) one of the Republic's three members of Yugoslavia's new 23-man collective presidency, (5) 11 prominent Croatian intellectuals, and (6) by January 1972, at least 300 resignations or dismissals of Party or State officials at all levels.¹¹ The crises was quelled, but Tito was later to say that Yugoslav unity was at stake. At a trade union congress he asserted "if the Croatian movement had been allowed to continue unchecked Yugoslavia would have reached the brink of civil war. If we had not gone into the fray to prevent it, there would perhaps be shooting, a civil war, in six months time."¹² Croatian nationalism was put to bed, but when will it be awakened again, and can the new leadership handle it as Tito did? It should be noted that the crises flourished because the Party leadership lost control and could not handle the underlying economic and political causes that triggered latent nationalistic animosities.

3. Croatian Emigre.

A definite threat, however small, the Croatian emigres' goal is an independent Croatia. The emigre, relatively active the last few years have performed acts of terrorism to include murder, extortion, air hi-jackings, and other crimes in the attempt to draw attention to their cause.¹³ In 1970, Dr. Branko Jelic, President of the Croatian National Committee, headquartered in Germany, and known as an extreme Croat nationalist, "offered the Russians not only the airport in . . . Mostar, but also a harbor near Pula" provided¹⁴ "that Moscow guarantees an independent Croatia." In 1972, Jelic died, however, his followers still pursue his views.

In 1972, an interesting plot was uncovered--if true--when a Czechoslovakian defector, Major General Jan Sejna, revealed a plan called "Polarka" in which the scenario presented was a military invasion of Yugoslavia. The attack would¹⁵ be a coordinated lightning attack, by Czech and Hungarian forces. The plan was reputed to be masterminded by Moscow. One thing is clear, the Soviets could utilize the Croatian emigre to keep the Serb-Croat mutual fears active and to agitate discord and conflict. In conclusion, the Croatian emigre have operatives in Europe (Germany), Australia, Argentina, the United States, and other parts of the world whose sole purpose is to use terrorist tactics to extort and promulgate their cause--an independent Croatia.

The Albanian Issue

A second area where nationalistic fervor may be revived is in the autonomous province of Kosovo located in Serbia and which is sandwiched between the two republics of Montenegro and Macedonia, and adjacent to the country of Albania. The root of the issue is the number of ethnic Albanians

who live in Yugoslavia as compared to the total population of Albania.

Albania is not a large country, only slightly larger than the state of

Maryland, and has a population of about 2.2 million people.¹⁶ In the Yugoslav 1971 census, there were 1,231,710 Albanians living in Yugoslavia.

In the province of Kosovo there were 916,168 (1971 census) people. However, today in the province of Kosovo there are 1,150,000 Albanians of the estimated 1.5 million Albanians living in this province. To further expand, there are only 250,000 Serbs, and 40,000 Montenegrins in the province--a definite minority.¹⁷ This population factor and the ethnic affinity to Albania

spurs irredentist tendencies for a greater Albania.

Another factor which exacerbates the population issue is the prolific increase in the population in Kosovo which has occurred and continues. For example, from the 1961 census to the 1971 census, the population increased by 29.1 percent, or from 964,000 to 1,245,000. It has been estimated that at the present growth rate, by 1986 there will be 1,968,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia. Of significance, is that Albanians comprise the largest ethnic minority and soon will exceed the Slovenian population and become the third largest group of people behind the Serbs and Croats whose populations are decreasing.¹⁸ It will require greater representation in the multinational nation of Yugoslavia. Table 3-1 shows the population increase and decreases for all the republics.

TABLE 3-1
POPULATION GROWTH BY REGION
(National Increase Per 1,000)

<u>Republic</u>	<u>1950-54</u>	<u>1960-64</u>	<u>1971</u>
Bosnia-Herzegovina	24.3	22.6	15.1
Croatia	11.5	7.5	4.4
Macedonia	23.9	19.7	15.6
Montenegro	22.1	19.6	13.2
Serbia			
Serbia Proper	14.8	7.9	6.2
Vojvodina	10.9	6.6	3.0
Kosovo	25.5	28.6	29.1

It should be noted that the more rapid increase in the Kosovo coupled with a decrease in population in the more advanced regions of Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina contributes to fermenting the associated nationality problem of cultural differences.

Another problem exists, that of poverty and relative backwardness of the people in the Kosovo. It is the poorest of all the other areas in Yugoslavia. To illustrate the development disparity, the per capita income in the Kosovo is \$810, as compared to the national average of \$2,930, or for Slovenia which is \$5,669. This is anywhere from more than three to seven times less than the other regions. What then does this all mean to the new leadership in Yugoslavia? Simply, trouble.

In the past, there have been numerous nationalistically related flare-ups. In 1968, there was an anti-government demonstration at the university as the ethnically Albanians strove for greater recognition. This disturbance was harshly put down by the Army. As a result, the formation of an underground political organization, calling itself the Kosovo National Liberation Movement was started. Belgrade does not take kindly to such organizations,

and in February 1976, sentenced 19 alleged members to hard labor prison terms--all accused of Albania irredentist.

Creating greater tension at the border is the country of Albania's attitude toward those living in Yugoslavia. Albania's borders are generally closed to the outside world; however, ethnic Albanians are allowed to travel across the borders relatively freely compared to other nationalities, thus exacerbating the issue.

The government in Belgrade recognizes that Kosovo is the least developed, has the highest illiteracy rate, highest mortality rate, highest birth rate, lowest per capita income, and overall worst standard of living, thus Tito has attempted to re-channel investment funds to equalize the economic disparity with the other republics. The Albanian language and culture is recognized by the 1974 Constitution and they receive the bulk of development funds. But as much as Tito has done to bolster the economy and culture, the people do not believe he has done enough. The northern republics feel Albania is an albatross and draining funds for their investments.

In conclusion, after decades of economic assistance, Kosovo is still the least developed. Kosovo remains the tinderbox for nationalistic and irredentist thought by neighboring countries. To the Federation she is important for she represents 60 percent of the countries lead and zinc reserves, more than 20,000,000 tons of ferro-nickle ore and other valuable metals. Kosovo is economically important for the interdependence in the Federation and it is essential that the new leadership assist and carry on Tito's promise of full equality among the other nations of Yugoslavia.

Moreover, it is also important that anti-Yugoslav agitation (internal and external) be carefully monitored and controlled in this volatile province.

The Macedonian Issue

The backdrop for problems in Macedonia stem from Yugoslavia's historical past and the dividing up of the spoils of various wars, in particular, the Balkan wars. Over 100 years ago the ethnicity of Macedonia was highlighted by the Congress of Berlin (1878) in which Serbia gained considerable Macedonian territory. The very heart of the Macedonian issue revolves about the fact that Bulgaria does not recognize Macedonia as a separate nationality but as Bulgars. Bulgarian territory vacillated between Yugoslavia and Greece as various wars were fought. Bulgaria, not friendly to Yugoslavia and who is a staunch Soviet servant, has eyes on annexing the Macedonians whom she considers Bulgarian. Yugoslavia did make a key tactical move of recognizing Macedonians as a separate nationality for two reasons: (1) justify retaining its parts of Macedonia, and (2) extend its influence over all Macedonians, in or out of her borders. Thus, those living in Bulgaria, and for that matter Greece, reflect Yugoslavia's stake in a claim to unification of the Macedonian nationality

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under the auspices of Belgrade-- a concept that does not breed harmony with Bulgaria, only resentment.

Tito's passing will undoubtedly lead to increased polemics and support from Russia for Bulgaria's claims. Incidentally, in a 1973 survey, 70 percent of the people (1,142,375) in Macedonia were Macedonians; Serbs constituted two percent; Croats less than one percent. Consequently, on the other side of the coin, to the Bulgarians the Macedonians represent a sizeable population which reside outside her borders. Bulgaria has an estimated population of nine

22

million. In any case, Macedonia represents a trouble spot for latent nationalistic tendencies of conflict with Belgrade--the instigator of which could be the opportunistic Soviets.

Nationality Problem Summary

Yugoslavia is a diverse nation of many multinational latent animosities. Tito has tried to accommodate the ethnic differences in several ways. The primary means were rapid industrialization and later decentralization. The concept being that economic equality in the republics and provinces would overcome nationalistic conflict. However, these innate tendencies still linger after four decades of Yugoslav socialism. In order of priority, it is most likely that flare-ups will occur in Kosovo, Macedonia and then Croatia/Serbia. In all circumstances, it is believed that Soviet influence will play a big part in the revival of nationalistic animosities in the territories in Yugoslavia.

POLITICAL FORCES

It has been said that the three pillars of the Yugoslav government are the Communist Party Central Committee (CC) Presidium, the government administration element, the Presidency, and the Army. In this chapter we will deal with the Party and government administration. The next chapter will discuss the role of the Army as an institution for preserving Yugoslav independence and internal unity. The one characteristic that best describes Tito's regime is change. As Yugoslavia developed politically and economically, she was never reluctant to make changes to Party policy or the Constitution. Hence, the direction Yugoslavia took in developing her socialist system has often been described as the Yugoslav Experiment. For ease of understanding, first the Party, then the government administration system will be discussed.

The Party

Let there be no mistake that the state preserving political institution is the Party. Tito carefully forged the organization, uniquely Yugoslav, to

suit the political requirements of order, control, and maintenance of the Yugoslav way. Now that Tito is gone, the Party first, the State Presidency second, and a strong Army are the keys to the future of Yugoslavia's independence and stability. How did Tito forge the Party and manage its organization to maintain power?

You will recall that during the Second World War, in 1942, an Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberation of Yugoslavia was established. In Yugoslavia it was referred to as the ANVOJ for its Serbian wording. The People's Liberation Movement was the forerunner of Tito's modern Communism. On November 26, 1942 the first session of the movement met. There were 44 delegates present at that time. It united all the patriots with the goal of liberating and restoring Yugoslavia which had been desecrated by the Germans. ²³ It was at this time that Tito started building a Party infrastructure. The following year (1943) a second session was held in Bosnia. The membership had now grown to 142 delegates as partisan successes became known. At this second meeting a provisional state was set up as a federation of six republics to recognize and accommodate ethnic differences. The provisional government was known as the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia. Tito ²⁴ was elected President and given the title Marshall. He expanded his control by forming people's councils throughout the country who reported to the National Committee--Communist controlled. ²⁵ By 1945, the people's councils who collectively were now known as the National Liberation Front became the People's Front with a membership of one million people, many of which were Communists, many of which were not; however, one thing was certain, ²⁶ the Communists of Tito controlled the People's Front and worked through them.

The third and last session of the ANVOJ was held in 1945 with 318 delegates
27
in attendance. This last meeting established and formed the vanguard of
the new Tito regime.

Tito was now presiding over the Party and State structure. He was the
Premier, Secretary General of the Communist Party, Chief of Politburo, Presi-
dent of the People's Front, Marshall of Yugoslavia, Minister of National
Defense, and Commander-in-Chief. All power emanated from the Party and a
small inner circle of partisan cronies. It is one of these men, Vladimir
Bakaric, who presently sits on both the party Presidium and the Presidency who
is a key figure in Yugoslavia since Tito died. He is the last of Tito's close
partisan friends and very much looked up to in Belgrade. It was through the
non-Communist People's Front that Tito sought to establish control over the
whole population. By 1948, the People's Front had grown collectively to seven

28
million members. Incidentally, of the 12,000 Communist members at the
beginning of the Second World War, only 3,000 survived. By 1948 the Party
membership had grown to 448,175 members or about three percent of the popu-
29
lation. Whereas the People's Front had approximately 44 percent of the
people. To recap at this point, the Party ruled through four mechanisms: (1)
key positions in the economy and government controlled by the party, (2) Party
members had the authority to directly intervene in the functions of government
and economy at all levels, (3) the Party controlled the People's Front, an
organization which although non-Communist, had people who supported socialism,
and (4) an area not touched upon, the security police system similar to the
30
Soviet K.G.B.

From 1946 until 1948, the Party ruled with an iron fist while copying
and implementing a Soviet type government and party. Then came the expulsion

of Yugoslavia from the Cominform on June 28, 1948. Heretofore, the Party ruled by being involved in the day-to-day administration and direction of the state through methods of compulsion. The split with Russia changed their modus operandi. Tito instructed his Party theoreticians to look at Marxism-Leninism in light of the ideological differences between themselves and the Soviets. Incidentally, Tito was bolstered by the United States in his struggle for independence from Russia by massive economic aid under the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine. In any event, a new road to socialism was forged to counter the Soviets. The Yugoslavs took the position that the Soviet Union had developed a deviant form of socialism. They contended that the USSR had created an independent Communist bureaucracy which "has been able to establish a dictatorship, not for, but over the proletariat and the masses of the people."³¹ Instead of the state withering away as suggested by Marx-Leninist theory, they had created a bureaucracy in the Soviet Union which perpetuates³² itself and becomes stronger and bigger with no foreseeable bounds. The Yugoslavs, in their attempt to overcome and safeguard against this bureaucratic state capitalism, proposed major changes to their system. At the Sixth Congress of the Party in 1952, they changed the role of the Party. First, the name of the Party was changed to give it a new image, from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Next, the role of the Party was defined as one of education and guidance, and the elites were told to relinquish and redistribute political power to the³³ republics. They were to reduce Party influence in Yugoslavian society-- liberalization. Third, to eliminate Party bureaucracy, they were to increase

participation at the republican level by the process of democratization. What emerged was the keystone of the Yugoslav system; decentralization and a concept known as workers self-management.

In 1950, a historic step was made, and the Law on Workers Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations was enacted.³⁴ Simply put, workers self-management is a system whereby the workers are given a say in the management and control of the means of production by creating workers councils and management boards in the factories and business enterprises.³⁵ The decentralization, democratization process had far-reaching implications for the Party and government.

In 1953, an entirely new constitution was legislated and the former Soviet model was discarded. It drastically reduced and curtailed the Party and government control and decentralized the power to the republics, communes and below. Following on the heels of the new constitution was the renaming of the People's Front at the Fourth Conference of the non-Communist organization.³⁶ The Front's new name was Socialist Alliance for Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), which was in consonance with self-management and decentralization. However, the Communist Party still controlled the Alliance.

The effect these changes had on the Party were profound. Foremost, it lowered the prestige of the Party in the eyes of the people. Next, it weakened the Party's strength. Also, the process spurned nationalism as the republics gained more stature. In summary, the policy of hastening the withering away of the state by democratization and decentralization--both liberalizing policies--caused Party power and control to diminish and precipitated a Party reduction in membership. National separatist sentiments

in the republics were rekindled and animosities grew. Regarding Party membership, due to a relaxed expulsion policy of Party members, and adding less new members, the membership fell from a high in 1952 of 779,382 to a low of 635,984 in 1956.³⁷ Tito reasserted minor Party controls and by 1959 the membership rose to 857,537. As a result, factions formed, some for, some against, decentralization and control by the republics.

Just in passing, in 1965-1966 a significant economic reform was instituted which further exacerbated the devolution of power from the Federation to the republics and thus intensified nationality rivalry. The next section will further amplify on those economic reforms.

Factionalism took the form of two opposing views. One, centralization, or returning to stricter Party and government control. The second, liberalization or further allowing the republics and provinces a greater say in their destiny. From the last section on nationalism you could guess that the more developed North would favor liberalization; while the less developed South would favor centralization, and this is exactly what happened.

In 1966, Alexander Rankovic, one of Tito's inner circle during the Second World War Partisan movement, and head of the Secret Police, was implicated in a plot to seize power from Tito. Rankovic, a Serb, advocated centralist ideas and did not like what was going on and attempted to gain power and recentralize. Conversely, Croatia, a highly developed country, favored more liberalization and a greater say in her economy and society. Rankovic lost, but Tito, wiley as he was, continued on the decentralization path but adjusted to the ethnic differences.

Two events in 1968 reshaped Tito's thinking and delayed the planned

Ninth Party Congress from 1968 to 1969. The first, a student revolt in April 1968 occurred in Belgrade when the students demanded "the abolition of all social inequality and privilege and the introduction of democratic freedoms." ³⁸ In this crises, Tito personally had to talk to the students and eventually he appeased their demands while threatening the use of the Army. The second, was the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia and her surrogates in August 1968. The latter had a sombering effect on Tito and his regime. The next chapter will discuss the effect that the incursion had on the organization of the Yugoslav Army. But for now, at the Ninth Congress held in 1969, further decentralization was enacted in a new Defense Act--Total National Defense for Yugoslavia. It delegated a portion of the defense of each of the republics to the republics by legalizing Territorial Defense Units to augment the Yugoslav Army. Conversely, Tito felt that the Party must be strengthened, therefore, he enacted a change in the structure of the Party. First, the Central Committee was dissolved and the functions were divided between the existing Presidium and a new organ called the Conference of the League of Communists. This new organ would meet annually between Party Congresses and be represented by 280 members. One-fourth of these would be from regional Congresses and whose tenure would last until the next Congress; the remaining members would be elected on a yearly basis at the communal level. The Presidium or Presidency of the LCY would be represented by five members from each republic, three members from each autonomous province, and three Army representatives, for a total of 40, including Tito. Tito also suggested that a new Executive Bureau be established from the Presidium. This new agency--mini politburo--consisted of 15 people; two from each republic, one from each province, and Tito. Eventually, the Presidium was

increased to 46 members by increasing by one the number of representatives
39
from the republics. The significance of these changes is that Tito
tried to strengthen the Party while still proceeding on a course of
democratization and decentralization. In the face of growing economic
and nationality tensions, he felt that by giving equal representation
of the republics, regardless of population, these tendencies could be
overcome while all the long restoring power to the Party.

The Tenth Congress, held in 1974, was the last major constitutional
change which legitimized forevermore the concept of self-management
throughout the entire political and economic system--Democratic Socialism.
However, in 1971, prior to the Tenth Congress, there was a major nationality
crisis in Croatia (previous section this chapter--Nationalism). This shook
the central Party leadership because it was the ineffectiveness of the Croatian
Party to handle the situation that allowed the tensions to get out of hand.
Subsequently, after Party purges in Croatia and Serbia, a Second Conference
of the LCY was held in January 1972 and an Action Program was established
40
to further strengthen the Party "ideological and organizational unity."
One action that was undertaken was to reduce the Party Executive Bureau
from 15 to 8 members. Tito had insisted this be done. His purpose was to
recentralize power and eliminate any opposition of those who opposed
41
his policies he felt essential. Subsequently, at the end of the Tenth
LCY Congress, the Central Committee of 166 members was reinstituted,
the Presidium of the CC was made up of 39 members, and the Executive Committee
consisted of 12 members. In 1975, the Presidium was enlarged to 48 members.

In June of 1978, the Eleventh LCY Party Congress was held and notable

changes occurred in the organization. A reduction in the Presidium from 48 members to 24 had occurred. The theme of the Congress was that the Party is the keystone of Yugoslav stability and unity and, therefore, must reassert itself for the preservation of Yugoslavia amidst economic and ethnic tensions. Moreover, Tito was crystallizing his plans for the Party concerning the transfer of power upon his death.

In 1968, Tito proposed a collective leadership for the Communist Party to take over his function as President of the LCY upon his death, retirement or incapacitation. Thus, was created the position of Chairman of the CC Presidium in the October 1968 Standing Rules of the Presidium which authorized the Chairman "to prepare and invoke Presidium sessions following agreement with...LCY President...in cooperation with the Secretary and other members of the Presidium."⁴² The idea behind the collective leadership was⁴³ to insure that no single person would assume absolute power after Tito's death. In operation, the Chairman would be elected from each republic and autonomous province for one year in an eight-year rotation. The main task of the Chairman was to preside over the CC Presidium in the absence of Tito⁴⁴ and upon his death assume the functions held by Tito in the Party. Of the 23 members, the CC Presidium has only four members under 50, the youngest being 44, and the average age is less than 58. Upon Tito's death, a Serb, Stevan Doronjski (61) from the Vojvodina assumed control. The Secretary of the Presidium is also a Serb from Croatia, Dusan Dragosovec (60), who is not very popular with the Croats. The Chairman has a one year tenure while the Secretary has two years.

In conclusion, the Party is the key to stability in Yugoslavia since Tito has died. It appears that Tito has provided for an orderly succession

and if history teaches us anything about Yugoslav politics, it is we can expect changes in the Party to suit the situation while accommodating the ethnic differences. Furthermore, we can expect the collective concept to spread throughout the society. Evidence a statement made by the Vice Chairman of the Yugoslav Front Organization(SAWPY): "There cannot be any exceptions...one set of principles cannot be permitted in the organization of our society and system in the Federation, another in the republics, and yet a third in the communes...collective leadership should be fully put into practice."⁴⁵ A nation ruled by committee?

Government Administration

Just as the Communist Party went through numerous organizational and role changes, the government experienced a series of revisions to the constitution. During the last 30 years or so, there have been four major constitutions: the first in 1946, 1953, 1963 and 1974. No less than 42 amendments were passed between 1967-1971, many of which appealed or altered provisions of the 1963 constitution. Concomitantly, the National Federal Assembly or Chambers, which are equivalent to a parliament, varied from two (1946), to six (1963), then to five (1968 amendment), and finally back to two (1974).⁴⁶ A detailed description will not be tackled in this study, but a few salient features leading to the collective concept of leadership--rotating collective--will be examined.

In 1946, shortly after the conclusion of the Second World War, the first constitution was promulgated. This new constitution acknowledged the existence of diverse ethnic groups and established a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces which were drawn along geographic

boundaries corresponding to the regions where the readily identifiable cultural characteristics of the people were distributed. Seizing upon his Russian training, Tito modeled the constitution after Stalin's 1936 constitution.

⁴⁷ Tito proposed that the highest organ of the government be the People's Assembly consisting of two Chambers. A Federal Chamber which would have one representative per 50,000 people or 348 members.

The second Chamber, the Chamber of Nationalities, would have 30 representatives from each republic and 20 representatives from the province of Vojvodina, and 15 from the province of Kosovo.

⁴⁸ Through this representative mechanism the Yugoslav government attempted to foster Tito's theme of Brotherhood and Unity by appeasing the various nationalities. However, the regime was still dictatorial and repressive, and the Secret Police were very active eliminating any opposition to Tito. Economically, the Yugoslavs tailored themselves after the Russians and implemented industrialization, collectivization, nationalization and even their first five-year plan which was from 1947 to 1951. The break with the Cominform in 1948 changed Tito's outlook for the government. At the same time the Party was going through its self-examination, the government was doing likewise. As with the Party, Yugoslavia's new road to independence and the introduction of workers self-management necessitated a change.

In 1953, the Soviet styled constitution was discarded and an entirely new document, called the Fundamental Law, was adopted which made extensive organizational changes to the way business was conducted. The Council of Nationalities of 1946 never did fulfill its expectations of protecting and guaranteeing the rights of the nationalities of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the Council of Nationalities was merged with the more powerful Federal Council. A second Chamber was created called the Council of Producers

to give the producers in agriculture and industry a say in government. Thus, the bicameral parliament was retained, but the focus was now on the workers self-management. Coupled with the policy of decentralization, the new government was radically different than the previous Soviet styled regime. A devolution of power from the Federation to the republics ensued and the seeds of nationality tension were sown as the republics gained more influence. As one writer put it:

With the emergence of the republics as significant foci of power came a resurgence⁵⁰ of nationality sentiment along republic lines.

At the same time, economic reforms were being instituted in the interest of equalizing the economic disparity between the developed North and less developed Southern regions of Yugoslavia. The government continued on its path of liberalization and decentralization not yet able to find a satisfactory way to handle the government and economic system in the multinational state.

The next major change in the government came in 1963 with a new constitution. As espoused, it gave every citizen the right to self-management principles which were to be applied to all spheres of economic, social and political life. In addition, it further specified the relationship between the Federal and local governments. Most notable though, was an organizational change which expanded the Federal Assembly into five Federal Chambers: (1) Chamber of Nationalities, (2) Chamber of Economy, (3) Chamber of Social Welfare and Health, (4) Social-Political Chamber, and (5) Cultural and Educational Chamber. Representation in the chambers was by population with the exception of the Chamber of Nationalities where each republic had⁵¹ equal representation and the autonomous provinces half of the republics.

Incidentally, each of the republics had their own constitution which supported the Federal constitution.

In consonance with the rising awariness of nationality, the 1963 constitution was amended in 1968 and gave to the republics and provinces additional rights and responsibilities. The 1968 amendments also recognized a greater independence for the two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. ⁵²

Commensurate with the above, the Chamber of Nationalities was given much greater authority and importance. To summarize to this point, Tito had made a conscious decision to liberalize and decentralize the government through the mechanism of workers self-management and the economic market. His basic premise was to equalize the authority and economic wealth of the republics and provinces to cope with the nationality issue and promote Yugoslav unity. One of the policies he had was promulgated with the 1963 constitution and involved the working people more in the process of direct democracy--workers self-management. The years 1968 and 1969 were to signal other changes to the government in preparation for a Yugoslavia without Tito.

President Tito became concerned about the transition of the Party and government after he was gone from the scene. The succession he had so carefully orchestrated to accommodate the nationalities and foster unity troubled him. His first move was, in 1968, to create the position of Presidency which he himself filled--no vice president. It appeared that the position was created so Tito could observe and survey the Federal government activities and intervene when necessary as he had done earlier in 1968 at the Belgrade student riot. He also established a Federal Executive Council consisting of 17 members, corresponding to a Western

cabinet, which was considered an administrative collective body with the
53
Presidency as the overseer. Recall, that at the Ninth Party Congress in
March 1969, he extended this principle to the Party by creating a 15-man
Executive body with equal representation from the republics and provinces.
When it appeared to Tito that the government Federal Executive Council was
not operating as planned, he proposed in 1970 to create a Collective
Presidency to replace his single position. The composition of the organ
would be composed of three members from each republic, two from each province,
plus Tito, as the overall leader, for a total of 23. The Federal Council would
54
be relegated to strictly administrative functions. Then, on June 30, 1971,
the Federal Assembly adopted:

...the final, revised text of the constitutional
amendments (numbered 20 through 40) which introduce
a new federal administrative structure, significantly
increasing the autonomy and independence of the country's
55
six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces.

With adoption of the amendments, the State Presidency was established with
Tito as President of the organization for life. The Federal Executive Council
would have 15 members of which six would have secretariats concerned with
foreign affairs, finance, national defense, internal affairs, economic affairs
and foreign trade. It is well to remember that as the government was decentralizing,
because of nationality crises, (Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, etc.) Tito was concurrently
strengthening the Party apparatus for control. It was he, because of the
Croatian crises, that insisted that the Party must reassert itself and stop
the propensity for republican oligarchies and nationalism. He advocated the
Party exercise political power over all segments of the society; government,
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economic, industrial, cultural and educational organizations of self-management.
On the one hand he was liberalizing, while on the other, he was re-centralizing.

But in retrospect, what Tito was doing was consensus building in the Party and the government in preparation for his successors, but make no mistake, the Party was still king.

The last big change to the constitution came in 1974 and consisted of 404 articles. The most significant changes were:

1. The State Presidency was reduced from an unwieldy 23 members to 9, including Tito; one from each republic and province; elected for a term of five years; and, no one to serve more than two terms.
2. The reduction in the number of Chambers in the Federal Assembly to two: Federal Chamber; 220 delegates--30 per republic; and 20 per province and Chamber of Republics and Provinces; 88 delegates--12 from each republic and 8 from each province.
3. Increase Party control through three mechanisms: (1) reduction of the Presidency from 23 to 9 and the inclusion of the President of the League of Communists (Tito before death) as ex officio, (2) a new system of delegation called imperative mandate, where each elected delegate at all levels must adhere to the instructions given to them by "their basic organization" (Communist controlled) rather than allowed to make their own decision; and (3) the Social-Political Chamber of the three-house assemblies at the republic, province, and commune level (Socialist Alliance led by the Party) will send delegates to the three assemblies mentioned, thus exercising control thru imperative mandate.

Consequently, the 1974 constitution can be summarized as supporting Tito's principles of restricting the accumulation of political power at the highest levels and promote the self-management system.

The basic question with regard to the government is will the collective leadership as envisioned by Tito work? Since the 1974 constitution, numerous

insidious changes have occurred which might help to shed some light on what might happen.

State Presidency and Succession

To reiterate, Tito was President of the Party Presidium, President of the State Presidency, and Supreme Commander of the Army. Before his death, he wanted to create a system whereby no one person could assume full power in Yugoslavia after his death. He created a Collective Leadership system to take over the positions he held, not by one person, but by a collective. His reasons were twofold: (1) accommodate the nationality issue since no one nationality could then control the government as the Serbs did during the Second World War, and (2) provide for an orderly succession, something no other Communist leader was ever able to do. He recognized that his liberalization and decentralization policies were necessary but somehow he must still maintain Yugoslavia's unity and independence through some means of power control--the Party, Government, and Army as the guarantor. Both the Party and the Army had clear lines of responsibility for the preservation of unity in Yugoslavia and their dominant position is not questioned. However, what was not set clear was what role the government administration would play. Because of the decentralization process, the Federal Government had power over foreign affairs, defense, and certain aspects of the economy. Thus, the creation of the Collective Presidency became the highest state governing organ representing all the people, Communist and non-Communist. But, in reality, it is still Communist leadership that mans the government.

Members of the Presidency are elected one from each republic and province. Their tenure is for five years with two terms the maximum. The Standing Rules for the Presidency establish the fact that a Vice President will be elected for

a period of one year. The Vice Presidency will be rotated on a yearly basis in the following order and changed in May of each year: Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Following Tito's death, Lazar Kolisevski from Macedonia is the President of the Presidency. Next in line is Cvijetei Mijatovic, a Serb, from Bosnia-Herzegovina. An examination of the nationality of the members of the Presidency yields: three Serbs, one Macedonian, one Croat, one Slovene, one Albanian, and one Montenegrin. The average age of the Presidency is 63.8 years, with Vidoji Zarkovic from Montenegro the youngest at 52, while Fadilj-Hodza, an Albanian, is the oldest at 69. For comparison, the average age of the CC Presidium is less than 58. Two additional changes occurred to the Presidency that are noteworthy. First, General Ivan Dolnicar, former Deputy Defense Minister, was appointed in June 1979 to the position of secretary-general of the State Presidency and signaled the appointment of another Army general to a senior post in the government. Also, in February 1978, at the height of Tito's illness prior to his death, the State Presidency was enlarged by officially including seven ex officio members to the Presidency. The new members were: President of the Federal Assembly, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the CC Presidium and Secretary of the CC Presidium (two most powerful in Party) and federal secretaries for national defense, internal affairs and foreign affairs. The Presidency has eight ruling and seven ex officio members. Included among the ex officio members are two Army generals bringing to three the number in the Presidency, or nearly 20 percent. The mechanism for the succession has been created, but can it work?

ECONOMIC FORCES

At the beginning of this report we indicated that the economic stability of the Yugoslav economy is in question. Yugoslavia suffers from high inflation,

a large expanding trade deficit, a growing indebtedness, and rising unemployment. Many believe it is the fuse of a time bomb that will set off severe internal problems. This section of the report will not examine in minute detail the economy of Yugoslavia, but, it will briefly look at her economic development from 1945 up to the present in four periods. First, the post-war rebuilding period from 1945 to 1949 which featured a centrally planned economy based on a Soviet model. Second, a period of change from 1949 to 1953 in which the Soviet model was discarded and a Yugoslav self-management system was introduced. Third, the period of economic reform from 1954 to 1973 when individual regional forces caused changes in the new Yugoslav system. Finally, from 1974 to the present, in which the Yugoslav economic system reached its final development. This section on economic forces will conclude with the current economic trends and the impact on stability in Yugoslavia.

Economic Development

The Second World War had a devastating impact on the Yugoslav nation and required a huge rebuilding program. One of the first tasks was to re-establish the agricultural industry to be able to feed the people. The war took a huge toll on the farm resources. For example, a total reduction in farm resources was⁶⁰ from between 40 to 60 percent of the total pre-war holdings. Thus, the ability of the Yugoslavs to feed their approximately 15 million people was a serious problem. It is safe to say that in 1945 and 1946, without the help of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRAA), much of⁶¹ which was supplied by the United States, mass starvation would have resulted.

Development in other sectors of the economy was sorely needed. Tito, being a loyal Communist to Russia, established the Soviet model for the economic rebuilding of the country. The basic elements featured by the Soviet system were

industrialization, collectivization, and nationalization. The keystone of the total system was central planning. In the traditional sense, socialist doctrine called for production planning, investment planning, and social ownership of property, with the distribution of income according to labor supplied; however, all controlled from the central government. Along the road to economic development, Yugoslavia discarded the traditional methods of central planning and proceeded on an economic development plan driven by political events and an awareness of its diverse peoples.

The path of economic development that Yugoslavia took is closely tied to the ethnic, cultural, and economic disparity which existed before World War II and which exists today. As has been hinted to throughout this report, all the actions taken by past and present elite leaders have been to neutralize the nationalistic disparities between the individual republics and provinces which breed discontent and thus are a destabilizing influence. Tito was very aware of the ethnic differences and pushed economic development in a direction that would be more egalitarian throughout the federation. To repeat, he felt that if he could equalize the economic well being of the peoples of Yugoslavia, then the nationality animosities held before the war could be overcome. Consequently, Yugoslav unity was tied to economic development, and government actions and programs striving to satisfy and accommodate ethnic and cultural differences. Tito's initial move was to use the Soviet system of Joseph Stalin. What then is the development pattern and trends of the Yugoslavian economy? The following sub-sections trace the development of the Yugoslav system:

1. 1945-1949: Post War--Centralization. In every respect, this period of development is characterized by the emulation of the Soviet model--central

planning and control. The total objective following the war was reconstruction, the same pattern followed by Russia. During this period, the Communist Party was the sole master and directed the new centrally controlled economy mainly through nationalization of the means of production, collectivization of the farms, and industrialization designed for rapid growth. Even before the war had ended, the provisional government (ANVOJ) began operating in the Soviet style. In November 1944, a decree was issued to confiscate property of collaborators, former enemies, and people who had fled the country and refused to return. This process of nationalization was culminated in December 1946 when the Nationalization Law was passed "making all industries of 'national importance' and all transportation, banking and wholesale trade facilities the property of the state."⁶³ In fact, a series of acts between 1946 and 1948, nationalized everything except land which came under land reforms and collectivization. However, subsequent to these latter actions, the planning mechanism for central control was made law by the installation of a federal planning commission in May 1946. The republican, district, and Communist organizations⁶⁴ were subordinated to this commission. The enterprises, through the established hierarchy, were told what their targets in both industry and agriculture were to be, and how to meet these goals.

In addition, during this crucial period of rebuilding, the Soviets, along with the Eastern bloc Communist countries provided assistance to Yugoslavia. The Eastern bloc trade with Yugoslavia was 55% of the total. Also, the Eastern countries along with the Soviets provided advisors, technical assistance, and resources for the industrialization process. By the end of 1946, the Yugoslavs felt that the rebuilding phase was complete and it was time to move forward more rapidly; hence, true to the Soviet system, a Five-Year Economic Plan was implemented--1947-1951.

On April 30, 1947 the law on the first Five-Year Plan was enacted and set in motion. The goals and targets for the plan were very vigorous, if not unachievable in a developing country. As one author noted:

...within the five-year period the national income was to increase 93 percent (with 1939 as a comparison year), the value of total production by 128 percent, and the value of industrial production by 394 percent.... Agriculture production was to be increased by 52 percent from the level attained in 1939. The people were to be supplied with increasing quantities of food, clothing, and footwear. Construction of 110 new hospitals with 14,000 beds.... New schools, theaters, museums, and galleries...Housing facilities were to be improved and 15 million square meters of new housing were to be added.⁶⁵

Nearly 27 percent of the national income would be invested each year, of which, almost half would be for industry. Table 3-2 synopsized the planned investment. Of note, is the small investment planned for agriculture, with greatest emphasis on industry, transportation, and the social sector.

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TABLE 3-2

Percentage Investment by Sector: 1947-1951					
	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>
Agriculture	9	12	11	9	8
Forestry	2	3	2	1	1
Mining and Manufacturing	34	32	38	42	46
Construction	1	2	3	3	3
Transport	21	22	13	13	17
Social Investment	26	27	30	29	22
Other	7	2	3	3	3

To get the workers needed for the rapid industrialization process, the government planned to transfer 170,000 workers from the agriculture sector to industry, a move that would double the labor force. A move such as this had a striking effect on the society as a whole and the economy in particular. To illustrate, in 1939 about 75% of the people derived their

income from agriculture. By 1948 it would fall to 68.3; in 1953 it would be about 50%. Commensurately, in 1939 industry and mining accounted for about 27% of the national income, and agriculture contributed 44%. By 1960,⁶⁸ industry and mining grew to over 44% and agriculture fell to less than 25%.

In keeping with Tito's plan to equalize the less developed Southern territories with the more developed North, the plan called for "increases in Bosnia's industrial production of ten and one half times; and in Macedonia of over 26 times; and in the republic of Montenegro, which before the war⁶⁹ had no industry, industrial production was to reach 1.1 billion dinars." As the plan was executed it became apparent that the lofty goals were not going to be met. An ideological split was developing between Yugoslavia, strongly independent, and Russia as she attempted to subjugate Yugoslavia. Then, as is well documented, in 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform and the economy took a turn for the worst.

The expulsion had a devastating effect on Yugoslavia as Russian technicians left and aid was reduced. By 1949, trade with the Eastern bloc countries was nil. Before the economic blockade perpetrated by the Soviets, 48.3 percent of Yugoslavia's imports came from Russia, Czechoslovakia⁷⁰ and Hungary. The Russian sanctioned blockage forced Yugoslavia to turn to the West for economic assistance since the society was being threatened by economic collapse. The United States responded by providing generous amounts of aid in several forms: (1) UNRRA aid between 1945 and 1948, of which the US share was \$365 million; (2) general economic assistance from 1950 to 1959 amounted to \$1,066.1 million; and (3) economic assistance for special projects totaling to \$91.5 million. All in all, the US provided \$1,157.6 million for the period 1950-1959. In addition, \$65 million in 1950-51 was provided in the form of emergency food shipments which were badly needed. This latter need arose from insufficient investment in agriculture, bad

droughts in 1950 and again in 1952, and because of an inefficient collective system.

In agriculture the government vigorously pursued the collectivization of agriculture despite the fact that in 1947 and 1948 the harvests were good and plan goals were being exceeded. In 1945 there were 454 collective farms; by 1948 the number had grown to 1,318; and, by 1950 there were 6,968. In June 1951, the number reached a peak of 6,994 as the regime faced a crises⁷¹ in the agricultural sector. First, there was bitter opposition from the Yugoslav peasants on the policy of collectivization and the peasants passively resisted the system. Second, a drought occurred in 1950, and again in 1952 a worse drought occurred, which drastically reduced agricultural output. These first two factors produced famine conditions and a greater dependence on the West, in particular, American aid. Thomas Wolff captured the mood when he pointed out:

...the peasants in collectives...reached the end of their three-year trial period, and in droves petitioned to get out. By sheer terror, the state stopped what surely would have been a mass flight of the collectives.⁷²

Thus, after the second drought, the grain production fell below pre-war levels, and the administration had to admit that their plan for agriculture failed. In March 1953, a period when the number of collectives fell to a low of 4,821, the government relaxed legislation and permitted the peasants to leave the collectives and allowed private ownership. However, an upper limit of about 25 acres of land that an individual peasant could own, was imposed. The agricultural sector began to improve.

It was obvious to the leaders that the first Five-Year Plan under central control had failed. National income in 1952 was below the 1947 level despite high levels of investment.⁷³ The balance of payments was climbing due to the rapid industrialization and requirement for imports. Also, with emphasis on industry, the impact of two droughts forced a poor agricultural performance and the agricultural sector could not provide needed foreign exchange. Adding to the economic woes was social unrest created by insufficient wages, high prices, and material hardships. The Yugoslavs well knew that the root of all their problems was the Soviet expulsion and economic blockade. But, they also knew it was due to inept planning and inefficient programs designed to equalize the republics and provinces. In 1949, the Plan was extended for one year to 1952.

2. 1949-1953: The Yugoslav System of Worker Self-Management. With the failure of the first Five-Year Plan, Tito and his ideologists began regrouping and forging a new road to socialism which in reality was manifest by the Soviet expulsion. Sweeping political and economic changes were implemented to accommodate the unrest in the country. The Soviet system of total central control and planning was shelved, and gave way to a unique Yugoslav system of decentralized power. At this point, devolution of power was rendered to the republics and provinces. One offshoot of the system was the beginnings of Yugoslav's workers self-management.

In July 1950, Tito promulgated a new "Law on the Management of Economics Organizations by Working Collectives." This law, initially limited to industrial enterprises, carried out the decentralization of the economic sector of power to the republics and provinces by forming workers councils who were responsible for planning the economic well being of the company.⁷⁴ The law stipulated that the

workers councils "are to examine and approve annual economic plans of their enterprise, contract investment loans, approve balance sheets, and make disposition of profits." ⁷⁵ Other laws followed which further decentralized economic planning to the republics and provinces within guidelines established by the Federation. The entire territory of Yugoslavia was divided into self-governing autonomous communes who had the responsibility to impose their own taxes and who had partial control of their budgets and investment funds. By 1953 the decentralization/liberalization process was well under way and was legitimized by the promulgation of the Fundamental Law--a revision of the 1946 constitution. One thing is sure, the driving force for change was the economic failure of the first plan and the political reality of pursuing an international independent policy. The concept of independence, which later led to Yugoslavia's nonalignment foreign policy, and workers self-management are the cornerstones of Yugoslav political and economic policy and doctrine. However, the decentralization process tended to weaken the party and nationalistic animosities. Tito's strong desire to equalize the Federation economically added fuel to the nationality tensions. First, investments were channeled to the South and factories were often built without a suitable infrastructure, thus creating inefficiency and waste. Second, the requirements for the more developed republics (Croatia and Slovenia) to contribute to the Southern inefficiencies by means of this investment and oftentimes duplication of effort in types of factories, led to a greater desire on the part of the republics for more control of their economic resources. It was a constraint on the future development of the more developed republics when funds were drawn away for other purposes. Thus, an attempt at economic equality was exacerbating the nationality problem.

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
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
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Before moving on from these two periods, one other comment should be made pertaining to the military and its impact on the economic situation as described above. Due to the Soviet expulsion and pressures, it was felt that the Soviets might use military force to subjugate Yugoslavia. Thus, military preparedness was stressed, resulting in 23 percent of the national income in 1950 going to the military,⁷⁶ a heavy burden. By 1952 the rate dropped to 19.2 percent, and in 1956 as the Soviet threat subsided, it fell to 9.8 percent.

3. 1954-1973: Economic Reform Period. The 1953 constitutional law made possible the development of workers self-management in enterprises. How effective it was is illustrated by the following comparison. From the period 1923-1929, a period of relative free economic system, the national income grew at an average rate of 3.5 percent. During the period of 1947-1952, a time of centralized control, the national income grew at an annual rate of one percent. Furthermore, in the period 1952-1960 the national income increased at a rate of 10 percent, or 10 times what it had been under central control. It is interesting to note that investment was about 21 percent of the national income which is less than the 26 percent in the 1947 to 1952 period of the first plan which was centrally controlled.

Between 1952 and 1957, after the dismal performance of the first Five-Year Plan, the country was guided by one-year plans. In December 1957, the second Five-Year Plan was promulgated and was to last from 1957 to 1961; however, by 1960 the goals that were set had been achieved and the plan was considered a success. The difference between the first and second plans was that the second plan's goals were more realistic and achievable for a developing country. To illustrate, instead of a 394 percent increase in industry, the second plan was set at 68 percent; agriculture was 42.7 percent vice 52 percent. Nonetheless, even with great success, economic problems prevailed, as Joseph Bombells noted: By 1956 the economic problems

of low agricultural output, a large deficit in balance of payments, a low standard of living, lack of incentive, and low level of productivity, were tackled by the second plan. Yet, even though the plan was a success, he went on to say:

...the balance of payments deficit was not reduced, but sharply increased. The great expansion of industrial products had worsened the balance of trade in that sector, while increase in agriculture production proved too small.... The gap between republics had also continued to widen, with all political consequences coming more sharply into focus.

Technically, though the second plan succeeded, the economy was still hurting. In December 1960, the third Five-Year Plan was instituted and was to run from 1961 to 1965; however, after only two years it was discontinued. A recession occurred in 1961 and price controls were instituted to combat the problem. But still, the economy faltered. Looking at cost of living figures, in October 1964, the cost of living was 15 percent more than October 1963. During the same period, food costs rose 22 percent, and fuel and electricity increased by 35 percent. At approximately the same period(August 1963 to August 1964) wages were 23 percent higher. In addition, the trade deficit during this period continued to rise by over 60 percent. Another interesting fact is that 73 percent of the gross wages earned by the average Yugoslav went to taxes and deductions for social services. By 1965⁸¹ the figure had risen to 80 percent. Of note, is the fact that in 1963 a new constitution was promulgated that further extended the self-management system to all other areas of society, e.g., education, cultural, health, etcetera. Besides the constitutional change, it became apparent that economic reforms were needed to stabilize the country. Again, as in the past, price controls were used as a control mechanism, and in March 1965, a general

price freeze was ordered on all industrial goods. In July 1965, an economic reform consisting of some 30 laws was promulgated. The result was the price of industrial goods rose 39 percent, food prices by over 50 percent, and cost of living by 44 percent. The purpose of the 1965 economic reforms was to free prices from administrative controls and allow the market to be the main determinant of prices. Once again the government felt compelled to impose price controls on most goods. ⁸² Table 3-3 summarizes the movement of prices before and after the 1965 reform.

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TABLE 3-3

Movement of Prices, 1960-1966 (chain index)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
General Retail	108	109	104	105	113	144	107
Cost of Living	110	112	107	105	118	150	107

The impact on the economy during this period was to lower individual incentives and productivity, and in general affected the total performance of the economy.

Two results of the attempt at decentralization in the economy and government were: (1) increased tensions between nationalities, and (2) opening of borders to emigres to find work in Western Europe when employment opportunities slackened. Concerning the first, two factions developed which culminated in a student riot in Croatia in 1971. The first faction believed that the economy must be re-centralized. The second faction led by Croatia, felt that self-management must be expanded and the republics and provinces must have a greater say in how they use their resources. The liberalists won and greater decentralization of the economy occurred with the promulgation of the 1974 constitution; but, not before Tito had to intervene in a nationalistic dispute in Zagreb, Croatia, over economic issues. As we have indicated in

other previous chapters, numerous purges occurred in the republican party governments as the perception that the Party had been weakened persisted.

The second result concerns working Yugoslav emigres. When jobs could not be provided in Yugoslavia, the borders were opened and Yugoslavs were allowed to travel to Western Europe in search of jobs. Two positive results happened in response to the open borders policy: (1) provided an outlet for excessive Yugoslav labor, and (2) the emigres proved to be a source of foreign exchange by means of workers remittances. For example, it was estimated that in 1968, 170 million dollars was remitted back to Yugoslavia. In 1969 the figure rose to 250 million dollars. In 1970 it was estimated⁸⁴ that 750,000 Yugoslavs worked in the West. By 1971, this rose to well over a million people.

During the time frame from 1969 to 1972, there was a rapid increase in production, the average of which was seven percent. At the same time, inflationary pressures and increasing trade deficit pervaded the economy. On the average, between 1964 and 1973 inflation ran at an average of 15.4 percent. By 1974 it reached 30 percent. During the same period the trade⁸⁵ deficit increased from \$660 million in 1969 to \$1,439 million in 1971. Again, Yugoslavia was having an economic crisis, the third in a decade (1960-61, 1964-65, and 1970-71). The answer as usual was the application of a price freeze on all goods and services in November 1971. The inflationary trend abated slightly but soon increased as indicated above to about 30 percent in 1974.

In conclusion, the period between 1954 and 1974 was characterized by further decentralization and the fostering of workers self-management as

an economic policy. It was first introduced by the 1950 Law on Workers Councils and later incorporated in the 1953 and 1963 constitutions. Numerous amendments further required the system and legitimized the self-management policy. Meanwhile, trade deficits, unemployment, inflation, balance of payments and other indicators vacillated in response to two Five-Year Plans and economic reforms of the sixties which were introduced during this period. Somehow the economy continued to grow and Yugoslavia maintained relative stability despite numerous ups and downs.

4. 1974-1980: Continued Economic Growth. On February 21, 1974 a completely revised constitution was promulgated. A voluminous document containing 404 articles, the most notable change was the recognition and legitimation of self-management by stating in Part One, Article One; that, the republics and provinces were "a socialist self-management democratic community of working peoples and citizens of all nations and nationalities having equal rights." However, the final development is not complete, because as Rudolph Bicancic stated, the goals of self-management are the four D's--Decentralization, De-statistation, De-politicization and Democratization. He added "When their ultimate fulfillment is achieved, the State will have withered away, and society will consist of a common-wealth of self-managed, autonomous socialist enterprises and institutions. Self-management had come a long way since the break with the Cominform, but was certainly not withering away--economic problems abounded.

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The Yugoslav economy continued to rapidly grow, fueled by a strong investment policy. From 1960 to 1973 the rate was about 30 percent of the Social Product, a term synonymous with GNP. Further, from 1974 until

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the present, it has run around 33 percent. The high investment program has resulted in a substantially high growth rate running to about an average of six and one-fourth percent of the Social Product since 1955. ⁸⁸ In comparison, the US growth rate is about 3 to 4 percent. However, after the implementation of the 1974 constitution, the growth rate fell to three and three-quarters percent of the Social Product in 1975 and 1976. Commensurately, inflation slowed to about 12 percent between 1975 and 1978. But these recoveries were only temporary as rate of wages rose, forcing labor costs up which, when combined with full production capacity, caused inflationary pressures to once again increase the inflation rate to 18 percent in late 1978, and reaching 30 percent in late 1979. In addition, the Social Product continued to rapidly move and grew at nearly eight percent in 1977. A direct result of this continued rapid growth is the widening trade deficit and balance of payments created by a need for greater imports of resources. For example, in 1977, it was \$4,380 million, while in 1979, it grew to over six billion dollars.

Another problem that cropped up is unemployment created by returning "gastarbeiter" or emigre workers in the West. In 1975 a world recession occurred which had an effect on these workers as jobs became scarce in Western Europe, so they began returning to Yugoslavia. By 1978 some 300,000 workers had returned and the trend continues. Hence, with agricultural workers seeking employment in the cities to raise their standard of living, and with the returning gastarbeiter, the number of job-seekers has since 1975 doubled to 735,000 in 1978. The trend for the returning workers seems to indicate they will continue returning which will strain the economy. It is estimated that 725,000 workers are still in the West. It appears that the outlook remains the same for Yugoslavia as it has in the past; that is, periods of rapid growth followed by periods of consolidation while attempting to reorganize.

CURRENT ECONOMIC TRENDS

The trends for the Yugoslav economy are best described by Yugoslav

Prime Minister Veselin Djuranovic when he warned:

Despite the fact...that the country's economic growth had been 6 to 7 percent higher in 1979 than in 1978, and that industrial production had been up by 8 percent, the country's unfavorable balance of payments, a large trade deficit, too much spending, difficulties stemming from foreign exchange projections and high inflation--in October, 30 percent--had brought the country to the verge of economic ruin.⁹⁰

Table 3-4 summarizes these trends.

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TABLE 3-4

Yugoslav Economic Trends

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
GNP (in #Billion)	54.2	65	20
Investments (in \$Billion)	14.6	18.7	28
Per Capita Income	\$2,462.00	\$2,930.00	19
Slovenia	\$4,887.00	\$5,669.00	16
Serbia	\$2,344.00	\$2,790.00	19
Kosovo	\$ 704.00	\$ 810.00	15
Industrial Production	9%	7.9%	
Agricultural Production	-5%	2.0%	
Productivity	4.1%	4.1%	
Employment	4.1%	4.1%	
Unemployment	7.4%	7.7%	
Cost of Living	16%	23%	
Trade Deficit	4.3	6.4	48
West	3.5	4.7	34
CEMA	.5	.9	80
LDC	.3	.8	167
Foreign Debt (Gross)	11.5	13.0	13
Balance of Payment	1.2	3.2	166
Deficit			

From Table 3-4 it can be seen that the Yugoslav economy is overheated.

The biggest problem facing the government is reducing the balance of payments deficit, no easy task as the price of oil and other resources increase in price on the world market. Of interesting note is the difference in per capita income

of Slovenia as compared to the less developed Kosovo--a seven-fold difference--which indicates that after nearly four decades, Tito's attempt to equalize the production has not succeeded. The cost of living continues to climb while at the same time unemployment rises. In summary, the trends are very unfavorable and will require careful scrutiny. The fact remains, Yugoslavia itself must resolve its economic problems. The West can assist, but is not the total answer. There is no doubt that if the trend continues the Yugoslav economy is in for hard times. The economic development of Yugoslavia to this author indicates that the people of Yugoslavia would not stand peaceably for a return to a Soviet type system. This perception is derived from three observations. First, the market system has allowed Yugoslavia to progress to a higher standard of living and relative freedom compared to Eastern bloc countries. Second, the open border policy and free travel stimulate greater desire for freedom vice oppression. Finally, Yugoslavia with its connections in EEC, OECD and other European agencies, could not revert to a centralized system without civil war. Yugoslavia must remain independent so that stability can be maintained in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the West has a vested interest both politically and geo-strategically to help maintain Yugoslavia's independence.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Tables 2-1 and 2-2.
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CHAPTER IV

MILITARY: FACTOR FOR STABILITY

The task of our army is not merely to defend the territorial integrity of our country, but also to defend our socialism when we see that it is in danger and that it cannot be defended by other means.

Joseph B. Tito
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia
December 21, 1971

With this statement Tito reaffirmed two elements of the military in Yugoslavia. First, it provides for the defense and external security of Yugoslavia. Second, and most important, the army is a political tool that will be used to suppress domestic and nationalistic challenges to the integrity of Yugoslavia. It has been said that the three pillars of Yugoslav society are the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), the Party, and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). The Party because it is the state preserving element, the Army because of its protector role and loyalty to both the state and its leadership. In the preceding chapters we discussed the factors which most likely will affect Yugoslavia's stability as a nation. Our discussion looked at the nationality question, the political and economic systems, and concluded that there is a considerable propensity for instability in Yugoslavia. The question then becomes, what institution(s) are likely to be most effective in holding the Yugoslav state together now that Tito is gone in the face of the above factors? The role played by the Yugoslav People's Army in the preservation of the Yugoslav society will be of critical importance.

YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY (YPA)

The one factor which permeates the entire Yugoslav society is that of nationality. As we have seen, it is the catalyst for all political and economic

actions taken by the government to build the nation. In fact, Tito had been very cognizant of the part nationality plays in Yugoslavia. The history and formation of the south slav state is steeped in the conflict between nationalities and ethnic differences. In 1945 when Tito came to power he attempted to override nationalistic antagonisms by calling for, as he did in the war, brotherhood and unity of the various nationalities. He failed. It was realized that the nationalistic tendencies are innate and will be endured. But what institution(s) are truly Yugoslav? The question has been invariably answered, Tito and the Yugoslav People's Army. The army's ability to rise above the nationality question will be one of the most critical elements for the preservation of stability. The catalyst for the potential outbreak of latent animosities probably will be economic.

When World War II broke out for Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941 (German bombardment), Tito created his Partisan guerrilla force, the forerunner of the YPA. He strategically forged the Partisans into an all-Yugoslav fighting army of all nationalities. He stressed nationalistic equality and coined the slogan-- Brotherhood and Unity. Many historians feel that this was one of the factors which set the Partisans apart from the nationalistic Sub movement of General Draza Mihailovic, the Chetniks, and why it became more popular. Many joined the Partisans to fight the Germans and concerned about communism or the Communist party per se, they were surviving. In the summer of 1944 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as the Partisans were now called, had 390,000 soldiers organized in 39 divisions.³ By 1945 the Army had grown to 800,000 men in 48 divisions and four armies.⁴ The Partisans had been transformed from a guerrilla type force into a conventionally organized army. Moreover, as with the rest of Yugoslav society, the army was under the strict Communist party control with Tito as the Supreme Commander. After the war, the army continued to build a conventional

structure although somewhat smaller in size. Its new name was the People's Liberation Army.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, the post-war period saw Yugoslavia emulate the Soviet Communist system, and the army was no exception. All aspects of the Yugoslav society fell under Soviet influence by choice. At this same time there was a marked increase of Soviet military advisers and it began to appear that Stalin wished to control the Yugoslav army. As Tito noted: "The Soviet Union does not want to help us arm our army and they keep telling us we do not need a strong army, since they will defend us."⁵ But the highly independent Tito did not agree with the Soviets since there were still bordering countries (Italy, Bulgaria, and Albania) who still harbored animosities toward Yugoslavia; hence, he felt the need for a strong standing army. As yet, there was no perceived threat from Russia although a schism was developing.

With the sudden 1948 expulsion of the Yugoslavs from the Cominform, Russia very much became a threat along with Yugoslav neighbors. From 1945 to 1948 the Soviets had attempted to infiltrate the entire Yugoslav fabric including the army. Evidence supporting this contention is the fact that General Arso Jovanovic, Tito's Chief of General Staff of the PLA in 1943-45, was shot while trying to flee to Romania. He reputedly had been working with the Soviets and subverting elements of the Yugoslav army.⁶ By the end of 1950, there had been 1,397 border incidents with Romania, Hungaria, Bulgaria, and Albania.⁷ Another factor having a great impact was the Korean war supported by the Soviets (1950-53). The people of Yugoslavia rallied behind Tito in his stand against Stalin. By 1951 the army had increased from the 32 divisions they had drawn down to in 1948, to 42 divisions--500,000 men in arms. The year 1952 saw Yugoslavia's defense budget become the largest in the world as a percentage of the national economy (22 percent).⁸ Between 1948 and 1950, over fifty percent of the Yugoslav budget was

devoted to defense.⁹ In 1953, Stalin died, the Soviet threat abated, and rapprochement followed.

From Chapter III you will recall how in the sixties, Yugoslavia was going through a process of decentralization and the application of the workers self-management concept to the economy. It had a profound impact on the army which up until this time had been outside the decentralization process. Because of the heavy burden of defense on the budget, the economic reforms of 1965, and the nationalism question, there was considerable debate on the role of the army and its defense role. As authority was decentralized and returned to the republics, it was suggested by the northern provinces that the republics should be responsible for defense in their own territory. As an all-Yugoslav institution, the army rejected this suggestion. At this point it is appropriate to pause and discuss nationalist tendency in the army prior to proceeding further.

For historical reasons, the Yugoslav army is very sensitive to national/ethnic representation of the peoples in the army. Traditionally, from the inception of the Yugoslav government in 1918, the Serbs and Montenegrins have dominated the military hierarchy. As the scholar, Bogdan Denitch, noted, there are several reasons for this phenomenon. First, not only by tradition but they also inhabited the territories most involved in the Partisan warfare. Second, because of the higher economic and cultural level attained by the Croats, Slovenes, and Hungarians, a military career is less attractive than the opportunities in these more developed regions.¹⁰ For example, on the eve of the Second World War in 1939, of the 165 active duty generals, 161 were Serbs, two were Croats, and two were Slovenes. Thirteen-hundred of the 1500 military cadets were Serb.¹¹ This reflects the Serb hegemony in all sections of the government prior to World War II. Nonetheless, it continued in the military until the mid-sixties when economic factors and decentralization afforded the northern republics the opportunity to

press for the assumption of responsibility for their own territorial defense. As indicated earlier, the army balked. To some, separatism as it was called, was unfeasible because none of the republics could defend themselves on their own. Thus in 1965, a new Defense Act was being prepared to revise the military organization of the YPA. Meanwhile, it was suggested that a "key" system be devised for the army to equalize the ethnic representation of all army officers. This was codified in the 1974 Constitution which states in Article 242:

As regards the composition of the officer corps and promotion to senior commanding and directing posts in the Yugoslav People's Army, the principle of the host proportional representation of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces shall be applied.¹²

Just how effective the attempts have been to equalize the nationality structure of the army is reflected in Figure 1, taken from A. Ross Johnson's study.¹³ In essence, Serbs and Montenegrins occupy 66 percent of general officer billets, 67.7 percent of the overall officer positions, and 42.2 percent of the total population. They are still over-represented in the field grade positions but as one author¹⁴ noted in the high command positions, they are "scrupulously balanced to prevent any possible suggestion of Serbian domination. In fact it is, if anything disproportionately balanced against the Serbes." However, it is important for the future that Yugoslavia maintain the careful balance to project a multinational character of an all-Yugoslav institution.

Returning to the point where the National Defense Act was being developed, the feeling or sense of urgency was not felt and planning dragged on. A reflection of the lack of urgency was the fact that the army was down to 200,000 men in 1968 from the 500,000 in 1953. There was no perceived sense of danger or any reason for a major reorganization of the military.¹³

Subsequently on 20-21 August 1968, the armed forces of five Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav response was immediate. Two assumptions were made: (1) the Brezhnev Doctrine signalled that Yugoslavia

FIGURE 1

NATIONALITY OF OFFICER CORPS
(Percentages, rounded)

Nationality	General Officers 1970	Officers Corps 1970	Total Population 1948	Total Population 1971
Serb	46.7	57.4	41.5	39.7
Croat	19.3	14.7	24.0	22.1
Slav Muslim	3.2	4.0	5.1	8.4
	6.3	5.2	8.9	8.2
Albanian	0	1.2	4.8	6.4
Macedonian	3.9	5.6	5.2	5.8
Montengrin	19.3	10.3	2.7	2.5
Hungarian	0.4	0.6	3.2	2.3
Other	0.9	1.0	4.6	4.6

Source: A. Ross Johnson. "The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical Sketch."
(Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation), p. 19.

could be next, and (2) if the Soviets did attack in mass, outside military help might not be available.¹⁵ The new law on National Defense was also pushed through. It provided for the introduction of a new "National Defense System, under which every Yugoslav citizen, without exception, as well as every social group . . . is not to tolerate any type of foreign occupation."¹⁶ The National Defense Act went into effect on February 12, 1969. Thus was born the Total National Defense Strategy for Yugoslavia.

TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE

Once again, an action by the Soviets worked to pull the Yugoslavs together. But because of the drawdown of forces in the sixties, it was infeasible for several reasons to rebuild the army to defend against the Soviets. First, the current economic difficulties would not allow it; second, the decentralized political system coupled with the unavailability of outside aid was a negative factor; and third, in no way could Yugoslavia match the Soviet power or might.¹⁷ Therefore, a system catering to the republics and nationalism was devised--Total National Defense. Adam Roberts defines the defense system as:

A system of defense in depth; it is the governmentally-organized defense of a state's own territory, conducted on its own territory. It is aimed at creating a situation in which an invader, even though he may at least for a time gain geographical possession of part or all of the territory, is constantly harrassed and attacked from all sides. It is a form of defense strategy which has important organizational implications, be liable to involve substantial reliance on a citizen army, including local units of a militia type.¹⁸

Briefly, the Defense Act of 1969 made all the Republics and Provinces responsible to President Tito as the Supreme Commander and required that they operate within the framework of the constitution. The Act had 183 articles covering all aspects of defense. It tasked each republic, province, and commune to set up a national defense staff to plan and support the act at their own

levels. It established two distinct forces of equal status: (1) the YPA, reinforced by the YPA reserves, and (2) the Republic Territorial Defense Units which includes the militia and frontier guards. The Act in essence stipulated that the YPA would resist any invader until full mobilization of the territorial forces could be accomplished. Within this system, the present 259,000-man army would be jointed in 48 hours by one million people. The goal is three million people or fifteen percent of the population. Emphasis is on company sized units at the commune level and on defense units organized on a production basis; that is, within factories (2000 such factories).¹⁹ The republics thus had a role to play in the defense of Yugoslavia. The YPA became the trainers of the Territorial Defense Units. To man the territorial forces, the eligibility criterion is: (1) all adults between the ages sixteen and sixty (fifty-five for women) not assigned to the military or militia, and (2) women with children seven years of age or younger are not eligible.²⁰ The new system is not without cost to the YPA.

The new doctrine has the following effect on the YPA: (1) the new system is a drain on the YPA manpower and material resources in favor of the Territorial Defense Units, and (2) it requires a new organization in the YPA since the military regions did not correspond geographically to the republics.²¹ To illustrate, in a special feature of the Military Review²² dated October 1971 (p. 31), the publication listed one armored division, nine infantry divisions, 33 independent infantry brigades, 12 independent tank brigades, one airborne brigade, and one marine brigade. In the International Institute for Strategic Studies,²³ London, "The Military Balance: 1979-1980," lists no armored divisions--from one to zero, eight infantry divisions--reduction of one, twelve independent infantry brigades--reduction of 21, seven independent tank brigades--a reduction of five, and one airborne and marine brigade--no change. The Yugoslavs have apparently added two

mountain brigades, but the reduction in forces is substantial--two divisions and twenty-six brigades. The gain is between one and three million people with defense in depth.

Since the republics are now responsible for a part of the total defense posture, and they are now responsible for arming their forces, does this not fuel nationalism and foster separatism? It could, however, it also reflects the leadership's confidence in the peoples of Yugoslavia and the YPA as a political force for use against internal turmoil, to sustain the Yugoslav integrity as a nation. It is a two-edge sword chosen on the basis of a greater "Yugoslav Cause." Nonetheless, there is the danger that at some future time, in the event of civil strife the Territorial Forces of one republic could be used against another, although this is not likely. For the future it behooves the Yugoslav government to foster political and economic dependence between the republics.

A more reasonable scenario would suggest the seeking of outside military help by a republic in the interest of protecting itself amidst civil strife. For just such a situation Article 238, Chapter VI, of the National Defense Act specifies:

No one should have the right to acknowledge or sign an act of capitulation, nor accept or recognize the occupation of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia or of any of its individual parts.²⁴

Similar wording can also be found in the Constitution. Clearly, the latent fear of nationalism within Yugoslavia is alive and deep-rooted. In every sphere of government nationalism is accommodated.

YPA FORCE SUMMARY: MANPOWER

To summarize, the total manpower of the Yugoslavian security forces are as follows:²⁵

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>
Army	190,000-130,000 conscripts*
Navy	25,000- 8,000 conscripts
Air Force	45,000- 7,000 conscripts
Total	259,000-145,000 conscripts
Reserves	500,000
Frontier Guard	16,000
Territorial Defense Forces	1,000,000
	1,516,000

*Note: Conscription for the army is for a period fifteen months; after completing initial service, about 20 percent in reserves, and 80 percent in territorial forces.

ROLE OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY

The army in Yugoslavia fulfills three tasks: military defender of the country against outside aggression; unifying factor in a multinational state fragmented by nationality quarrels; and a unifying factor in a party also divided on nationality issues.²⁶ Otherwise, the army is the cornerstone in guaranteeing the integrity of the Federation, it is the right arm of the party, and is above the nationality issue in insuring stability. This later thought is reinforced by a poll conducted in 1968-69 among 16,000 soldiers, cadets, noncommissioned officers and officers in the Federal Army regarding relations between nationalities in the army. The results indicated that 89.4 percent stated it didn't matter what nation (republic) they lived among, and 85.7 percent felt they would have the complete support of the people regardless of which republic they were in when hostilities broke out.²⁷ The role of the army is, however, probably best summarized by the introductory remarks of Tito at the beginning of this chapter and his words at Rudo, Bosnia in Central Yugoslavia in 1971 when he said:

Our army in the first place should defend the country from all foreign enemies . . . but if worse comes to worse, if it is necessary to defend internal order--there is the army . . . he [Tito] would not hesitate to use the army to crush dissidents who threaten the unity of Yugoslavia.²⁸

Also in 1971, during Croatia nationalistic riots in Zagreb, Tito actually threatened to use the military but the disturbance was quelled. The stabilizing feature of the military is reflected in the late Tito's proclaimed confidence and support for the army. This was reinforced as recently as 1979 by Tito's appointment of military officers to high level positions in the party and government thereby giving the military a greater political role.

Party Appointments

When the Eleventh Party Congress convened in 1978, there was a marked increase in the number of army officers elected to the Central Committee (CC) of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The 17 members elected at the Tenth Congress in 1974 were increased to 23 in 1978. Figure 4-1 below summarizes the steady increase in army officers assuming key posts in the CC.

FIGURE 4-1

ARMY CC MEMBERSHIP²⁹

<u>Congress</u>	<u>Number of CC Members</u>	<u>% of Total CC Membership</u>
5th (1948)	2	3
6th (1952)	6	6
7th (1958)	4	3
8th (1964)	9	6
9th (1969)	3	6
10th (1974)	17	10
11th (1978)	23	14

In addition to the above, 36 percent of the armed forces, 90 percent of the NCO's, and 98.5 percent of the officers corps hold partial membership.³⁰ Thus the army is gaining prominence in the Party apparatus.

Government Appointments

In June 1979, an army officer was appointed to the top-state collective leadership position--the State Presidency. General Ivan Dolnicar (Slovene) was also appointed the Secretary-General, replacing a civilian. This appointment further strengthened the role of the YPA in the government. In effect, the Secretary-General serves as a unifying force and helps the president and vice presidents to organize meetings.³¹

The YPA must thus guarantee the unity of both the country and party, and to this end the late Tito strengthened the army's position. The latest appointments place army generals in the following positions: command the country's secret and public police; control of the country's judicial system; Secretary-General of the Presidency; Editor-in-Chief of Kommunist, the major party weekly; Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; Minister of Defense, and not to mention the 23 members within the CC. Of the above mentioned, four are strictly civilian positions. It should be clear that Tito relied on the military and its national leadership will continue to do so. As he planned for his succession, Tito not only strengthened the Army's hand, but also sought to perpetuate the three pillars of government after his death--the State Presidency, the CC Presidium (party), and the Army. Before going on to the next chapter, one more important to US policy must be discussed, Military Assistance.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The United States has a history of aiding Yugoslavia militarily. When Tito broke with the Soviets, he turned to the west for help. In 1951 Yugoslavia received aid from Britain, France, and America. On November of the same year a Military Assistance Agreement was signed by the United States in Belgrade providing tanks, heavy arms, and aircraft for Yugoslavia.³² From between 1950 to 1958, the United States provided \$1,157.6 million dollars of economic aid

and an additional \$724.2 million in military aid.³³ Major US arms sales were terminated in 1960 as Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved. In 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger visited Belgrade and arms talks were renewed. However, American reluctance to provide high technology equipment such as anti-tank (TOW) missiles which might fall into Soviet hands angered the Yugoslavs. Rising prices and the restrictive arms sales policy concerning high technology items disturbed them and the deal was terminated.³⁴ In 1976 the press carried reports that evidence had reached Washington that Yugoslavia was reexporting to Russia sophisticated technology banned by the US Government from sale to the Soviets, "including computers, computerized components, and even entire computerized systems."³⁵ The US response was immediate--Washington cut off shipments. When the United States was assured that its regulations had been complied with, shipments were resumed. However, suspicions remained. Nevertheless, in 1976 negotiations again were resumed and the press reported the possible selling of TOW anti-tank missiles to Yugoslavia was a signal that "the US claims a direct and active mission in maintaining Yugoslavia's independence from Soviet interference after the death of Tito." It also hinted that selling arms to Yugoslavia was one way to break Yugoslav dependence on Soviet equipment.³⁶ In 1977 discussions were again held, this time with Secretary Brown. They concerned "maintenance and communications equipment" and the US Army's new generation of anti-tank missiles.³⁷ No deal was struck. In effect, while the US did the talking, the Soviets delivered. Between 1967-76 the Soviets supplied Yugoslavia with 93 percent or \$540 million dollars worth of equipment; the United States supplied \$5 million during the same period.³⁸ Later in 1978, discussions resumed, but this time they were relatively effective. A \$1.4 million agreement was reputedly reached. The figure was to be increased between \$5 and \$10 million over the next two years.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

This chapter has traced the development of the Yugoslav People's Army and its defense system--the Total National Defense concept. The impact of nationalism on this concept and the resultant Republic Territorial Defense Units were also discussed. Finally, military aid was reviewed.

The evidence clearly indicates that Tito prepared for his succession thoroughly. He made it apparent that the role of the YPA as an arm of the LCY is to be used to combat internal political problems as well as external security problems. The armed forces are to suppress any nationalistic or domestic disputes should they be called upon by the leadership to do so. The message that comes out of Yugoslavia concerning the defense of Yugoslavia and the Army's role is one of confidence. First, Yugoslavia can go it alone and does not need outside help to defend itself. Second, should they be attacked by any aggressor, they will fight a fierce and protracted war. Finally, the cornerstone of Yugoslavian unity continues to be the Party, the Collective Presidency system, and the Army.

Tito in the last few years continued to pursue a modernization program for a modern mobile infantry, well armed with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. He continued to seek US military aid to meet his goal of strengthening the PLA. Within the bounds of a Total Defense Concept, the United States should on an item-by-item basis honor Yugoslav proposals for social reasons: (1) it is important to NATO that Yugoslavia remain independent; therefore, the arming of Yugoslavia would be a signal to the Soviets of US resolve to help keep them independent; and (2) it could establish a useful military tie and assist in breaking Yugoslav dependence upon Soviet equipment and supplies. It is in the national interest of the United States to marshall support from the European Community both politically and economically to reduce the destabilizing influences discussed in the previous two chapters. In the next chapter we will

look at the policies and programs instituted by the government in the pursuit of an independent posture.

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CHAPTER V

NONALIGNMENT: FACTOR FOR INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY

When I say that self-management and non-alignment are for Yugoslavia the essential components of one and the same concept . . . a nation which governs its own country and which recognizes the same right to other nations, cannot, in its international relations, pursue any other policy . . . the policy of equality, mutual respect, independence, that is the policy of non-alignment.¹

Edward Kaldej
Yugoslav Minister of
Foreign Affairs

It has been said that the legacy Tito left Yugoslavia consisted of his policies of independence, self-management, nonalignment and market-socialism. In the above quote from Tito's chief ideologist and architect, are incorporated three out of four of these policies. The policies of self-management and nonalignment are related intrinsically to Yugoslavia's struggle to maintain independence and foster a sense of unity within the country. The struggle for independence and unity has its roots in the post-war relationship of Yugoslavia and Russia. This chapter will trace Yugoslavia's participation in the nonaligned movement and survey the relations which have formed her foreign policy. It will indicate the possible path that the nonaligned movement will take and the implication for US policymakers.

1948-1952: SEEDS OF YUGOSLAV NONALIGNMENT

The single most traumatic event which had a tremendous impact on shaping the Yugoslav society was the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948, the impact of which is still felt today. The expulsion convinced the leadership that the greatest danger to Yugoslavia was not from the West because she was Communist, but from the East, derived mainly

from the threat of Soviet military intervention. To the Yugoslavs, the Hungarian, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan incursions, were vivid reminders of the fate of some of their comrades when the Soviets perceived them to have overstepped the bounds set by Moscow. It was in the context of searching for a means of security that the concept of nonalignment sprang.

But there should be no doubt about one fact. When Yugoslavia was excommunicated, she did not immediately drop support for Russia and go her separate way. Economically, she was still trying to recover from the ravages of war, and therefore, was quite fearful of the Soviets and their power. Recall that Yugoslav allegiance to Russia was manifest in the adoption of the Soviet model for government, which included a constitution and economic guidelines for rebuilding. Yugoslavia was Communist then, is a Communist state now, and will remain Communist. The fact remains that Tito attempted to reconcile his differences with Stalin and remained loyal to, and supportive of Soviet policies. However, Tito's staunch position of earned independence through the war, and his reluctance to relinquish control of his country and the Communist party made reconciliation impossible with Stalin. Through the years, the propensity of Yugoslavia has been to align with the Soviets. That trend will most likely continue since she is a socialist country espousing Marxist-Leninist teachings. At the same time, however, the strength of the relationship will be tied to Yugoslavia's perceived independence, security and, especially, support from other Communist or non-Communist countries. The above comments beg two questions: First, can the new collective regime in Yugoslavia continue Tito's policies; and second, in a confrontation between East and West, notwithstanding Yugoslavia's aversion to blocs, who would she support? Time will answer

the first question; the second is debatable, and no easy answer is apparent.

In 1949 it became apparent to the Yugoslav leadership that with Soviet subversion, border incidents, and moral suasion, reconciliation with Moscow was not possible. The first time this became apparent to the world was in a speech at the United Nations in 1949 by Edward Kardelj, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs when he lambasted the Soviets and implied that the Soviets were the real threat to Yugoslavia.² Because of the perceived solidarity of other Communist countries, Yugoslavia was forced to look to non-Communist countries for security and new relationships. The United States at this time was a strong supporter of Communist containment through the use of the Truman Doctrine and was, therefore, economically supportive of Yugoslavia. Ironically, the Soviet assaults against the Yugoslavs strengthened their unity and pushed Tito into the world limelight as a patriot and champion of national independence.

In 1950, the Korean War, as one writer put it "heightened Yugoslavia's sense of insecurity and expectation of Soviet attack."³ Hence, all avenues of gaining support against the Soviets were explored by the Yugoslavs. As a member of the United Nations Security Council (1950-51), it became evident to Yugoslavia that this agency was an ideal forum to use in Yugoslavia's search for worldwide support to deter the Soviets. As Edward Kardelj noted, it was expected that "the United Nations became the rallying point for all the peoples of the world. . . whenever the peace-minded, democratic and progressive consciousness of nations could not prevail against the spontaneous pressures of momentary conflict of interest."⁴ The United Nations thus became Yugoslavia's voice against the Soviets and later developed into a forum against the Great Powers.

Following Yugoslavia's expulsion, political and economic structures of the country were changed. The Soviet constitution was discarded and a process of liberalization occurred in consonance with Yugoslavia's independence. As we have shown, Tito's preoccupation with the nationality question and the philosophy of brotherhood and unity led to workers self-management. This in turn led to decentralization of powers to the republics and autonomous provinces. But, this might not have happened if Yugoslavia had succumbed to Stalin's pressure. Nonetheless, it is most improbable that this would have occurred because of Tito's power and meteoric rise in worldwide popularity. Tito with Kardelj's help forged a foreign policy which provided security with world support while cleverly playing up the nation's socialist leanings and not further antagonizing the Russians through any alignment with the West. Yugoslavia's "nonalignment" also worked to internally reinforce her unity by enabling her to become an important small nation in a big world--the nonaligned policy provided international recognition which, in turn, fostered Yugoslav pride.

Several factors reinforced Yugoslavia in its intent to pursue a nonaligned policy. First, was the perception that the world was forming up into two power blocs. Tito's experience in the Second World War led him to the conclusion that conflict was inevitable. The keystone of Yugoslav foreign policy was nonalignment with any bloc, and reliance upon the United Nations for the resolution of any disputes. He well knew that he could not align with the West and antagonize the Soviets, nor could he align with the East when Western economic aid was vital to his country. Second, Tito's experience in the United Nations led him to the belief that economics was the root of international tensions, and since he could not align with either East or West, he sought the Third World for support, resources, and markets

for Yugoslav products. Economically, Tito knew he could not compete with the West, nor would the Third World fully supply his needs. But, politically, the nonaligned position gave Yugoslavia a status in the world as a member of the nonaligned movement influential action in the United Nations. Finally, in the desire to keep the Soviets at arms length and preserve his security, Tito used his position with the underdeveloped nations as a bargaining element.⁵

By 1955, tensions with the Soviets had eased and Tito's personal style of diplomacy encouraged other nations to follow Yugoslavia's lead. Among the Third World nations Belgrade had earned great respect for holding off the Soviets and proving to be a force to be reckoned with no matter how small.

1955-1979: SIX NONALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCES

Since the very beginning of the nonaligned movement there have been six conferences. The membership grew from 25 primary nations and three observer nations to over 94 nations. During this time the focus and emphasis on the issues have changed. This section will briefly highlight the meetings and the issues.

FIRST NONALIGNED CONFERENCE: BELGRADE--1961

Because of their association in the United Nations, it was only natural that these three nations, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia who were non-permanent members of the Security Conference, and whose peace initiative by a 1960 joint resolution with Ghana and Indonesia in the United Nations General Assembly which called for a summit meeting between the United States and Russia, headed the first conference.

In July 1956, Tito called a meeting with President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, at his island of

Brioni off the Croatian Coast, to discuss plans for a meeting of the nonaligned nations. It was determined that the criteria for membership in the nonaligned movement would be: (1) an independent foreign policy dedicated to peaceful coexistence; (2) support for national liberation movements (a criteria eventually ignored); (3) nonparticipation in military pacts supporting the cold war, and (4) unwillingness to grant military bases to great powers. As it evolved, nonalignment can be whatever the members said it was.

Several years later, and after personal diplomacy visits by Tito, the first meeting was held at Belgrade in 1961 with 25 nations in attendance. Emphasis was on world peace and recognition that the cause of world tension was the creation of power blocs of nations. The non-aligned nations recognized that if nuclear war was started it would be the lesser nations who would suffer; therefore, they had an interest in being heard no matter how small their voice. To reiterate, at this point in the development of the movement, the focus was on world peace and lessening of the cold war between the two giant antagonists; the United States of America and the USSR who were perceived as causing all world instability.

SECOND AND THIRD CONFERENCES: CAIRO (1960) AND LUSAKA,
ZAMBIA (1970)

At Cairo there were 47 governments representing the nonaligned membership and 10 observer nations; at Lusaka the membership grew to 55 primary and 12 observers. As the membership grew it tended to factionalize into two camps: (1) the radicals (Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Cuba) stressed anti-colonial themes and economic disparities, and (2) the moderates (India, Kenya, Nigeria, Ceylon, Yugoslavia) continued their emphasis on world peace

and the need for balance in the face of the cold war. The Lusaka Summit turned out to be the last "moderate" meeting.⁶

FOURTH CONFERENCE: ALGERIA (1973)

As the fourth conference convened, the world scene had changed. As Mr. Leo Grande indicated in his excellent article on the "Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement." Problems in Communism, January-February 1980; cold war had given way to detente; and the economic crises of inflation and recession were aggravating the nonaligned countries' ability to compete economically. The crises tended to bring together the nonaligned countries around an economic cause. This focus tended to direct grievances against the developed West and politically. The themes of colonialism, imperialism, and exploitation of the lesser developed countries (LDC) became the vogue. The radical element began to exert greater influence.

FIFTH CONFERENCE: SRI LANKA, COLOMBO--1976

During this conference Cuba attempted to get her views accepted by the other nonaligned nations as the focus of the movement turned toward economic factors. As Mr. Leon Grande noted: "In the 1960's statements by Cuban delegates had reflected views only of the most radical wing. . . . By the 1970's . . . Cuba's views were widely shared."⁷ Tito and the moderates were still relatively able to control the movement. Considerable more criticism was directly aimed at the United States and imperialism, a term associated with the United States; whereas, hegemony, a term associated with the USSR was avoided. Thus the radical element and world economic conditions changed the focus from world peace to political economic elements.

SIXTH CONFERENCE: CUBA--1979

This quote from YUGOSLAV LIFE hinted at things to come at the sixth conference:

One of the crucial points in the entire policy and movement of nonalignment now concerns beyond any doubt the preservation of the authentic nature of the movement, maintenance of its fundamental commitment, unity of action and international role.⁸

A flurry of diplomatic activity amongst the nonaligned countries ensued. In fact, Tito, although 87 years old and not well, went on a tour of four continents, talking with the heads of six countries. Yugoslavia's fear was that the movement would move left and support Cuba's contention that the natural allies of the Third World were the socialist states. To Castro, President of Cuba, it was a question of socialism versus imperialism of the United States.

When the conference opened, Castro assailed US Yankee Imperialism which prompted the US and Chinese diplomats to walk out and leave.⁹ Castro was accused of trying to draw the movement into the Soviet sphere; thus, violating the precept of non-bloc affiliation--this he denied. Castro, per nonaligned operating procedures, since his country was the host, until the next meeting in 1982 in India.

Tito in attendance, even though ill, spoke to the gathering from a chair. It was low key and very diplomatic, exalting the movement and "opposed to bloc politics and foreign domination, to all forms of political and economic hegemony (emphases added)."¹⁰ The master diplomat had once again triumphed and put down the radical element. But, the United States was still denounced for activities in the Middle East. Castro ended the summit by saying "(I) will never use the movement to benefit our country, but shall use it to struggle and work for others."¹¹ At one point in the conference, it was

reputed by the Singapore Foreign Minister, that Castro took his glove and flung it down before Tito exulting him to pick it up. Tito replied "I'm too tired, you pick it up."¹² Is this a portend of things to come in the nonaligned movement.

YUGOSLAV-NONALIGNMENT POLICY

It is clear that Yugoslavia still adheres to the very basic principles of the nonalignment movement: (1) independent foreign policy, (2) non-bloc alignment, and (3) support movements for national independence.

OUTLOOK FOR YUGOSLAV NONALIGNMENT IN THE EIGHTIES

First, with the passing of Tito it can be expected that the leadership role so carefully nurtured by Tito will be lost, to whom is the question. (Cuba?) Second, it appears that the nonalignment movement will regionalize as groups of countries and factions congeal. Finally, Yugoslavia's loss of leadership will impact on her position in the world, heretofore, much greater than her size, will wane and unity in the country will be challenged without a strong leader such as Tito.

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CHAPTER VI

CURRENT US POLICY FOR YUGOSLAVIA

I would never go to war, or become militarily involved in the internal affairs of another country unless our own security was directly threatened. . . and I don't think that our security would be directly threatened if the Soviet Union went into Yugoslavia.

Jimmy Carter¹
October 23, 1976

The statement made by then Governor Carter during a presidential debate with President Gerald Ford caused considerable concern within political circles in the United States and NATO not to mention Yugoslavia. Why was such a statement offensive? On the one hand, it contradicted established American foreign policy toward Yugoslavia followed by every President since Truman (fifties), and on the other, if he were to be elected president, a policy statement such as this would signal to the Soviets a free hand in Yugoslavia and indicate that Yugoslavia was outside the US sphere of influence. The last time such statement was made we found ourselves in a war in Korea.² Moreover, this apparent repudiation of the policy affecting the southern flank of NATO raises speculation regarding the courses of action which the Soviets could take to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean. There is considerable fear in the West that because of the Soviet actions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), and now Afghanistan, it is not outside the realm of possibility, in light of Carter's statement, that the Soviets would use military force to subjugate Yugoslavia. Later in this section we will examine the Soviet interests and reasons why such an action might be justified by them.

Carter is now President, raising questions as to what US policy is regarding the East European Communist countries and in particular, Yugoslavia. This chapter will review in broad terms the policies of the United States since the fifties; focus on Yugoslavia and examine our interests there as enunciated by our government; examine the specific expressed policy toward Yugoslavia; and, finally, conclude by discussing several policy options in preparation for the final chapter of this study.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Jack C. Plano and Roy Alton, authors of "The International Relations Dictionary" define Foreign Policy as:

A strategy or planned course of action developed by the decision makers of a state vis-a-vis other states or international entities aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interests.³

If you accept this definition, then you will agree with a thesis the author holds that US foreign policy is sorely deficient in planning, specifying national interests and goals, and communicating that policy to the people. First, our government bureaucracy is so huge that the process, if ever there was one, of the elites for determining our national interests has been lost in the vastness of the bureaucracy. Second, the determination or agreement on our interests are obscured. Third, there is no formal process by which a single document is developed to delineate the national interests, goals to satisfy these interests, and a plan to carry out those goals. Instead, to find out what the policy is we have to accumulate information from various sources in our government. For example, we use policy statements by the President, Secretary of State, and Congressional members; the President's State of the Union Address; budget messages to

Congress; Congressional hearings and legislation; and, a myriad of other government sources to determine the nature of the policy.. It is no wonder that to our allies, or any other nation for that matter, it is very difficult and risky to interpret the signals sent by our government. Incidentally, while the author was gathering data for this study he was struck by a statement made by Mr. William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to a Congressional committee examining US policy toward Eastern Europe in which he said: "In looking back over the past record We have no record of extensive testimony on Eastern European policy in particular, and there are usually only a few policy statements, and this offered us an excellent opportunity to pull together the threads of our relations with this part of the world over the last 15 or 20 years."⁴ Even at his level, the information has to be pulled together to arrive at a policy for an area of great importance to world stability.

We have evolved into a crises management mode of foreign policymaking. During interviews with government officials this observation was reinforced by the impression that long range planning is precipitous and spur-of-the-moment, and that daily actions follow events. Henry Kissinger best described the process as, "Bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership" in which "the approach to policy is ad hoc, pragmatic, and somewhat mechanical."⁵ He asserted that the nature and content of an event dictates or produces a solution, and that the tendency is to wait until an event occurs before taking action.⁶ We deal with events as they occur with very little forethought. The US Government's action in the Iranian and Afghan crises illustrate this reactive philosophy. This mode inevitably results in a shortsighted foreign policy.

It has been said that our policies are not clearly articulated until after the fact, and then, depend only on the criticality of the event. President Carter went on national television after Russia invaded Afghanistan to tell the nation what our policy was. The President's action vividly illustrates the reactive approach highlighted in this study. Thus the net effect is, our policy lacks credibility and trust. The bottom line is that our policy which reflects our national interests is not well known; is shortsighted or too broad; is general or ambiguous; and is very seldom understood by the public at large. In view of the foregoing, what is the foreign policy of the United States toward Eastern Europe in general, and toward Yugoslavia as a special Eastern European nation? What will be our policy toward Yugoslavia since Tito died or, more significantly, will it matter if civil strife occurs or worse yet, the Soviets use military force?

Having laid this foundation, the next section will discuss the evolution of US policy on the broad scale, and subsequently will focus on Yugoslavia.

FOREIGN POLICY EVOLUTION

If one generalization can be made concerning the evolution of US foreign policy from the post World War II era to the present, it is that this policy has lacked purpose, and has suffered from chronic indecision.⁷ In just over three decades there have been six distinct policies, possibly because this same period witnessed the administrations of seven different presidents. It appears that each president advocated his own concept of foreign policy and one after another they developed the policies of "containment," "liberation," "peaceful engagement," "bridge-building," "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine," and Carter's "moral politics." This section will examine just a few of these concepts prior to a discussion of current foreign policy.

In the late forties and early fifties, following World War II, the policies which developed were the result of perceived Russian Communist expansionism. The first was "containment" as espoused by then President Truman. It was a policy designed to halt Soviet expansion and influence. The aim was to convince the Soviets that what they could not attain by subversion or violent means, they could secure through peaceful accommodations.

Following Stalin's death in 1953 it appeared the "cold war" was easing. The new Premier of Russia, Nikita Khrushchev began a de-Stalinization process designed to eradicate the policies of Stalin. The Eastern European countries experienced some liberalization; however, in 1956 Hungary was invaded by the Soviets when the changes were too great. This same year witnessed the creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization. During the next two decades the US policy was one of attempting to deal with each country independently. President Johnson described his policy as "bridge-building" in the hope of creating a better understanding between the East European countries and the United States.⁸ The aim was to loosen Soviet hegemony over the Eastern European countries.

In the sixties a new phenomena emerged--the striving of Eastern Communist nations for independence within the bounds of Soviet influence. In 1964, Romania declared its independent policy based on its own national interests. But this euphoria of anti-Soviet invasion (except Romania) of Czechoslovakia "seeking to establish a more human and pluralist social order."⁹

The beginning of the seventies ushered in the forerunner of the Sonnenfeldt doctrine--detente.

When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was asked in 1976 to interpret the meaning of the term detente, a term which had been extant in foreign policy jargon for some time, he replied:

The word detente attempts to deal with the reality of our relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . We have the fact that Soviet power is growing and must be matched and that Soviet expansion must be prevented We are attempting to create a better environment and kind of coexistence that is less dependent on a balance of terror."⁹

There was a feeling that the East Europeans were seeking greater economic freedom and wished to exchange heavy industry and military equipment for consumer goods. In some circles the argument was made that as these countries produced more consumer goods and the standard of living rose, this would create pressure for freedom as we know it in the West. The intent of this US policy was to foster this evolution. As the external tensions subsided, it was hoped the Soviet branch of communism would become less belligerent. But Kissinger noted in his book "The Necessity for Choice":

It is idle to expect communism, which has been expanding for over a quarter of a century, to transform itself into a democratic government . . . a democratic government of the Western type in the Soviet Union would require not evolution but a revolutionary upheaval.¹⁰

With this in mind, American foreign policy took another turn in 1976 to what is now known as the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, State Department Counselor and Kissinger's chief advisor, addressed a London meeting of ambassadors in December 1975 and gave what was interpreted as new American Policy. In the speech, he indicated that the single most important unifying force in East Europe was the presence of Soviet military power. But this power is developing unequally; that is, the present relationship between the Soviets and her client states is unnatural and unstable. Therefore it should be the policy of the United States to "influence the events in this area--because of the present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union--so that they would not sooner or later explode, causing World War III." Sonnenfeldt went on further to say "So it

must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one." Further, he adds: "our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence."¹¹ In essence, through these remarks the Soviets were conceded the East European states and it was posited that US tampering and even a "peaceful engagement" would upset Soviet hegemony and threaten their sphere of influence. Thus he cautioned that the United States must be very careful in fostering economic expectations and Western thoughts which could be construed as encroachment. So our policy must be one of response to East European aspirations for greater economic and political autonomy while remaining every conscious of the Soviet Geopolitical influence.¹² In a sense it was an attempt to tamper the rising forces of individualism in Eastern Europe sometimes attributed to Tito's influence and success with Yugoslavia.

The Carter position on foreign policy toward Eastern Europe was spelled out by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Mr. Luers, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, during the period September 7-14, 1978. He based President Carter's policy on four premises:¹³ (1) recognition and support for the nations in East Europe in more independent approach to domestic and foreign affairs, (2) treatment of each of the states as a sovereign country while taking into account the political and geographical realities of the area, (3) improvement of relations with the countries through expanded human contacts, trade, institutional cooperation, and information flow, and (4) recognizing the limits of US influences in the region and the importance of contributing to

the security of Europe in pursuit of our policies. But the principle that sets the Carter policy apart from all others is the active fostering of the human rights principle adopted by the United Nations and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act in which 35 nations participated, including all the nations of Europe (except Albania), the United States and Canada. In addition, the policy places its emphasis on closer relations with nations based on the demonstrated propensity to liberalize their domestic and internal treatment of their population.

Because of Yugoslavia's policy of decentralization and "relative" freedom she enjoys not only the political but the economic benefits of Most-favored-Nation treatment by the US. Access to low-interest loans, and once again being considered for arms sales.

In summary, this section has sought to present the author's impression of US foreign policy shortfalls. The evolution of foreign policy from the early fifties to the present was then briefly traced. It is the author's contention that through all the different successive administrations, US foreign policy has fluctuated and has not specified, other than in the broadest of terms, clear policy objectives or goals. In addition, the policy has not been consistent. This may be the result of each administration imposing its own views regarding the nature of US national interests. Moreover, in a reactive bureaucratic system charged with fulfilling the "event, content, action, and solution" cycle, forethought and planning are negligible. In fairness, this "flexibility" in shifting policies is a strength of our nation--it keeps other countries guessing our reaction in the event of a crisis.

Finally, the current Carter administration policy was briefly examined. (In keeping with the changing tradition of American foreign

policy) The Carter approach to foreign policy was discussed as representing a distinct change from the Nixon and Ford administration policies.¹⁴

Before looking at the current policy toward Yugoslavia, US interests, as spelled out in the official literature, will be addressed.

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

As noted in Chapter I, the primary reason for Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 was her strong desire to be independent and not become subservient to the Soviets, who were attempting to unify and control the Communist parties of Eastern Europe. In a sense, it was a revision to the historical ideal of the USSR as "protector" of the Balkans states and implement Pan-Slavism. Thus, after three years of strained relations with the Soviets following World War II, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Eastern Communist community. The ravages of war took their toll on Yugoslavia, poor and in need of economic aid and moral support to fend off the "great bear" who was employing tactics of subversion, propaganda, and economic sanctions for the purpose of aligning her in the Soviet Bloc of nations.

To the United States it was perfectly clear that two ideological blocs of nations were forming. To oppose the Communist bloc headed by the Soviets, it became the policy of the US to assist as much as possible in the reconstruction of Europe with the objective of lessening Soviet influence. The Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan and the idea of "Containment" satisfied these aims. When Yugoslavia broke with the Soviets, she was supported economically by the US during the period 1950-67 for about \$2.0 billion.¹⁵ One common thread in the policies of all of the presidents of the United States toward Yugoslavia was--support, her independence, sovereignty, and territorial borders. To the US, our aid helped Yugoslavia to maintain her independence from the Soviet camp and remain nonaligned with either bloc, despite our desire to win Belgrade over.

This leads us to current US interests in Yugoslavia.

Basically, there are two reasons why Yugoslavia is important to the United States, security and economic interests, which are intimately linked to our aspirations for Eastern European liberalization.

SECURITY INTERESTS

The overwhelming interest of the United States is the geostrategic position Yugoslavia enjoys in one of the most significant areas of the Mediterranean and Europe. It is important for these reasons. First, the military control of the area influences the balance of power worldwide. Second, the influence of Western policy is intrinsically tied to US political and economic support to various countries in the area. Third, Yugoslav reversion to the Soviet bloc and influence would tend to lead to an upset of the balance of power worldwide. In addition, a neutral Yugoslavia represents a buffer between the East and West polities.

In a report in December 1979, by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the US objectives in Yugoslavia were spelled out as:

to deny the Soviet Union hegemony over the country and to insure that Yugoslavia would not become a base for Soviet operations which might threaten the regional balance in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁶

Unfortunately, this view was not communicated well to the public at large until after Tito's severe illness, and then, only through a remark by President Carter at a news conference on February 13 in which he said he had "frequent" talks with leaders of European countries about the need to protect Yugoslavia from being "dominated by the Soviet Union."¹⁷

Soviet interests appear more sweeping. In the past several years the Soviets have been building a "Blue Water" navy and challenging the United States navy position as the leading naval power in the world. Associated with this plan is the capability to project sea power in the context of the Mediterranean.

Historically, because of the relative geographic position of Russia, vis-a-vis the Black Sea, Bosphorus and Dardenelles Strait, the Soviets have been denied unrestrained access to the Mediterranean. This restraint applies to peacetime as well as in time of war by the Montreaux Convention of July 1936 to which the Soviets are a party. The Montreaux Convention (Articles 10, 14 and 18 to 21) restricts non-Black sea states from sending warships into the Black Sea as well as constraining the Soviets. Articles 10 and 11 specify that: (1) Aircraft carriers are prohibited, and (2) Submarines are allowed to transit the straits in the daytime, on the surface and then only to allow Black Sea based submarines to leave and return from non-Black sea dockyards.¹⁸ Restrictions such as this prompt the Russians to seek new warm water ports in the Mediterranean and along the African coasts. Most notably, in August 1976, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, architect of the "Blue Water" navy, visited Yugoslavia naval units and ports. It was speculated that the visit was an attempt to pressure the Yugoslavs into providing additional support for Soviet vessels and for more port facilities.¹⁹ What prompts this attempt to obtain Yugoslav facilities is reflected in Belgrade's present legislation on foreign warships in Yugoslav waters.

Presently, the Soviets are restricted by regulations contained in the Law on Coastal Waters, and the External zone of Territorial Waters, as amended in 1972 and 1974. Paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the law stipulates that a maximum of "three foreign combat vessels and two foreign auxiliary naval vessels" may remain at the same time in Yugoslav harbors and then only at naval installations designated by the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. Moreover, "not more than two foreign vessels from the same country may be repaired simultaneously in the same port." Furthermore, time for repair should not "exceed six months."

Tonnage limits specify no ships larger than 4,000 tons for combat or 10,000 for an auxiliary. From this regulation, it is clear that Yugoslavia values her ports and maintains close control on her naval facilities, wary of sea power that could be used against her coastal facilities. To the Soviets this is a nuisance; however, it is endured as necessary since Egypt closed her ports to the Soviets in April 1976.²⁰ In 1977 the New York Times²¹ indicated that the Soviets were using the new port facility at Tivat in Kotor Bay near Albania. Most of the submarines repaired at the facilities have been the non-nuclear foxtrot -class vessels. Experts feel that the Soviet objective is to get Yugoslavia to let them use Tivat indefinitely. From the foregoing, it appears that Admiral Gorshkov was successful in his trip to Yugoslavia. In any case, it presents a problem to the US sixth fleet operating in the Mediterranean.

From a US perspective, Soviet Air, land and sea bases in Yugoslavia would severely upset NATO's southern flank militarily and would have an immeasurable effect on Italy and Greece politically.

The evidence clearly indicates that possession and/or use of the port facilities in the Adriatic are an important element in the East-West balance of power. As long as Yugoslavia is neutral and continues her close control over units in her ports and waters, the balance of power will remain as it is today. To the United States, Yugoslavia's independence and neutrality is vital to world peace. A threat to NATO security is a threat to the United States and our commitment to Europe.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

The economic relationship between the United States and Yugoslavia is distinct from US relations with any other East European country. Because of Yugoslavia's break with the Soviets in 1948, the United States, notwithstanding Belgrade's Communist regime and leanings, has treated Yugoslavia favorably throughout the

years. There are those who believe,²² that the overriding objective is to commercially assist Yugoslavia within certain bounds as a Communist country and help her to maintain economic independence and stability. As long as this policy is followed, Yugoslavia should remain non-aligned, subscribing to no single power for her allegiance or dependence. But, because she is a Communist non-aligned country, she occasionally will take stands against the United States and the West. For example she condemned actions in Vietnam and provided assistance to another "non-aligned" nation. US relations with Yugoslavia have fluctuated widely but the latter has consistently remained both non-aligned and neutral. Her independent bent in her relationship with Russia has been just as strong and she does not hesitate to criticize other Communist countries when she feels they are wrong. Yugoslavia (and Romania) strongly denounced the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan when Yugoslav representative at the United Nations, Miljan Komatina said at a UN Security Council meeting:

. . . There are and there can be no good and bad justified and non-justified foreign intervention. In keeping with this Yugoslavia accepts no preventive wars or military interventions under the pretext of so-called security reasons.²³

Yugoslavia remains dedicated to her position of independence and policy of self-determination.

During the rehabilitation period of the country following World War II, the United States supplied Yugoslavia with between \$2-2.5 billion of which \$724.6 million was military aid.²⁴ The reason for the aid was our attempt to shore up Yugoslavia economically when she broke with the Soviets in 1948. Recall that the Soviets employed economic embargoes and sanctions to bring her to her knees. Only with US aid was she able to maintain her independent stand. However, as Yugoslavia began to recover and grow economically, US aid slacked off. Military aid stopped in 1960 and by 1967 most economic aid had terminated.

Our position with Communist Yugoslavia is unique. In the trade area, she receives most-favored nation status; has access to low-interest loans; is sold military arms; is eligible for Export-Import Bank credits; and Overseas Private Investment Corporation benefits.²⁵ Yugoslavia has undisputedly benefited from her economic dealings with the West. Another illustration is also in the trade area. At present, Yugoslavia trades more with the Western countries than with the Socialist bloc. In 1977, 57 per cent of her imports came from the West, 29 per cent from the Socialist bloc Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), and 14 per cent from the developing countries.²⁶ But as has already been shown in Chapter III, Yugoslavia's economic outlook is not good: Inflation is high; an unfavorable balance of payments and growing trade imbalances present along with unemployment; and, excessive public spending.

A second aspect of aid is military arms sales. Major military arms shipments terminated in 1960, and only within the past couple of years has consideration been given to Yugoslavia for renewed military aid in larger amounts. Yugoslavia's primary supplier of arms has been the Soviet Union. In the period 1967-1976, Yugoslavia received \$581 million from various countries, of which the Soviet Union supplied \$540 million, and the US supplied \$5 million.²⁷ The amount of military aid has created a problem for Yugoslavia as well as the United States. For Yugoslavia has somewhat become dependent on the Soviets for logistical support for the weapons she has purchased from them. An embargo on spares could adversely affect Yugoslavia's military posture. Therefore, Yugoslavia has turned to the United States for more modern weapons as a hedge against dependence on the USSR. In some governmental quarters, there is a reluctance to sell to the Yugoslavs for fear that the weapons would end up in Soviet hands. Nevertheless, in 1978

President Tito visited the United States and one of the areas of discussion was arms sales.²⁸ Subsequently, Defense Minister Ljubicic came to the United States and had discussions with Defense Secretary Harold Brown. The result was that arms shipments to Yugoslavia in FY1978 totaled about \$1.4 million.²⁹ More sales are expected in the future to counter the Yugoslav dependence on the Soviets.

CURRENT US POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

Policy statements by all US Presidents from Truman to Carter regarding US interests in Yugoslavia stressed one recurring theme--maintain Yugoslavia's independence and neutrality between East and West.³⁰ As indicated earlier in this chapter, to determine US policy toward any country requires a search of numerous sources for "Policy Statements." A search of the documents with reference to Yugoslavia reveals the following:

1. In the late forties and early fifties, President Truman enunciated his "Truman Doctrine" in an address to Congress. In his policy statement he declared that the United States must go to the aid of any country whose "freedom and independence" was threatened. The basic theme was the need to halt the spread of communism in Eastern Europe. Moreover, an element of this "containment" policy was the Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program outlined in a speech at Harvard University. The plan specified that the United States would financially assist the states of Europe to recover.³¹ Thus, Yugoslavia received financial aid and support which enabled it to remain independent and neutral following its '48 break with the Soviets.

2. In his memoirs, President Johnson recalled how he felt that distrust could never be broken down between the United States and the Soviets. One of the reasons was the US policy of total disapproval of communism and the carryover of "McCarthyism" which also contributed to our turning our back on the East European countries. Johnson, in the belief that tensions were easing between the Soviets

and the United States, set out to establish relationships with the East European countries forced into communism after World War II. Johnson's policy statement in 1968 at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia during the George C. Marshall Library dedication stated:

Today . . . we work to carry on the vision of the Marshall Plan. . . the United States would work to 'build bridges'-- bridges of trade, travel, and humanitarian assistance.³⁴

President Johnson supported Yugoslavia's independence and neutrality and became a trend to normalize relations with the East European countries. When Czechoslovakia was invaded by Russia in 1968, President Johnson is reputed to have warned the Soviets against unleashing "the dogs of war" by any similar means in Yugoslavia.

3. President Nixon took Johnson's policy one step further. In a 1973 report to Congress entitled "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's," he stated a policy of shaping a durable peace. In the report the President noted³⁴ that the improved relationship with the Soviets (1972) had introduced an atmosphere favoring better relations with the East European countries. He added "We do not regard our relation with any East European country as a function of our relations with Moscow." This statement was to be refuted by the Ford administration in 1976, despite Secretary of State Kissinger's presence as chief foreign policy architect in both administrations. Nixon then went on to say: "We shall continue to seek ways to expand our economic, scientific, technological, and cultural contacts with the Eastern Communists." Mutual benefit and reciprocity are governing principles." But most importantly with regard to Yugoslavia, Nixon spelled out our interests and policies when he emphasized:

. . . our long-standing and cordial relationship with that important non-aligned country. Its independence, political stability, and economic well being are key factors for continuing peace in Europe. (underline added)

In spite of the hot and cold relationships with Yugoslavia created by Yugoslav stands on the Arab-Israeli and Vietnam Wars, the peace in Europe overshadowed ideological differences.

4. In 1976, US policy toward Yugoslavia became confused and inconsistent. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's key aide, in an address to the American European ambassadors in 1975 (December) suggested that it was Russian military power and her inability to foster an "organic" or natural relationship with the East European countries which had created an environment of potential conflict. But the section of the speech pertaining to Yugoslavia that was most revealing and which upset Yugoslav officials because of its implications was contained in the conclusion:

Finally on Yugoslavia, we and the Western Europeans indeed, the Eastern Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet Domination. . . . we accept the Yugoslav behavior will continue to be, as it has in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power. But any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major strategic setback for the West.³⁵

He went on to add that our basic policy was still keeping Yugoslavia independent from the Soviets:

Now at the same time, we would like them to be less obnoxious, and we should allow them to get away with very little. We should especially disabuse them of the notion that our interests in their independence is greater than our own and, therefore, they have a free ride.³⁶

Yugoslav officials resented the implication that Yugoslavia was in the controlling sphere of the USSR. Today, the US policy regards Yugoslavia as bordering on the vital for our own national security.

5. In April 1976, under the Ford administration, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during the question and answer period following a speech to the

Phoenix, Arizona, Downtown Rotary Club, was asked a question pertaining to Yugoslavia. His response clearly indicated what the administration felt at that time. He said:

The United States believes that the independence and sovereignty of Yugoslavia should be, must be, respected and that it should have the opportunity to develop its policies free of outside military pressure. . . if such an event were to occur, it would present a very grave situation, and it is one that the United States could not accept.³⁷

6. Policy statements, so far, are fairly consistent. But late in 1976, the picture gets very cloudy. Again, recall that in the beginning of this chapter, then Governor Carter made the statement: "I don't believe that our security would be threatened if the Soviet Union went into Yugoslavia." To many this was perceived as an open invitation to the Russians to do as they pleased; the United States would not interfere. President Ford responded that Carter's comment was a "singular mistake" and further added "when the potential adversary knows what you will and won't do in advance, your flexibility is limited and his increased."³⁸ Secretary Kissinger joined in the debate, remarking that Carter's statement was "unwise," and "dangerous." He suggested that Carter reconsider his views on the subject. A few days later Kissinger added:

It is my responsibility as Secretary of State that foreign countries not misunderstand what America considers to be its security interests [sic--interesting in light of President Ford's comments]. . . therefore I stated what six Administrators have stated; namely, that the United States has an interest in the independence and non-alignment of Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

In clearer terms Kissinger stated: "a threat to the independence and sovereignty and non-alignment of Yugoslavia is a matter of grave concern."⁴¹ He indicated that how the United States would respond would depend on the circumstances and that he felt that our policy was to "prevent this threat,"⁴² but not present a

checklist of actions ahead of time. This statement contains all the elements of the author's thesis: event, content, action, solution type of planning.

7. To determine present policy toward Yugoslavia, a search of official documents yields several guideposts regarding current policy. Shortly after taking office, President Carter sent Vice President Mondale on a goodwill trip that included Yugoslavia. In a statement by the President announcing the trip, he carefully reiterated the US concern and stressed the importance of Yugoslavia's independence, political unity and territorial integrity.⁴³ Almost a year later at the invitation of President Carter, President Tito paid a state visit to the United States (March 7-9, 1978). In the joint communique following their meeting, President Carter reiterated again:

Continuing support of the United States for the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia. . . . United States is interested in a strong and independent Yugoslavia as a factor for balance, peace and stability in the World.⁴⁴

It now appears that President Carter is repeating what every President since Truman has advocated. In fact, in a report in US News and World Report, dated February 25, 1980,⁴⁵ Carter appears to have reversed his earlier position. At a press conference he indicated that he had been in contact with European countries and had discussed protection of Yugoslavia from being dominated or threatened. President Carter further added: "if we are called upon to give any kind of aid to the Yugoslavian people in the future, we would seriously consider it."⁴⁶ He did not specify what "kind" of aid we would supply, but his comment was clearly for Soviet ears. To summarize, President Carter's policy toward Yugoslavia is:

a. Maintenance of Yugoslavia's independence and neutrality to preserve the balance of power in Europe and the world.

- b. Reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's commitment to non-alignment.
- c. Respect for Yugoslavia's individuality in its chosen type of government with bilateral relations remaining active.
- d. Increase in economic relations as being in the best interest of both countries in order to provide economic stability and well being.
- e. Reassurance of the trust and confidence between the two countries and promotion of human rights principles.

Having determined current US policy, the following paragraphs attempt to outline the author's basic foreign policy thesis.

POLICY OPTIONS THESIS

When viewed in the context of US perception of Yugoslavia's political and economic position in the world, the policy options available to US elites must above all else consider the contribution to and support for our own National Security and Interests.

As has been pointed out, the various administrations formulate their own conclusions as to the nature of the enduring values and beliefs in this country which combine to form our national interests. Some of these interests are considered vital for various domestic and international reasons. The problem facing the US policymaker is the translation of those interests into a workable plan which is generally accepted by the people. All too often the reasons behind the "interests" are hidden and not communicated to the public at large, which ultimately must support the policy decisions. For example, in the case of Vietnam, it was clear as to why the United States became so deeply involved; the commitment just seemed to evolve as the crises expanded and the United States "reacted." The need for a general consensus, and the importance of communicating US objectives in the interest of securing public support, cannot be overly stressed. This, then, is the essence of long range planning in the international/

political arena. We must determine what our interests are, establish long range goals, set the objectives to meet those goals and clearly enunciate them in order to form the vital national consensus.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Transcript of Foreign Affairs Debate Between Ford and Carter." New York Times, October 7, 1976, p. 10.
2. See Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 551, Pub. 3729, January 23, 1950: Secretary Dean Acheson in a statement made before the National Press Club, Washington, DC on Jan 12, 1950 in essence had given the Soviets a free ride by stating that Korea was outside US interests. Pp. 115-116.
3. Plano, Jack C. and Olton, Roy. The International Relations Dictionary. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 127.
4. US Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. US Policy Toward Eastern Europe. Hearings. 95th Congress. 2d session. September 7 and 12, 1978. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 2.
5. Kissinger, Henry A. American Foreign Policy. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1974), p. 29.
6. Ibid., pp. 29-32.
7. Rachwald, Arthur R. "United States Policy in East Europe." Current History, April 1978, p. 150.
8. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency: 1963-1969. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), p. 471.
9. Kissinger, Henry A. A Strong Foreign Policy for a Confident America. US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1924, May 10, 1976. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 606.
10. Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1961), p. 307.
11. "State Department Summary of Remarks by Sonnenfeldt," New York Times, April 6, 1976, p. 14.
12. Ibid.
13. "US Policy Toward Eastern Europe," op. cit., p. 36.
14. Ibid., p. 73 and p. 118. Comments made by Dr. Charles Gati, Professor of Political Science at Union College, Chairman of the Political Science Department there, and visiting Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, to the Committee on International Relations referenced.
15. US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. US Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Report. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, December 1979), p. 87.
16. Ibid., p. 82.

17. "Yugoslavia After Tito: The Dangers Ahead." US News and World Report, February 25, 1980, p. 35.
18. Brown, Aurel. "Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt." Orbis, Spring 1978, p. 112.
19. Antic Zdenko. "Soviet Naval Commander Visits Yugoslavia." Radio Free Europe Research, September 6, 1976. (RAD Background Report 193).
20. Ibid.
21. Browne, Macolm W. "Yugoslav Dock Yards Repair Soviet Ships." New York Times, February 7, 1977, p. 5, col. 1.
22. Silberman, Laurence. "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism." Foreign Policy, No. 26, Spring 1977, p. 16. Mr. Silberman also gives a skeptical view of Yugoslavia's stand on nonalignment. Very illuminating from his perspective as former Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
- 23./ Antic Zdenko. "Yugoslavia Wants UN Condemning Foreign Interference." Radio Free Europe Research (Yugoslavia), February 5, 1980. (RAD Background Report 26).
24. Pavlovitch, Stevan K. Yugoslavia (New York-Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 224.
25. "US Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," op. cit., p. 181.
26. Ibid., p. 87.
27. Information was gleaned from Table VII. Total Arms Transfers of Major Supplies from 1967-1976 by Recipient Country, p. 157. (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-1976. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978.).
28. Binder, David. "Tito Arrives in US: Sees Carter Today." New York Times, March 7, 1978, p. 11, col. 1.
29. "US Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," op. cit., p. 83.
30. Ibid., p. 81.
31. Burns, Edward M. Western Civilization: Their History and Their Culture. 4th ed., (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1955), pp. 840-841.
32. Johnson, Lyndon B., loc. cit., p. 470.
33. Ibid., p. 471.
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35. "State Department Summary of Remarks by Sonnenfeldt," loc. cit., p. 14, col. 6. Emphasis added.
36. Idem.
37. Kissinger, Henry A. "A Strong Foreign Policy For a Confident America." op. cit., p. 606.
38. Cannon, Lou. "Ford Hits Foreign Policy of Carter, Calls it 'Untried'." Washington Post, October 27, 1976, p. A1, col. 3.
39. Kissinger, Henry A. "Secretary Kissinger Interviews On 'Face the Nation'." US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1951, November 15, 1976, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 606-607.
40. Kissinger, Henry A. "Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27." US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1952, November 22, 1976, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 643.
41. Kissinger, Henry A. "Secretary Kissinger Interview on 'Face the Nation'." loc. cit., p. 609.
42. Kissinger, Henry A. "Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27." loc. cit., p. 644.
43. "Vice President Mandates Trip to Europe." A Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, May 9, 1977, vol. 12-Number 19, pages 623-663. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 647.
44. "Visit of President Tito of Yugoslavia." A Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, March 13, 1978, Vol. 14-No. 10, pages 459-504. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 458.
45. "Yugoslavia After Tito: The Dangers Ahead," loc. cit., p. 35.
46. Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the preceding chapters we have examined the roots of Yugoslav issues and US policy approaches from a historical perspective; looked at the factors most affecting Yugoslavia's stability; examined her military; reviewed her past policies and the impact they have had on Yugoslavia today; and finally, outlined the current American policy toward Yugoslavia. This chapter will conclude by suggesting a policy plan for Yugoslavia and recommend courses of action to meet that policy.

CONCLUSION

There are several basic elements which make up the overall policy of the US toward Yugoslavia and the Balkan/East mediterranean area. They are: our national interests, goals, and objectives in the area. Our national interests should be reflected in the goals we set for the area. The question to be answered is: how would the United States like to see the Yugoslav government move in the future in a manner mutually beneficial to the United States, Yugoslavia, and all other nations in the region and the world? The answer to that question would set the basis for our policy options as a vital component in the US grand strategy. Let us examine each of the three national interests, goals, and objectives separately.

From the preceding evidence, it is apparent that from President Truman to Carter, there has been unanimous agreement that our predominant interest in Yugoslavia stems from her geostrategic position in the region. The interest is generated by the situation created should Yugoslavia return to the Soviet bloc, forcefully or otherwise, and upset the balance of power in the region which would severely impact on our relations with East-West, Middle East, and African

countries. Yugoslavia could, of course, return to Soviet control as a result of invasion or by civil strife leading to the ascendancy of a conformist centralist element in Yugoslav society wishing unity with the USSR. But, from a US national security perspective, our interests and regional security requirements would be mutually served by a stable, independent Yugoslavia. In this regard, a military invasion of Yugoslavia would not be an immediate threat to US security. However, indirectly because of our close ties with Europe and our commitment to NATO security, it would interrupt and upset the balance of power, thus threatening world stability. It has been noted by other international observers that Yugoslavia is one of several countries whose security is of special importance to the United States. Yet there is no formal defense guarantee between the two countries. On the other hand, the US is committed to preserving the independence of Israel, but for other cultural, ethnic, and political affinity reasons. No formal agreement should be reached with Yugoslavia, however, because of her position of nonalignment. Nonetheless, it is primarily in the security area that US national interests are concerned with Yugoslavia, since it is important to sustain and maintain Yugoslavia's independence from destabilizing forces from whatever source, external or internal. In summary, a secure, independent Yugoslavia will help to sustain balance in the Mediterranean.² By the same token, an economically healthy Yugoslav state will lessen the internal pressures and nationalistic tendencies toward destabilization.

It should then be the goal of the United States to sustain and maintain the balance of power in the Mediterranean region and prevent Soviet hegemony in the area for the foreseeable future. Our policies must be designed to continue the relative stability that now exists, notwithstanding Greece and Turkey. In broadest terms, the United States should seek regional peace and

fair treatment for the people of the region in accordance with the United Nations proclamations as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,³ and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.⁴

Given our goals and interests as outlined, the objectives should be:

- (1) contain Soviet hegemonic tendencies in the area;
- (2) discourage Soviet acquisition of air and land bases in Yugoslavia as the base of operation for their projection of power in the region;
- (3) emphasize programs which will strengthen and stabilize the economy of Yugoslavia; and
- (4) express a genuine concern for the peoples of Yugoslavia.

In summary, Yugoslavia should be treated for what she is, a Communist country, independent and seeking the diminution of the two power bloc system in the world today. Our objectives should satisfy our interests by forming a bilateral arrangement beneficial to both.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As part of the United States Bicentennial celebration in 1976, TIME magazine asked various world leaders to share the celebration with the US by addressing the people of the United States through TIME, outlining their views of the United States.⁵ President Tito responded in his "Message to America" article which suggested "Yugoslav faith in further successful development of cooperation, notwithstanding some differences in view and stance." He further added that the lasting principles of Yugoslav foreign policy was "respect for independence" as a criterion of international behavior. The recommendations that follow have as "cornerstone principles": (1) the recognition and fostering of independence for its own sake regardless of ideological beliefs within reasonable bounds of US national security interests; (2) when dealing with "Communist" Yugoslavia, recognize that in supporting a nonaligned stance, there will be disparities of an ideological nature; (3) establish state-to-state

discussions but never compromise US integrity, values, and beliefs regarding fair and equal treatment; and (4) foster bilateral relationships in terms allowing countries to understand the "mutual" gains from an agreement spoken or otherwise, not giving the impression of a unilateral view motivated by self-serving actions. Further with regard to nations who would like to see Yugoslavia return to the Soviet camp, the US should clearly set limits within which the United States will act, and announce them publicly. These limits should be realizable, responsible, and formally agreed upon through Congressional action for consensus. Most importantly, the publically announced limits should be enforced. Provocation is not the aim; honest US support for independent principles and humanitarian concern for all peoples would have a profound impact on all international observers.

In consideration of the above, "cornerstone policies" for the US relationship with Yugoslavia, and the preceding chapters highlighting political, economic, cultural, and ethnic problems, the following actions should be initiated:

Political (Independence/Leader of Nonligned)

1. Make clear to the Soviet Union or any other nation, the United States' strong support for Yugoslavia's independence and national unity and indicate that any attempts to undermine these will be looked upon as most serious. Demonstrate concern for the peoples of Yugoslavia.
2. Encourage and support the "Presidency" as the legal governing body in Yugoslavia.
3. Encourage the European community to respect and establish diplomatic relations in cognizance of nonalignment and not as a member of a power bloc.
4. Reassure the Yugoslavs that any future bilateral agreements such

as SALT, MBFR, etcetera, will not result in "hidden" agreements made by the United States without Yugoslav knowledge.⁶

5. Establish "close" contact with government officials and civic leaders alike.

Economic (Stability)

1. Continue to support Yugoslavia's most-favored-nation status, and access to low-interest loans, eligibility for Export-Import Bank Credits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation backing. Work toward removing the Congressional "mindset" against Yugoslavia as a Communist country.

2. Take actions to assist Yugoslavia to overcome her balance of payments, inflation, hard currency debt, and unemployment problems.

3. Educate and encourage American joint ventures, stressing the efficacy and possibility of new markets, albeit small, in Yugoslavia.

4. Encourage the European community to help investments and trading in Yugoslavia.

Military (Strengthen and Diversify)

1. Within the bounds of the concept of territorial national defense, consider arms sales to Yugoslavia of types of weapons most effective for her concept of defense, to break and diversify her dependency on Soviet arms. This action would translate into supporting Yugoslavia's independence and would establish military contacts.

2. Increase military contacts with the Yugoslav's.

Humanitarian (Concern for the People)

1. Further foster liberalization and democratization by emphasizing the principles of human rights as agreed to by the Yugoslavs at the United Nations and Helsinki.

PROSPECTS FOR YUGOSLAVIA

As developed in this study, Yugoslavia faces difficult political, economic, ethnic, and nationality problems in the post-Tito era. The pressures will be internal as well as external.

Internally, the economic problems of high balance of payments (\$6.3 billion), high inflation (up to 30%), declining growth rates, unemployment (14%), and uneven regional economic development will all bring pressure on the new "Presidency." In addition, the ever-present latent ethnic Serb-Croat, Albanian, and Macedonian issues could surface under a faltering economy. Likewise, border issues with Bulgaria, Albania, and Italy could surface. All of these problems are present and exacerbated by religion, linguistics, and cultural differences. But perhaps decentralization of political and economic decisions to the Republics will backfire and create even greater Republic animosities. There is some evidence to indicate that the Republics are caring for themselves first, and for the interests of the Yugoslav nation second. But then again, history has proven how the Yugoslavs when faced with adversity have banded together and been successful. The original break with the Soviets in 1948 and the subsequent independent stand illustrates that point. However, there does not seem to be any doubt in western analysts minds that pro-Soviet elements in the society will attempt to undermine the new leadership and thrive on the economic, ethnic, and cultural problems.

The toughest problem is the spectre of Russia and her intentions. For many years analysts have been speculating, building scenarios, and theorizing what will happen to Yugoslavia after Tito. One thing is sure: a succession crises will occur. It has been postulated that the Soviets wish a return of Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc for two reasons: (1) to obtain new warm water ports and air bases for Soviet military forces; and (2) to strengthen the USSR's Mediterranean southern flank and gain access to the Middle East and Africa. Either of these ,

were they to come about, require an entire new appraisal by NATO on the East-West balance. Bogdan Denitch, in Journal of International Affairs (Fall/Winter 1978) very succinctly stated the problems created by a successful Soviet military invasion. He said:

Geographically, it would bring the Warsaw Pact forces to the Italian border, cut off Greece and Turkey, put into question the continued independence of Albania, and give the Soviets direct access to Mediterranean ports. Politically it would eliminate the Yugoslav-role within the non-aligned bloc, which is as exasperating to the Soviets as it is to the Washington policy planners.

The above would result if the Soviets took the risk and used military force. However, the real question is, what if anything will Russia do in the post-Tito era? The author believes the Soviets have three choices: (1) maintain the status quo and let the forces of discord work--time is on the side of Russia if the Yugoslavian economy falters badly; (2) directly intervene with military forces for the reasons above--very risky; and (3) indirectly speed up the turmoil internally by economic, political, ethnic, or cultural agitation. The third option would allow the Soviets to enter with military forces in the latter stages of instability under the guise of the "Socialist Protector" role much as she did in Afghanistan. But, the choice to use military forces will depend on:

1. The anticipated reaction of the West, in particular the United States.
2. The Yugoslav Peoples Army, capability, effectiveness, and staying power.
3. The support she can get from pro-Soviet elements in the Yugoslav government and party.
4. The impact it will have on Warsaw Pact countries and nonaligned "Third World" nations.
5. The impact it will have on Western European "Eurocommunists."

Given these choices, and the experience of Afghanistan, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would want to risk provoking the United States and the West. If Afghanistan had any effect it was to heighten awareness and bolster resistance against any such further actions.

In addition, Yugoslavia finds herself in a precarious balancing act with respect to nonalignment. Catering to either bloc will cause Yugoslavia to lose her independence.⁷

What then is the prospect for Yugoslavia? World economic and energy problems will affect Yugoslavia's road to Socialism. First, if the West does not provide markets for the Yugoslavs, she will have to lean to the East. Second, the West is a good source for joint ventures to reduce her high trade unbalance and balance of payments. Third, Yugoslavia must seek other sources of oil than the one-fourth she now receives from the Soviets. Fourth, Yugoslavia's military must become less dependent on the Soviets. All of these moves would be designed to stabilize her economy and move away from bloc dependence.

Next, the pressing question is will the collective leadership rotational system as forged by Tito be able to maintain stability and unity? Can Titoism survive without Tito? As we have indicated the three pillars of strength of the Yugoslav system are the Communist Party (LCY), the government administration of the Presidency, and the guarantor Army. Before he died, Tito was President of the Party Presidium, President of the Republic and State Presidency, and supreme commander of the Army. All of these positions/tasks have been assumed through an orderly succession process devised by Tito. Moreover, each of these positions have been filled by the most important people in Yugoslavia in the Government and Party. Five positions in these agencies are considered the most important. In the Party it is the Chairman

of the CC of the Presidium and the Secretary of the Presidium. In government it is the President of the Presidency. For the Army it is the Minister of Defense and the Chief-of-Staff of the Army. In review let's look at the succession as it occurred in each agency.

Party Succession

In October 1978, when the position of "Chairman of the CC Presidium" was created, they also went to a system of electing from each republic and province, from within the Presidium, a Chairman whose tenure would be one year, and who would assume Tito's party position upon his death. A rotational cycle would be on an eight year period to correspond to the six republics and two provinces, and they would rotate the chairmanship in a prescribed order. Therefore, as it happened, when Tito died on May 4, Stevan Doronjski (Serb, age 61), who was the Chairman, assumed Tito's tasks and responsibilities as President of the LCY.

Another position of importance in the Party is the Secretary of the Presidium. The Secretary is selected for two year terms. The present Secretary is another Serb from Croatia by the name of Susan Dragosavec. He replaced Stan Dolanc who had held the position for eight years and was considered to be gaining too much influence with Tito. Tito replaced him in May 1979, but we haven't heard the last of him, he is considered to be a capable organizer of the Party.

Presidency Succession

In reality, the concept for collective leadership began in the government first in 1971 with two amendments to the constitution. In operation a Vice-president is elected on a yearly rotational basis from the republics and provinces from within the Presidency to succeed Tito upon his death. As it happened, when Tito died, Lazar Kolisevski (Macedonian, age 66) assumed the duties but

then, because the changover month for the Vice-president is May, was replaced by Coljetin Mijatovci (Serb, age 66) from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next President of the Presidency will come from Slovenia (May 1981-1982), followed by Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Macedonia, in order, and then repeated.

Supreme Commander Armed Forces Succession

Upon Tito's death General Nikola Ljubicic (Serb, age 64) assumed the duty Tito held. Originally, in 1971 the plan was to have a military committee (collective) assume Tito's position. The committee was to be composed of the Minister of Defense (Ljubicic) and two others selected from the Presidency; however, when the constitution was finally made binding in 1974, it dropped the presidency members and stipulated that the Minister of Defense assume the job. He is under the constraint that the State Presidency may transfer certain assignments related to the direction and command of the armed forces and he shall be responsible to the Presidency for the conduct of affairs transferred to him (Article 316, S.F.R.Y. Constitution, 1974).

Outlook

Concerning the collective government, for the first two to three years after Tito the "Presidency" will function well. One of the reasons for this has been the inertia of Tito and his long illness which allowed the Presidency to function and grow with Tito still around, albeit in name only. There has never in history been a successful collective leadership in the Balkans, and there will probably not be in this case. A new leader will emerge and the constitution will once again be changed. However, at this time, there does not appear to be anyone on the horizon to meet this speculation. The direction that Yugoslavia will go will depend on the ties that are established during the first critical years after Tito and what lengths the elites of the Western

world are willing to go to in preventing Soviet hegemony. One thing is certain, Yugoslavia, after Tito and the succession, will be far different than with the charismatic, bold, and stately leader. With the passing of Tito, it is extremely unlikely another such unifying figure will rise to hold the nation together. Growing dissent is likely, and the collective leadership alone will be unequal to the task. Strong support, not rhetoric, from the West will be needed if the nation is not to fall prey to the spread of Soviet influence; Moscovs henchmen are already at work. It cannot be overemphasized that support from the West must be visable and sincere. President Carter's absence from Tito's funeral, which was attended by most of the World leaders to include President Brezhnev from Russia, was a mistake in that it sent the wrong signal of Western support. Talk is cheap--actions speak louder than words. The Yugoslav people very much want to have the West as their friends but are caught in the dichotomy of words and trust. Will the West really support Yugoslav independence? When will the West have to support Yugoslavia?

The answers may come sooner than we think. There are indications that external pressures are already beginning. Consider an article in the Washington Post dated March 24, 1980 which is titled, "Yugoslav Exchanges Sharp Words with Soviet Bloc as Tito Remains Ill."⁸ Could this be the beginning?

FOOTNOTES

1. Burt, Richard. "Tito is Taken Seriously, and His Succession Even More So." New York Times, October 16, 1977, sec. IV, p. 4, col. 1.
2. For an excellent view of Soviet interests in the Mediterranean, see Aural Brown "Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia and the Sonnenfeldt," Orbis, Spring 1978, pp. 101-133; and, John C. Campbell, "Communist Strategies in the Mediterranean," Problems of Communism, May-June 1979, pp. 1-13.
3. "The International Bill of Human Rights," Office of Public Information, United Nations: New York, 1978, p. 10 and p. 21.
4. "The Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Part II," Current History, March 1976, p. 131.
5. "Message to America: From Yugoslavia's Joseph Broz Tito." Time, August 23, 1976, p. 26.
6. This recommendation is in response to Tito's concern as expressed the New York Times (Binder, David, "Tito Arrives in US: Sees Carter Today," New York Times, March 7, 1978, p. 11, col. 1.). It has historical roots going back to a meeting at Yalta between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in which a secret agreement was reached between them without consultation with Tito. See Vladimir Pedijre, Tito (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 223.
7. Kronholz, Jean. "After Tito: Yugoslavia Stresses Trade with West to Keep Independence." Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1980, p. 1., col. 1.
8. Dobbs, Michael. "Yugoslavia Exchanges Sharp Words with Soviet Bloc as Tito Remains Ill," Washington Post, March 24, 1980, p. A18.